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1.1 Research Objectives and Methodology 
Marketing research in numerous studies has analyzed a wide variety of instruments designed 
to steer demand for products. For this substantial amount of research, meta-analyses provide a 
systematic overview of each field by summarizing the instruments’ performance as an 
elasticity. Elasticities capture the change in the dependent variable, i.e., sales, induced by a 
change in the marketing instrument by 1 percent. The latest meta-analysis on the relation of 
price and sales by Bijmolt et al. (2005) reports a price elasticity of -2.62 percent, i.e., reducing 
the price of a product by 1 percent increases sales by 2.62 percent. Numerous academic studies 
have assessed the effects of different marketing measures on sales, but we are not aware of any 
study that has identified a measure of importance higher than price changes. The latest meta-
analyses in each field report, e.g., short-term advertising elasticity of 0.12 and long-term 
advertising elasticity of 0.24 (Sethuraman et al. 2011), shelf-space elasticity of 0.17 (Eisend 
2014), and personal selling elasticity of 0.34 (Albers et al. 2010). Thus, these meta-analyses 
have established the relevance of pricing as a major tool for companies to influence sales. This 
strong effect of price changes on sales, combined with the fact that managers can adjust prices 
more quickly than other elements of the marketing mix, such as advertising or product 
attributes (Shugan 2014), make price the most powerful instrument for companies to stimulate 
demand.  
In practice, pricing decisions differ in complexity along the value chain, in particular, when we 
compare manufacturers and retailers. Consider the example of a price reduction. For a 
manufacturer, the price decision about a specific product or brand is typically the result of 
straightforward calculations: introducing a price reduction increases sales that stem from 
increased consumption and brand switchers. To make the price reduction economically 
attractive for the manufacturer, the sales increase must overcompensate for the loss in margin 
introduced by the price reduction (Srinivasan et al. 2004). Retailers, by contrast, typically find 
themselves in a more complex situation. The reason for this is that retailers usually offer 
products from multiple manufacturers, and a price reduction of a single product or brand might 
cannibalize sales of the remaining alternatives (Srinivasan et al. 2004), which the retailer sells 
at different prices and profit margins. Interestingly, previous studies have mainly focused on 
marketing measures for manufacturers, accumulating a substantial amount of research, while 
guidance for retailers is still sparse (Ailawadi and Gupta 2014). Consequently, the aim of this 
dissertation is to shed light on the effects of pricing measures for retailers by contributing to 
relevant research gaps on the impact of price on retailers’ corporate objectives. We focus on 
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sales, revenue, and profit as corporate objectives. While some prominent retailers, e.g., 
Zalando, the largest fashion retailer in Europe, focus on other financial indicators, such as sales 
or revenue (Schröder 2017), standard economic theory assumes that companies are guided by 
profit maximization. However, price research for retailers has so far mainly focused on the 
sales impact of pricing decisions, while the net profit impact of a price change for the retailer 
is largely unknown (Ailawadi and Gupta 2014). Therefore, this dissertation includes 
assessments of the profit impact of pricing decisions by retailers. 
In recent years, the fundamental premises of retailing have changed, as online shopping has 
heavily disrupted the retail market. This new environment has the potential to substantially 
impact the performance of pricing. The most substantial disruption concerns the informational 
environment: with the emergence of online retailing, transparency across stores and retailers 
increases to the point that customers have better access to information when making purchase 
decisions (Granados et al. 2012). This information is of central relevance for pricing, as the 
retail environment is typically characterized by an information asymmetry that is advantageous 
to the retailer, since retailers are better informed about their products. Thus, when making 
purchase decisions, customers perceive risk (Cox and Rich 1964; Murray 1991). More broadly, 
customers perceive risk in any purchase decision since they cannot foresee if the anticipated 
value of the acquired product will materialize, since a product might not be able to satisfy the 
specific customer’s consumption goal. In online settings, this perceived risk of purchases is 
even higher than for traditional shopping experiences (Lee and Tan 2003). A key reason for 
this is related to the product itself, that is, “concerns about the quality and suitability of the 
product” (Forsythe et al. 2006, p. 61). In contrast to traditional shopping, customers may not 
experience haptic and optic product features first hand, and they are unable to consult in-store 
sales representatives. In this context for both parties, retailers and customers, risk reduction is 
advantageous to facilitate purchases (Connelly et al. 2011). In order to reduce the perceived 
risk, on the one hand, retailers (and manufacturers) provide information about their products 
(Kirmani and Rao 2000), while, on the other hand, customers actively search for information. 
The Internet facilitates access to such risk-reducing information for customers, e.g., via price 
comparison websites, product reviews, or simply by not having to travel to different stores to 
compare prices. Because of this combination of increased information, easier access, and lower 
search costs in e-commerce than in traditional settings, the early literature on online pricing 
anticipated that the online market had the potential for becoming a perfect market (Bakos 
1997). In theory, increased transparency and complete availability of price information should 
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result in higher price elasticities, which in turn lead to lower price levels, with prices 
converging to marginal costs (Ghose and Yao 2011).  
At the same time, online shops profit from the cost-efficiency of digital shelf space compared 
to their offline counterparts, often leading to a much broader assortment online (Grewal et al. 
2010). With an increasing number of brands in one category, the similarity of products grows, 
resulting in customers having to face the agony of choice. Other marketing-mix variables than 
price, such as advertising messages, are of little help for overwhelmed customers and rarely 
allow substantial differentiation between brands (van Heerde 1999). Therefore, price is an 
instrument to differentiate between products. On top of that, the online setting even exacerbates 
the ease of price adjustments, as no adjustment of physical price tags is required; i.e., menu 
costs are smaller.  
Thus, theory suggests that strong competition and high price transparency characterize e-
commerce, which would decrease prices and increase price elasticities.  
Extant empirical results do not report evidence of a perfect market online. More interestingly, 
they do not even offer full support for the theoretical reasoning outlined above, i.e., that the 
online market is closer to a perfect market than the offline market. As noted above, a shift 
toward perfect competition would materialize in lower prices, lower price dispersion, and 
stronger price elasticities. First, following Granados et al. (2012), empirical evidence on 
whether the actual selling prices are lower online than offline is still mixed. Research by 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) analyzing books and CDs, by Brown and Goolsbee (2002) for 
life-insurance products, by Brynjolfsson et al. (2003), again focusing on books, and by 
Zettelmeyer et al. (2006) for automobile retailing, provide evidence of lower prices online. On 
the contrary, a recent large-scale study by Cavallo (2017) finds online and offline price levels 
to be identical 72 percent of the time based on a data set from multichannel retailers. Other, 
predominantly older, studies find higher prices online: Bailey (1998) reports an online premium 
for books, software, and CDs, while Lal and Sarvary (1999) offer an analytical model that 
describes the conditions under which higher prices emerge. Second, while in a perfect market, 
only one price would exist, i.e., price dispersion would be low, research reports price dispersion 
to be significant (see Bolton et al. (2006) for an overview of findings). Additionally, the limited 
research on information search shows that even with low online search costs, customers invest 
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limited time, resulting in low search efforts (Johnson et al. 2004).1 Finally, empirical evidence 
on price elasticities in online environments is mixed. On the one hand, Chevalier and Goolsbee 
(2003) for books, Ellison and Ellison (2009) for memory modules, Ghose and Yao (2011) for 
transactions of the Federal Supply, and Granados et al. (2012) for airline ticket sales, report 
strong elasticities online. On the other hand, several authors report less price sensitivity online. 
Degeratu et al. (2000) find promotion-induced price sensitivity to be lower online than offline. 
Andrews and Currim (2004) corroborate lower price sensitivity online for groceries. From a 
household perspective, Chu et al. (2008) and Chu et al. (2010) show that consumers are less 
price-sensitive online.  
Hence, against the background of this stream of previous research, the current state of academic 
knowledge provides no clear guidance for retailers regarding pricing decisions online. While 
theoretically the online marketplace should show stronger competition, higher price 
sensitivities, and lower prices, empirical research provides mixed results. As a consequence, 
online retailers often operate with existing offline-proven measures in order to influence online 
sales, while being unsure about the effects. Since retailers “are often operating on razor-thin 
margins” (Bolton et al. 2006, p. 255), it is worthwhile not only shedding light on the effects of 
pricing measures on sales and revenue but also assessing their impact on profit in online 
retailing.  
We analyze pricing in online retailing under the overarching theme of a new informational 
environment. First, the central relation of price and sales, revenue, and profit is in focus. We 
assess the impact of price changes, in the form of temporary price reductions, against the new 
informational background of the online environment. Afterwards, we take on two different 
perspectives to this central relation: on the one hand, we focus on the moderation of this relation 
by information provided by the retailer, in the form of an offline-proven instrument, namely, 
advertised reference prices. On the other hand, we analyze the moderation of this relation by 
online product reviews, which provide information beyond such retailer-provided information 
and which are a new phenomenon introduced by the Internet.  
In practice, for retailers, price reductions commonly materialize in the form of temporary price 
reductions, i.e., price promotions, and these price reductions will be the focus of this research. 
Many studies have analyzed the effect of price changes and price promotions on brand sales 
 
1 Johnson et al. (2004, p. 299) find that “[o]n average, households visit only 1.2 book sites, 1.3 CD sites, and 1.8 
travel sites during a typical active month in each category.” 
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for manufacturers. Much less, however, is known about the impact of price changes and price 
promotions on retailer’s sales, revenues, and profits, while, to the best of our knowledge, no 
study to date has addressed the profit implications of online promotions for online retailers, 
although facilitated information access online might influence the performance of these price 
reductions. By considering the profit impact of price reductions for online retailers this 
dissertation follows a recent research priority by The Marketing Science Institute2 (2018) that 
calls for a channel-specific assessment of the performance of online price reductions. We 
address this research gap through three steps: first, we estimate a demand model including 
heterogenous brand-specific elasticities. In a second step, we utilize these brand-specifically 
estimated elasticities to derive the net quantity impact of a price reduction and multiply the 
quantity impact by brand-specific and week-specific prices and profit margins to obtain the 
revenue and profit impact of a price reduction. In the last step, we relate the change in the 
retailer’s sales, revenue, and profit to characteristics of the brand on promotion with a focus on 
profit. Thus, our analysis, which is joint work with Dominik Papies, addresses the following 
research questions:  
(1.1) What are the brand-specific effects of price promotions on online retailers’ sales, 
revenue, and profit? 
(1.2) Which brand- and promotion-specific factors affect the sales, revenue, and profit 
impact of price promotions?  
After the assessment of this central relation of pricing in online retailing, we focus on the 
moderation of this relation by information provided by the retailer. When customers can 
quickly search for information themselves, the informational value of price cues provided by 
the retailer on the specific website might diminish. We focus on advertised reference prices to 
analyze whether information provided by the retailer is still capable of influencing customers’ 
purchase decisions online. Advertised reference prices are prices that retailers display in 
combination with a lower actual selling price to make the offer appear more attractive by 
influencing the reference point against which customers evaluate it (Compeau and Grewal 
1998; Mazumdar et al. 2005). Offline, existing research found advertised reference prices to 
 
2 The Marketing Science Institute (MSI) is a non-profit organization with a strong network of leading marketing 
academics and practitioners and aims to align marketing science and practice. In a biennial process, the MSI 
gathers information from its network to set priorities that are supposed to advance marketing research. According 
to these priorities, the MSI finances academic research that attempts to positively impact marketing practice 
(Marketing Science Institute 2019). 
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be a powerful measure to increase purchase intentions (Mazumdar et al. 2005). Online, 
advertised reference prices are characterized by strong prevalence, continuous display, and 
rising public media coverage due to their potentially deceptive usage (Streitfeld 2016a, 2016b; 
Bartz 2017; Wisoff 2017). Based on a literature review, we identify four aspects, which we 
address with our analyses to advance existing knowledge on advertised reference prices.  
First, while advertised reference prices are generally supposed to impact purchases positively, 
if they appear with high frequency, or if they are constantly displayed, their impact might 
diminish (Compeau and Grewal 1998; Ailawadi et al. 2006). We aim to address this 
contradiction by analyzing the effects of advertised reference prices in an online shop which 
continuously displays advertised reference prices. Additionally, to clearly differentiate 
between the effects of advertised reference prices and temporary price reductions we 
concentrate on manufacturer-suggested retail prices, since displaying a manufacturer-
suggested retail price is not temporarily restricted. 
Second, while the majority of the existing literature focuses on offline settings, the theory 
suggests that online the premises for advertised reference prices have changed as a result of 
facilitated information access. The facilitated information access of the online environment 
might influence the performance of advertised reference prices since customers can check 
competitive prices online with just one click. Hence, the information conveyed by advertised 
reference prices might be substituted. As existing research on advertised reference prices online 
is scarce and the findings are mixed (Jensen et al. 2003; Lii and Lee 2005), we aim to add to 
the knowledge on advertised reference prices in online settings by analyzing advertised 
reference prices in an online shop.  
Since both, the first and the second aspect outlined above, might induce a diminishing impact 
of advertised reference prices on sales, they lead to the following research question: 
(2.1) Do manufacturer-suggested retail prices have an impact on sales-related variables 
online? 
The third aspect focuses on the credibility of advertised reference prices online. Offline 
research finds that even implausible and inflated advertised reference prices impact purchase 
decisions positively (Urbany et al. 1988; Biswas and Blair 1991; Compeau and Grewal 1998). 
Online, improved information access, in combination with increasing awareness of potentially 
deceptive prices, could affect the impact of the credibility of advertised reference prices on 
sales. Hence, we assess this relation by asking the following exploratory research question: 
1. Introduction 
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(2.2) How does the credibility of a manufacturer-suggested retail price impact sales 
online?  
Fourth, if with lower credibility the effect of the advertised reference price on sales decreases, 
since it is not perceived as a credible signal, the actual selling price might gain importance (or 
vice versa). To the best of our knowledge, existing research has not yet assessed the moderation 
of price elasticities by the credibility of advertised reference prices, although this might mirror 
the main impact of credibility on sales explored in research question 2.2. Thus, in order to gain 
insights into the interplay of the actual selling price and the credibility of the advertised 
reference price, we explore the moderation of the actual selling price by the credibility of the 
advertised reference price. 
(2.3) Does the credibility of a manufacturer-suggested retail price moderate the impact 
of the actual selling price on sales online? 
Following the research priority published by the Marketing Science Institute (2018, p. 4) to 
assess “how customers’ increasing reliance on price can be attenuated in order to improve 
margins,” we show the revenue and profit impact for different degrees of credibility of 
advertised reference prices.  
Finally, we change the perspective and analyze whether information that is not fully under the 
control of the retailer, namely, online product reviews, can change the impact of price on sales. 
Customers use online product reviews heavily to reduce their perceived risk. According to a 
recent survey, 93 percent of respondents3 consider reviews to have an impact on their purchase 
decisions (Podium 2017). This might substantially impact the role of price. For example, for 
products with many and positive reviews, the perceived risk of the investment could decrease, 
to the point that price is a less relevant factor for this product and thereby decreasing the impact 
of price changes on sales. Therefore, we assess whether this information changes the impact of 
price on sales and, hence, whether retailers should include such information in their pricing 
strategies.  
Product reviews convey information via three dimensions (Chintagunta et al. 2010). First, they 
convey it via the average rating referred to as valence, which displays the level of satisfaction 
other customers derive from the product (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2008; 
Kostyra et al. 2016). Second, they provide information via volume, which is the number of 
 
3 A total of 2,005 respondents took part in the survey in 2017 (Podium 2017). 
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reviews other customers have provided for the specific product (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; 
Duan et al. 2008; Kostyra et al. 2016). Third, variance conveys information on the spread in 
average reviews (Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Sun 2012). These review dimensions are signals 
of the products’ quality and therefore have the potential to change the perception of risk 
involved in the purchase for the customer (Erdem et al. 2002; Kostyra et al. 2016), which in 
turn might moderate the impact of price on sales.  
A considerable amount of research has already analyzed online product reviews; however, the 
findings are still mixed, and the role of prices has mostly been neglected. To address these 
issues, we propose to comprehensively integrate existing research on product reviews and 
pricing research. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to interact all three review 
dimensions with price and ask the following research questions:  
(3.1) Do valence, volume, and variance moderate the impact of price on sales? 
(3.2) Do valence, volume, and variance – individually and comprehensively – have an 
impact on sales?  
Again this dissertation follows the research priority by the Marketing Science Institute (2018) 
by assessing profit impact and identifying pricing strategies for a retailer to counteract the 
impact of a change in valence, not only on sales and revenue but also on profit. 
To address our research questions, we collect data from a large European online retailer with 
more than five million active customers and more than one billion euros in revenue in 2017. 
The retailer offers a large variety of products including, for example, groceries, electronics, 
and accessories across multiple countries in Europe. The full data set comprises five years and 
seven countries with different informational attributes. The data provides both a product 
perspective and a customer perspective. Based on the most recent meta-analysis on price 
elasticities, we focus on demand models. Following Bijmolt et al. (2005, p. 151), “price 
elasticities are largely independent of whether consumer heterogeneity is modeled” while they 
differ across product categories. In addition to the above-described transaction data, we include 
data from a laboratory online experiment. Finally, we follow Gneezy (2017) in her call for field 
experiments and conduct a field experiment with the same online retailer.  
Based on the seven research questions described above, this dissertation attempts to contribute 
to current research gaps in online retail pricing and to add to the understanding and implications 
of pricing decisions for practitioners by assessing whether and how to account for the online 
environment in pricing decisions. The following section provides an outline of the dissertation.  
1. Introduction 
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1.2 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation sets out to answer the research questions described above structured along 
four chapters. We depict the connection between these chapters in Figure 1.1. 
Subsequent to this introduction, Chapter 2, which is joint work with Dominik Papies, focuses 
on research questions 1.1 and 1.2 by analyzing the impact of price reductions on sales, revenue, 
and foremost profit. The chapter follows three steps. Initially, we estimate a demand model 
using a Bayesian multi-level approach. The resulting parameters then serve as a basis to 
generate the unit impact of a price reduction, i.e., the monetary impact of a price reduction in 
euros. Finally, we offer correlates to explain the differences in monetary impact. The results 
are discussed considering both existing offline research and managerial implications. 
Chapter 3 follows an exploratory approach to answer research questions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 and 
sheds light on advertised reference prices as a marketing measure for online retailers. We 
approach the research questions with a unique combination of three empirical studies based on 
an online experiment, a field experiment, and a large transaction data set. We analyze data with 
Bayesian and frequentist models and add a sales and profit impact calculation to assess the 
profitability of changes in the advertised reference price. We summarize the exploratory 
findings from all three studies, juxtaposing and discussing their impact for researchers and 
practitioners. 
Chapter 4 asks whether online product reviews moderate the impact of prices on sales by 
merging research on product reviews and pricing. We test seven hypotheses to answer research 
questions 3.1 and 3.2 on the moderating effect of product review dimensions on price, as well 
as on the main effects of these dimensions on sales. The study further provides scenarios, in 
which we assess whether retailers can counteract the sales impact of changes in product reviews 
with a pricing strategy. After empirical testing of the seven hypotheses we discuss our findings 
and consider the implications for research and practice.  
Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation, with a discussion of the overarching findings, as well as 
limitations and suggestions for future research.  
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the Dissertation 
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2.1 Introduction 
More and more retail dollars are spent online and the sales volume in e-commerce is steadily 
increasing (Miller and Washington 2017). While some popular examples such as Amazon 
suggest that this also leads to a similar surge in profits, many online retailers in fact generate 
poor or even negative profits. One prominent example is the German online retailer Zalando, 
which is struggling to grow its profits despite strong growth in sales and revenue (McGee 2017; 
Buck 2018). In such an environment, the pricing decisions of retailers are likely to be of critical 
importance for at least two reasons. First, pricing decisions directly affect the margin at which 
products are sold. Second, it is well established that price changes have a strong and immediate 
effect on brand sales (e.g., Bijmolt et al. 2005), and the strong impact of price promotions on 
sales has been studied in great detail (e.g., van Heerde et al. 2003). One key finding from this 
research is that price and promotion elasticities with respect to sales are much larger than, e.g., 
advertising elasticities. Much less, however, is known about the impact of price changes and 
price promotions on profits. This observation in particular holds true for retailers, where the 
effects of price promotions are largely unclear (Ailawadi and Gupta 2014). This dearth of 
research and knowledge concerning retailing and profit is surprising because strategic pricing 
decisions are more complicated for retailers than for manufacturers. The reason for this is that 
retailers usually carry a large number of products that compete against one another (Levy et al. 
2004; Grewal et al. 2010), which implies that a price promotion on one product may lead to a 
sales increase at the retailer for this product that comes entirely from other brands in the same 
store, leading to a net effect of zero. What’s more, for most firms, profit, and not sales, is the 
ultimate long-term goal that ensures survival. In support of these considerations, Ailawadi et 
al. (2009, p. 50) state that the “few recent studies that have considered the profit impact of 
promotions show that it can be quite different from sales impact, so more research is needed in 
this area.”  
This dearth of research is due to the fact that, so far, only a few studies have analyzed the 
impact of price promotions on retailer profits, and we see two important voids in this literature 
stream. First, to the best of our knowledge, no research on the profit impact of promotions uses 
recent data or considers the online context, which is at odds with the fact that consumers are 
spending more and more retail dollars online. Second, the few studies that analyze the profit 
impact of price promotions either make the assumption that all brands in a category – be they 
large or small, high- or low-priced – have equal contribution margins for the retailer (Ailawadi 
et al. 2006), or they assume that different brands do not differ in manufacturer allowances 
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(Srinivasan et al. 2004). We argue that it is important to use brand-specific contribution 
margins for profit calculations. Let us consider the case of a promotion on a high-margin brand. 
If this promotion draws sales primarily from competing low-margin brands, the profit impact 
for the retailer is more beneficial compared to a situation in which it draws sales from high-
margin competing brands. As Figure 2.1 shows, the data we use in this study exhibits 
substantial heterogeneity in retailer margins across brands, which highlights the relevance of 
accounting for this heterogeneity. Hence, the profit impact of a price promotion might differ 
substantially from its sales impact. We therefore contribute to the literature by addressing these 
voids and by shedding light on the question of the impact of price promotions on (online) 
retailer’s profit and how this assessment depends on the consideration of brand-specific 
contribution margins and allowances. More specifically, we will address the following research 
questions:  
(1.1) What are the brand-specific effects of price promotions on online retailers’ sales, 
revenue, and profit? 
(1.2) Which brand- and promotion-specific factors affect the sales, revenue, and profit 
impact of price promotions?  
To answer these questions, we obtain a unique data set with weekly brand-level sales of the top 
ten brands in four categories across four countries during a five-year period until September 
2017 from a large European online retailer with more than five million active customers and 
more than one billion euros in revenue in 2017. Relying on a Bayesian multi-level model, we 
analyze within-category own and cross effects of promotions, accounting for brand-specific 
contribution margins and brand-specific manufacturer allowances. The results suggest that 
price promotions are, on average, unprofitable for the retailer that we analyze, and this 
unprofitability arises primarily as a result of the reduction in margins, and to a lesser degree 
because of brand-switching.  
In the next section, we outline our contribution to the literature. In Chapter 2.3, we describe the 
framework, before describing the data and the empirical analysis in Chapter 2.4. We provide a 
discussion in Chapter 2.5. 
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Figure 2.1: Average Brand-specific Profit Margin 
 
2.2 Related Literature and Contribution 
2.2.1 Online Pricing Decisions  
For bricks-and-mortar settings it is well established that a price reduction leads to a substantial 
sales increase of the price-reduced, focal brand. The most recent meta-analysis in this field 
reports an average own-price elasticity of -2.624 (Bijmolt et al. 2005). This strong effect, 
combined with the fact that managers can adjust prices more quickly than other elements of 
the marketing mix, such as advertising or product attributes (Shugan 2014), make prices and 
price promotions a go-to marketing instrument to stimulate demand.  
It is probable that the online channel emphasizes these characteristics of price as a marketing 
instrument because, e.g., menu costs are smaller (e.g., no adjustment of price tags). In addition 
to the ease of price adjustments, online shops profit from the cost-efficiency of digital shelf 
space compared to offline shelf space, leading to a broader and deeper assortment being 
available online (Grewal et al. 2010). On top of that, online retailers typically operate without 
 
4 For groceries with a high stockpiling propensity, elasticities are closer to zero (Bijmolt et al. 2005). 
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regional restrictions and draw their customers from the entire market because travel costs are 
eliminated, which is likely to increase competition in the online domain. Combined with the 
fact that online shoppers face much lower search costs than shoppers in bricks-and-mortar 
setting, the early literature on online pricing saw the potential in the Internet for a perfect 
market (Bakos 1997). In theory, increased transparency and complete availability of price 
information should result in higher price elasticities, which in turn leads to lower price levels, 
and prices in such a perfect market should converge to marginal costs (Ghose and Yao 2011).  
Thus, theory suggests that the online market place is characterized by higher competition and 
higher price transparency, which would drive prices down and price sensitivity up. If this is the 
case, it is likely that online retailers operate at lower margins, which in turn makes it more 
likely that price promotions in the online domain will be unprofitable. 
So far, empirical evidence on the question of whether the price level5 online is different from 
that offline is mixed. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) find lower prices in the life-insurance 
industry resulting from online price comparisons that reduce search costs. The authors base 
their findings on an extensive data set covering 1992 to 1997. In contrast, Cavallo (2017) finds 
online and offline price levels to be identical 72 percent of the time based on a large-scale data 
set of multi-channel retailers covering December 2014 to March 2016. Regarding search costs, 
based on individual-level panel data, Johnson et al. (2004) show that the search effort is rather 
limited, with customers visiting only 1.2 to 1.8 sites during a one-month period. 
Empirical evidence on price elasticities in online environments is also mixed. Chevalier and 
Goolsbee (2003), Ellison and Ellison (2009), Ghose and Yao (2011), and Granados et al. (2012) 
report strong elasticities online. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) find online price elasticities 
ranging from -3.5 to -0.45 for books. Ellison and Ellison (2009) estimate price elasticities for 
memory modules, for which price search engines are influential in the sales process. They find 
that some products are extremely price-sensitive with price elasticities of up to -33.1. Ghose 
and Yao (2011) estimate online and offline price elasticities for transactions of the Federal 
Supply Services in the U.S. in 2000. The online elasticity of -1.47 is stronger than the offline 
market’s elasticity of -0.84. Granados et al. (2012) compare the price elasticities of online and 
offline airline ticket sales based on data from September 2003 until August 2004. Online 
demand is more elastic than offline demand. However, they find online price elasticities to 
 
5 Empirical evidence on the price level is mixed, while empirical evidence on price expectations online points in 
the direction of lower expectations than offline. 
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depend on the channel and customer group ranging between -0.89 and -2.28, while offline 
elasticities are in the range of -0.34 and -1.33. More price-sensitive customers self-select in the 
online channels, accounting for 22 percent of the elasticity difference between online and 
offline. In contrast, several authors report less price sensitivity online. Based on grocery data 
from 1995 to 1997, Degeratu et al. (2000) find promotion-induced price sensitivity to be lower 
online than offline. Andrews and Currim (2004) support this notion that online consumers are 
less price sensitive than offline consumers of groceries using panel data from 1995 to 1997. 
From a household perspective, Chu et al. (2008) show that the same household has lower price 
sensitivity when shopping online for groceries than offline. Chu et al. (2010) underline the 
findings that consumers are less price sensitive online. The authors base their analyses in both 
studies on data from the early 2000s. 
Against the background of this stream of previous research, we conclude that the online 
marketplace should in theory show stronger competition, higher price sensitivities, and lower 
prices. Empirical evidence in support of this theory, however, is not unambiguous. These 
characteristics of the online marketplace suggest that it is important to consider how the 
profitability of price promotions fares in the online market place. 
 
2.2.2 Profit Impact of Price Reductions 
Within the wide field of studies considering the impact of price reductions, we focus on those 
studies that analyze profit (see Table 2.1). All five studies are based on offline data from the 
U.S. The most recent data set used in these studies is 16 years old (Ailawadi et al. 2006), while 
the others are based on data from the 1980s and 1990s. Two out of five studies (Srinivasan et 
al. 2004; Dawes 2012) rely on the data set of Dominick’s Finer Foods, which is a former U.S. 
grocery chain based in the Chicago area. The profit calculations based on this data set, as well 
as the data set used by Mulhern and Leone (1991), include brand-specific wholesale prices but 
no manufacturer funding. Ailawadi et al. (2006) and Walters and MacKenzie (1988) do not 
include brand-specific margins for cross effects but assume an average margin for the 
competing brands. Most studies focus on a small subset of brands, e.g., assessing the profit 
impact of private-label brands (Dawes 2012).  
Walters and MacKenzie (1988) start this stream of research by applying a structural equation 
model to analyze the store profitability of two grocery supermarkets using weekly data, 
including specific margin information from the years 1983 to 1985. They focus on the impact 
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of three different promotional schemes (loss leader, in-store price specials, and double 
couponing) on profit, sales, and traffic. The results indicate that, depending on the promotional 
scheme, profit is affected in diverse ways. For loss leaders, profit is impacted through traffic 
rather than sales, and for couponing the opposite is true, while in-store price specials have no 
impact. As a result, they highlight the importance of building store traffic. Brand-specific 
analyses are not part of their study, as they take on a category perspective.  
Mulhern and Leone (1991) focus on the impact of cross-category relations on profit with a 
demand model in log sales. Two complementary categories with four brands each from a 
grocery chain are analyzed. For each category, a system of seemingly unrelated regressions on 
brand level is estimated. The analysis reveals both substitution effects within category, as well 
as complementary effects across categories. The authors use cost data on wholesale prices 
without promotional allowances. Importantly, they do not consider a second-stage regression 
to obtain factors that drive profitability. 
Srinivasan et al. (2004) take a more holistic view by quantifying and explaining the impact of 
price promotions on both manufacturer and retailer revenue, as well as retailer traffic and 
profits, using a vector autoregressive model. Their data source is the database of Dominick’s 
Finer Foods (DFF). The authors include weekly scanner data from 1989 to 1994 in 21 
categories. The focus is on the three best-selling brands per category. In line with literature, a 
positive impact of promotions on retailer and manufacturer sales is found. Regarding revenue, 
promotions are more attractive to manufacturers than to retailers as a result of a strong post-
promotion dip for retailers. The vector autoregressive models on retailer category margin 
reveal a negative impact for most brands. In a second stage, the authors explain those effects 
using brand and category characteristics. For retailer margins, market share, promotional 
frequency, and promotional depth, they identify a negative association with profit. The authors 
consider wholesale prices but no promotional allowances, which are now a major component 
in the promotional relationships between manufacturers and retailers. According to the authors, 
promotional support by manufacturers started in 1994; therefore, they restrict their data to the 
period ending in 1994.  
Ailawadi et al. (2006) take on a decompositional approach on promotion level using scanner 
data from CVS, a major US drug retailer, from the year 2003. The promotional sales increase 
is decomposed into its components, i.e., consumption from other periods, other stores, and 
other brands, as well as a cross-category effect (halo effect). For the CVS data, the authors find 
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that 45 percent of the gross lift comes from brand switching within the store, which is not 
considered as being incremental. For those brand-switching movements, the authors use an 
average category margin, i.e., not considering margin differences per brand. Another 10 percent 
comes from future periods, and the remaining 45 percent is considered to be incremental lift 
coming from other stores, new users, or increased consumption. Additionally, a positive cross-
category impact is found. Most of the promotions are not profitable for the retailer. 
Furthermore, the decomposition restricts brand switching to substitution. Potential 
complementary or category expansion effects are found in the halo effect. The profit impact of 
the halo effect is calculated using the average store margin. For profit, cross-brand impact is 
substantial (Ailawadi et al. 2006). In a second-step regression Ailawadi et al. (2006) analyze a 
high number of correlates, for which they find opposing effects for sales versus profit. “Deep, 
featured promotions on high ‘consumer-pull’ brands generate high net unit impact, but they are 
also the ones for which the retailer's promotional margin is substantially lower than regular 
margin, resulting in lower net profit impact” (Ailawadi et al. 2006, p. 520). In line with 
Srinivasan et al. (2004), net profit impact, discount depth, and share have a negative effect on 
profit, although Ailawadi et al. (2006) include promotional funding by manufacturers. 
Dawes (2012) focuses on promotional impact on a more granular level, with a demand model. 
The authors analyze cannibalization between different sizes of the same brand based on the 
same data and time period as Srinivasan et al. (2004). Regarding profit, the focus is on the 
private-label brands of the retailer alone. The authors report a negative impact of promotions 
on private-label profits.  
Study 
Observation 
Period 
Number  
of  
Brands 
Online 
Brand- 
specific 
Margin Incl. 
Allowances  
Brand-
specific 
Margin for 
Cross Effects 
Data  
Origin 
Profit 
Drivers 
Walters and 
MacKenzie (1988) 
1983–5 
Not 
specified 
- Yes - 
USA,  
Midwest 
- 
Mulhern and 
Leone (1991) 
1986–8 8 - - - 
Regional  
data 
- 
Srinivasan et al. 
(2004) 
1989–94 63 - - Yes 
USA,  
Midwest 
Yes 
Ailawadi et al. 
(2006) 
2003 
177 
categories 
- Yes - USA Yes 
Dawes (2012) 1989–94 16 - - Yes 
USA,  
Midwest 
- 
This study 2012–17 160 Yes Yes Yes 
4 European 
countries  
Yes 
Table 2.1: Literature Overview on Price Promotions' Profit Impact 
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Given the substantial changes in retailing in recent decades (e.g., online retailing, the surge in 
private labels, the increasing relevance of manufacturer allowances), we add to the existing 
literature by including the growing importance of temporary price reductions and considering 
correlates of the monetary impact of such price promotions. On top of that, we seek to 
overcome existing limitations in the literature and base profit calculations on brand-specific 
margins for cross effects, including manufacturer allowances.  
2.2.3 Correlates of Promotional Impact 
A number of existing studies link price elasticities to market, brand, or category characteristics 
(see an overview in Fok et al. 2006, p. 445). However, only two studies discuss the correlates 
of revenue and profit: Ailawadi et al. (2006) analyze the correlates of net unit impact and 
Srinivasan et al. (2004) examine the correlates of elasticities. We select correlates based on 
these two existing studies, as well as data properties. As a result of its novel online setting, our 
analysis remains exploratory. 
Brand Size 
The size of a brand, i.e., the share of units sold of a given brand in the respective category, has 
been found to have an impact on both own and cross effects. Larger brands are commonly more 
heavily advertised, increasing the probability of customers switching from other brands and 
other stores (Krishna 1992). For own price elasticities, Bolton (1989) finds high-share brands 
to be more price-inelastic, based on store-level scanner data. Bemmaor and Mouchoux (1991) 
underpin this finding with experimental data, and Vilcassim and Jain (1991) with household 
panel data. For cross-price elasticities, asymmetric relations regarding brand share are 
documented. The asymmetry concerns the impact on each other, i.e., that price reductions on 
high-share brands reduce sales of smaller brands, while reductions on smaller brands affect 
sales of high-share brands to a lesser degree (see, for example, Sethuraman (1995, p. 284) in 
the context of national and private-label brands). Sethuraman and Srinivasan (2002) show that 
the relation reverses when considering absolute impact compared to the elasticity approach. 
However, in their study category expansion is excluded from consideration (Sethuraman and 
Srinivasan 2002). Regarding profit impact, Ailawadi et al. (2006) and Srinivasan et al. (2004) 
report that a higher market share of a brand leads to a lower impact on category profit. This 
finding is in line with the notion that large brands exert stronger market power, thereby offering 
less manufacturer funding for the retailer. 
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We add line length as a further attribute of brand size, which has not yet been studied in the 
context of correlates. The number of products sold under one brand name represents the line 
length. We positively associate line length with brand size, expecting analogous results. 
Price Level 
The effects of brands in different segments or tiers on one another have been generalized in a 
meta-analysis by Sethuraman et al. (1999). The asymmetric price effect describes that price 
reductions of higher-priced brands have a larger impact on the market share of lower-priced 
brands than vice versa. A stronger effect holding for both elasticities and units is the 
neighborhood effect, i.e., “brands that are closer to each other in price have larger cross-price 
effects than brands that are priced farther apart” (Sethuraman et al. 1999, p. 23). Regarding 
profit, only Ailawadi et al. (2006) include a brand’s relative price, reporting a positive impact, 
i.e., price reductions on high-priced brands drive category profit. 
Private Label 
One of the reasons for retailers to sell private-label products is to skip the manufacturers in the 
value chain and thereby generate higher profits. Ailawadi et al. (2006) report a strong positive 
impact of store brands on profits, while Srinivasan et al. (2004) find no significant effect. 
Price Range 
Raju (1992) shows that deeper discounts increase elasticity on category level, and Fok et al. 
(2006) report the same effect on brand and category level. For a retailer, a higher price 
reduction leads to a smaller profit margin given no increase in manufacturer financing. 
Srinivasan et al. (2004) find that promotional depth has a negative impact on the total 
promotional elasticity on both retailer revenue and margins, and this finding is corroborated by 
Ailawadi et al. (2006). The price range of a brand captures all price changes within the brand 
thereby it also illustrates the promotional depth. 
Frequency of Promotions 
The theory and the empirical findings deliver contradictory results on the impact of the 
frequency of price reductions. On the one hand, a high frequency of promotions leads to price-
conscious customers, who buy more items on sale (Mela et al. 1997). On the other hand, 
reference prices might be reduced over time, leading to less effective discounts (Kalyanaram 
and Winer 1995). For sales, Fok et al. (2006) find a significant impact on brand level, meaning 
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that high frequency causes smaller elasticities, and no effect on category level. Nijs et al. (2001) 
report a contrary effect on category level. These mixed findings are reflected in profit research. 
Ailawadi et al. (2006) find a positive impact, while Srinivasan et al. (2004) report a negative 
impact.  
Intensity of Promotions 
With respect to promotions, we additionally include the intensity of promotions of a brand, i.e., 
the share of items of a brand that is on promotion compared to the promotion share within the 
associated category. Ailawadi et al. (2006) report that promotions on a greater share of items 
in a category increase the net sales impact, while they decrease the net profit impact. Srinivasan 
et al. (2004) do not include this correlate. Table 2.2 summarizes the empirical findings on the 
correlates of revenue and profit. 
 Ailawadi et al. (2006) Srinivasan et al. (2004) Consistent 
Profit Impact 
Across Studies 
 Sales Profit Revenue Profit 
Brand Size + - + (n.s.) - Yes 
Price Level - + Not incl. Not incl. Unclear 
Private Label - + - (n.s.) + Yes 
Price Range + - - - Yes 
Promotion Frequency - + + - No 
Promotion Intensity + - Not incl. Not incl. Unclear 
Table 2.2: Overview of Existing Empirical Findings on Correlates of Revenue and Profit 
We add to the limited and mixed knowledge on the correlates of promotional performance, as 
we rely on existing studies concerning variable selection and aim to deepen our understanding 
of correlates. Based on the correlates we offer guidelines for promotion setting. On top of that, 
to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the correlates of sales, revenue, and 
profit in an online context.  
2.3 Framework 
Our framework, which we show in Figure 2.2, consists of three main parts. In the first step, we 
estimate response elasticities. To this end, we estimate a demand model with a focus on the 
brands’ own price effect, the cross-price effects, and potential carry-over effects that may arise 
as a result of, e.g., stockpiling. A core theme of the empirical approach is that we allow all 
brands in our data set to have heterogeneous own-price elasticities and heterogeneous cross-
2. Looking beyond Sales – Promotion Impact on Profit in Online Retailing 
 
23 
 
price elasticities, i.e., we allow all elasticities to vary across brands. The result of step 1 is a set 
of elasticities, which we then utilize in step 2. 
In step 2 we utilize the previously estimated elasticities to calculate the net effect of a change 
in promotional price by 1 percent on unit sales for the retailer. This net effect includes the 
contemporaneous demand reaction for the focal brand, potential dynamic effects (e.g., 
stockpiling), and cross-effects from other brands. By multiplying the unit sales by prices that 
vary over time and brands, we obtain the revenue effect. By multiplying the revenue effect with 
the margin, which again varies over brands and time, we obtain the profit impact for the retailer 
if a brand is on promotion. 
In the third and last step, we relate the change in the retailer’s sales, revenue, and profit, 
respectively, to characteristics of the brand on promotion. Here, we cover potential factors that 
have been used in previous research on promotion profitability.  
  
Note: The cross impact of brand i is the sum of the changes in sales, revenue, or profit of all other brands within 
the same category induced by a change in the actual price of brand i.
6
 
Figure 2.2: Framework 
 
6 IPF = inter-purchase frequency. The subscript it-IPF indicates that the variable is lagged by the brand-specific 
inter-purchase frequency (IPF).  
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2.4 Empirical Study 
2.4.1 Data Description 
Our data set comprises weekly sales and price data from an online retailer without any physical 
stores, and the data set includes data from four European markets. The transactional data covers 
the five-year period from September 2012 until September 2017. We select the four categories 
that show the highest turnover rate at this online retailer. The products are groceries with high 
stockpiling propensity. In each category and each country, out of those brands selling at least 
one item in each week of the five-year period, we include the top ten brands in terms of sales. 
The top ten brands account, on average, for 88 percent of sales per category. In sum, we cover 
a total of 160 country–category–brand combinations. 
For each brand, we aggregate the actual prices of items to the brand level using constant sales-
based weights before taking the log (Srinivasan et al. 2004). We calculate the sales-based 
weight for a specific item of a brand by cumulating the sales of this specific item over the entire 
five-year period and dividing these cumulated sales by the total sales that the respective brand 
cumulates over the same period. We account for different package sizes using price per kg sold. 
As we are interested in brand-level elasticities to derive the brand-specific correlates of price 
promotion impact, the aggregation to brand level does not limit our results. 
The original data set contains only the actual price. To differentiate between promotional and 
regular prices, we make use of a nominal variable included in the data set flagging the 
promotion status of an item. We determine a brand’s regular price based on the brand’s share 
of items flagged as being on promotion in each week, so that the regular price is the actual 
price of the surrounding five weeks with the minimal promotion share. To measure promotional 
price elasticities, we use a price index, i.e., the actual divided by the determined regular price. 
Using a price index allows for cross-category comparison while measuring the size of the 
promotion (Fok et al. 2006). To control for cross-price effects, we include the respective 
average cross-price indices across all competing brands. The products that the retailer sells are 
measured in weight (kg), and we aggregate across items per brand in a category. Hence, our 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the total weekly unit sales (in kg) of each brand in each 
category (see Table 2.3 for descriptive statistics). In Table 6.1 in the Appendix, we provide a 
correlation table that shows the bivariate correlations between all variables that we use in the 
first step of our analysis. 
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Country 
Cate- 
gories 
Brands 
 Actual Price in € per kg   Sales in kg  Promotion Share 
 Mean sd Min. Max.  Mean sd Min. Max.  Mean sd Min. Max. 
A 4 40  5.40 2.50 1.79 15.05  2,622    4,890    3    46,889    0.09  0.10    0.00 0.77    
B 4 40  3.77 1.76 1.55 12.76  4,251    3,914    61    23,389    0.14    0.11    0.00 0.60    
C 4 40  3.94 1.69 1.26 10.65  1,636    2,172    1    17,595    0.16    0.13    0.00 1.00    
D 4 40  3.71 1.63 1.41 11.19  1,806    2,609    2    25,282    0.13    0.13    0.00 0.88    
Total 16 160  4.20 2.05 1.26 15.05  2,579    3,709    1    46,889    0.13    0.12    0.00 1.00    
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.2 Model 
We use a multi-level demand model in logs to analyze the own and cross effects of temporary 
promotional price changes on sales at brand level within one category and one country. This is 
the first step of our analysis. We include promotional, regular, and cross-price variables as 
explanatory variables, i.e., the current and lagged7 promotional price index of brand i, the 
current regular price of brand i as well as the average of the price-indices of the competing nine 
brands in each category: 
 
We utilize the hierarchical model structure and account for brand heterogeneity in the following 
ways. First, we include random brand-specific intercepts. Second, to account for heterogeneous 
customer responses to changes in price, we estimate brand-specific own-price elasticities. In 
the case of I different brands, this leads to I different price elasticities. Furthermore, we control 
for seasonal variation in sales. To account for possible seasonality, we include random 
 
7 We include a lagged promotional price index based on the brand-specific inter-purchase frequency (IPF). 
Price index = log (Price/regular Price). 
log(Quantity)it =αBrandi+αQuarterq+  β1i* log(Promotional Price Index)it  
+ β
2i
* log(Promotional Price Index)it-IPF + β3j* log(Cross Price Index)it  
+ β4 ∗ log(Regular Price)t +β5* log(Category Quantity)t + εit  
(2.1) 
   
αBrand ~ normal (μBrand, σBrand) β1i ~ normal (μ1, σ1) β2i ~ normal (μ2, σ2) β3j ~ normal (μ3, σ3)  
μBrand ~ normal (0, 1) μ1 ~ normal (-1, 3) μ2 ~ normal (1, 3) μ3 ~ normal (0.3, 3)  
σBrand ~ normal (0, 1) σ1 ~ normal (0, 1) σ2 ~ normal (0, 1) σ3 ~ normal (0, 1)  
     
αQuarter ~ normal (μQuarter, σQuarter) β4 ~ normal (μ4, σ4)    
μQuarter ~ normal (0, 1) β5 ~ normal (μ5, σ5)    
σQuarter ~ normal (0, 1)     
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intercepts, each covering 12 consecutive weeks. We choose the period of 12 consecutive weeks 
to generate the best model convergence. Unit root tests show that sales series are stationary.8  
The second step of our analysis concerns calculation of the promotional impact on sales, 
revenue, and profit. For this analysis, we use the estimated coefficients from the first step to 
predict the change in unit sales for brand i that occurs after a 1 percent decrease in the actual 
price of brand i in t, and in t-IPF.9 We denote these changes in unit sales as the own-sales 
impact (in t, t-IPF). We derive the cross effects in the same manner, i.e., given a price reduction 
of brand i, we sum up the difference in units sold of all other brands in the category except for 
brand i. This amount is the cross-sales impact of brand i in the respective category. Importantly, 
for revenue and profit, we multiply sales with brand- and time-specific prices and contribution 
margins. To obtain the category net impact for each brand, we add the own and cross impact 
of the price reduction. This gives us the full category net impact of a 1 percent price reduction 
after considering all cross effects and the reduced margin of the price-changing brand. We 
repeat this across all weeks of our observation period and use this predicted impact on unit 
sales, revenue, and profit as the dependent variable in a second regression to assess how brand 
characteristics affect the impact of price reductions. 
2.4.3 Demand Model Estimation 
We estimate the demand model using Bayesian estimation with No-U-Turn sampling (Stan 
Development Team 2017). We set generic, weakly informative hyperpriors and priors normally 
distributed at location 0 and spread 1 for the intercepts. Based on extensive existing research 
on price elasticities, we set negative hyperpriors for the promotional price index, and positive 
hyperpriors for the lagged promotional price index and the cross-price index. We estimate 16 
chains and base the posterior results on a total of 64,000 draws, of which we use the first 32,000 
for warm-up. All chains are well converged and mixed with a potential scale reduction factor 
(?̂?) of close to 1 (see last column in Table 2.4) (Gelman et al. 2013). 
 
8 We test stationarity with the Phillips-Perron test. The null hypothesis of the Phillips-Perron test, that x has a unit 
root, i.e., that it is non-stationary, is rejected at 0.01. 
9 IPF = inter-purchase frequency. For each customer we calculate a brand-specific purchase frequency. We derive 
the number of weeks between the first and the last order of each customer and divide this by the number of orders 
of this specific brand by this specific customer. The average of all customer-specific purchase frequencies for one 
brand gives us the brand-specific inter-purchase frequency, which we use to lag the promotional price index. We 
exclude all orders conducted by customers who only bought once from the calculation of the inter-purchase 
frequency. 
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2.4.4 Results 
Table 2.4 shows the results of the demand model estimation. The second column of Table 2.4 
reports the posterior means; the mean promotional price elasticity (-2.30) is the mu of the 160 
estimated brand-specific posterior price elasticity means. Figure 2.3 shows the heterogeneity 
of promotional price index coefficients. As expected, posterior means of the promotional price 
index coefficients are below zero and elastic, such that a promotional price decrease induces a 
sales increase. One brand constitutes an exception with a positive own-price elasticity; 
however, this coefficient is not significant. Furthermore, we do not find a stockpiling effect 
based on the brand-specific inter-purchase frequency, as the coefficient is small and exhibits 
low significance levels indicated by the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles of the posterior interval in 
parentheses in column 2 of Table 2.4. This interval clearly includes zero for the lagged 
promotional price index. 
 Coefficient μ Number of Coefficients ?̂?  
Promotional Price Index -2.30 (-2.63; -1.96) 160 1.00 
Promotional Price Index t-IPF -0.01 (-0.26; 0.23) 160 1.00 
Cross Price Index 0.54 (-0.06; 1.15) 160 1.00 
Regular Price -2.80 (-2.88; -2.73) 1 1.00 
Category Sales 0.75 (0.73; 0.77) 1 1.00 
Intercept Brand 1.57 (-0.11; 3.45) 20 1.11 
Intercept Quarter 1.87 (0.00; 3.53) 160 1.11 
Note: Posterior mean followed by 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles of posterior interval in parentheses. 
Table 2.4: Posterior Means of Coefficients 
 
The cross-price elasticities of the average cross-price index within category are relatively 
strong, with a mu of 0.54. While a recent meta-analysis shows an average cross-price elasticity 
of 0.26 (Auer and Papies forthcoming), we find stronger substitutional relations in this online 
data set. Cross-price coefficients display a more diverse picture, including substitutive and 
complementary brand relations within category (Figure 2.4), meaning that a price reduction 
might increase or decrease sales of competitive brands. 
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of Posterior Means of 160 Promotional Price Indices  
 
Figure 2.4: Histogram of Posterior Means of 160 Cross Price Effects 
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We estimate the regular price elasticity as homogenous across brands, and we obtain a posterior 
mean of -2.80. The magnitude of this coefficient, relative to the promotional price elasticity, is 
unexpected, being stronger than the mu of the hierarchically estimated posterior mean of the 
promotional price elasticity. Existing research offers mixed findings on regular price 
elasticities. Fok et al. (2006) find strong dispersion in regular price elasticities, including both 
positive and negative regular price elasticities. Jedidi et al. (1999) show that, in the case of 
long-term promotions, consumers are more sensitive to changes in regular price and less 
sensitive to promotional price discounts. 
Further results include substantial brand-specific dispersion. Hence, the introduction of a 
brand-specific varying intercept accounts for the brand-specific heterogeneity.  
2.4.5 Promotional Impact Calculation 
We use the estimated posterior means of coefficients to derive the impact of a 1 percent 
promotional price reduction on quantity, revenue, and profit of a category. 
First, we separately reduce the actual price as part of the promotional price index of brand i in 
t and in t-IPF by 1 percent to compute changes in the quantity sold of brand i induced by the 
price of brand i (see Table 2.5, rows one and two). We calculate the net revenue and profit from 
those units by multiplying each brand’s quantity with the respective week- and brand-specific 
prices and profit margins. We repeat this process for every week and every brand in our data 
set.  
We capture within-category cross effects using the estimated cross-price elasticity of the 
average cross price index per category. To this end, we compute the quantity change of each 
of the competing nine brands when the price of the focal brand in the average cross price is 
reduced (Table 2.5, row 3 displays the sum of the quantity impact of the nine competing brands 
within category). For revenue and profit we again multiply each brand’s quantity with the 
respective week- and brand-specific prices and margins. Hence, the cross impact of the focal 
brand i is the sum of the quantity changes of the nine competing brands within the same 
category and country induced by a 1 percent price reduction of the price of brand i. We derive 
“impact” as the difference between the sales (revenue/ profit) predicted from actual prices and 
the sales (revenue/ profit) predicted after a 1 percent price reduction. 
The results of this calculation, averaged across weeks and brands, are shown in Table 2.5. The 
columns show the effect of a 1 percent price promotion on sales, revenue, and profit, 
respectively. The rows represent the own impact, the lagged impact, the cross impact, and the 
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total across these three effects. In column one and row one, we see the own impact of a 1 
percent price promotion, measured in units. This suggests that, on average, sales increase as a 
result of the negative own-price elasticity when a brand is on promotion. This positive effect 
is barely affected by stockpiling, and somewhat reduced because of cannibalization effects, 
i.e., the price promotion for the focal brand also draws demand from competing brands. The 
net category impact is also positive, which is evidence of a primary demand increase due to the 
price promotion, i.e., total demand at the retailer increases as a result of the price promotion.  
A similar picture emerges for the case of revenue. We again find a positive impact due to the 
own-price effect, and negative effects due to substitution effects across brands. The net effect, 
however, is still positive.  
For the case of profit, the results are different. The own impact is negative, i.e., decreasing 
prices reduces profit, even before we consider substitution effects across brands. The total 
effect on profit is also negative, and substantial. Table 2.5 displays the means across all weeks, 
brands, categories, and countries.  
 Sales Net Revenue Profit 
Own impact in t 62.53 (-0.14; 357.36) 118.01 (-54.11; 728.88) -60.44 (-294.78; 0.23) 
Own impact in t-1 1.33 (-58.15; 68.42) 2.67 (-188.28; 198.67) 0.66 (-24.64; 29.48) 
Cross impact -12.41 (-97.23; 31.16) -43.51 (-307.57; 100.9) -5.17 (-41.32; 14.68) 
Net category impact 51.46 (-50.86; 365.56) 77.17 (-267.17; 752.19) -64.96 (-309.14; 7.06) 
Note: 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of impact based on 250 random draws in parentheses. 
Table 2.5: Average Unit Sales, Net Revenue, and Profit Impact of 1 Percent Promotional Price Reduction across 
160 Brands 
While, on average, the impact of sales and revenue is positive and the profit impact of a price 
reduction is negative, there is considerable variation resulting from the estimation over brands 
and weeks. To show the heterogeneity resulting from the estimation, we simulate the sales, 
revenue, and profit impact of 250 randomly selected draws, i.e., we repeat the brand- and week-
specific calculation of the unit impact 250 times with 250 randomly drawn coefficients. The 
2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the sales, revenue, and profit impact of these 250 randomly selected 
draws are displayed in parentheses in Table 2.5. For example, in row 1, column 1 of Table 2.5 
we present the average unit increase of 62.53 kg across all brands and weeks due to a 1 percent 
price reduction, followed by the information about the distribution in parentheses. 2.5 percent 
of the simulated brand- and week-specific unit impacts are smaller than -0.14 kg, while 97.5 
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percent of these are smaller than 357.36 kg. Figure 2.5 highlights this distribution of unit impact 
for row 1, column 1 of Table 2.5.  
 
Figure 2.5: Own Sales Impact per Brand 
The x-axis of Figure 2.5 shows the 160 brands sorted by size of the mean unit impact. For each 
brand, the mean unit impact is vertically surrounded by the 2.5 percent quantile below the mean 
and the 97.5 percent quantile above the mean. The red horizontal line highlights the unit impact 
of zero. Figure 2.5 underlines that the impact of a price reduction on the brand’s own sales is 
mostly positive, while only few of the 2.5 quantiles drop below the zero line. 
Table 2.6 shows these graphs for each of the cells of Table 2.5, with each graph sorted by size 
of the mean impact of the specific cell. Table 2.6 highlights that, while the simulation 
corroborates the directions of own, cross, and net effects, it exhibits substantial dispersion for 
the insignificant stockpiling effect. 
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Table 2.6: Sales, Revenue, and Profit Impact by Brand 
2.4.6 Understanding the Impact of Brand-specific Margins 
An important contribution of this paper lies in our ability to consider brand-specific margins. 
To explore the value of brand-specific margins, in both the own effects and the cross effects, 
we assess whether the results change if we apply a constant margin as the average across all 
contribution margins that we observe in a given category. Table 2.7 shows the results of this 
assessment and displays the differences in profit impact. Using a category margin leads to a 
slight overestimation of the negative cross impact, an underestimation of the negative own 
impact, and an underestimation of the total impact.  
 
 Sales Net Revenue Profit 
Own impact in t 
   
Own impact in t-IPF 
   
Cross impact 
   
Net impact 
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 Profit 
 Brand-specific Margin Constant Category Margin 
Own impact in t -60.44 -56.00 
Own impact in t-1 0.66 0.44 
Cross impact -5.17 -6.03 
Net category impact -64.96 -61.58 
Table 2.7: Average Profit Impact of 1 Percent Promotional Price Reduction with Brand-Specific Versus Constant 
Margin 
 
Importantly, however, the results differ greatly across brands. Figure 2.6 shows the relative 
deviation of the net profit impact calculated with a constant margin, compared to the net profit 
impact calculated with brand- and time-specific margin by brand.10   
 
 
Figure 2.6: Deviation of Profit Impact with Constant Margin from Profit Impact with Brand-specific Margins 
 
 
10 Four brands with very strong deviations are removed for visual presentation.  
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The graph indicates that for roughly one-third of the brands, the net profit impact for the retailer 
is similar when constant margins are used, compared to brand-specific margins. For one-third, 
we observe an overestimation of the profit impact of up to 100 percent, and for another third, 
we observe an underestimation of up to 50 percent. This analysis highlights that brand-specific 
margins are extremely important if a retailer seeks to analyze for which brands promotions 
enhance or hurt a retailer’s profit.  
2.4.7 Robustness Check 
One unexpected finding from the above analysis concerns the insignificance of stockpiling 
effects, meaning that price reductions in the past do not influence current sales significantly. 
Of the 160 lagged price elasticities estimated in the main model, for only four brands the effects 
are positive and do not include zero in the posterior interval, and for two brands the effects are 
negative without including zero in the posterior interval. To assess whether this finding is 
idiosyncratic to the specific model specification chosen, we conduct a robustness check. In this 
chapter we re-estimate the model with a different constellation of lagged promotional price 
index variables. While the main model includes the promotional price index lagged by the 
brand-specific inter-purchase frequency, including only this specific week as a lagged variable, 
we now estimate a wider range of weeks to capture the stockpiling effect. We use the average 
inter-purchase frequency across all brands after excluding one-time customers, which is 13.5 
weeks. To capture more information on potential stockpiling effects the robustness check 
includes lags from week t-1 up to week t-14. To limit the number of parameters to be estimated, 
we average neighboring weeks. For example, instead of including the promotional price index 
lagged by one week and lagged by two weeks separately, we calculate the average of the two 
and include this average as variable in the model indicated by the subscript t-1.5. Hence, this 
robustness check includes seven lags of the promotional price index, covering 14 weeks. With 
the exception of this adjustment, the model equation and the priors and hyperpriors remain 
similar to Equation 2.1. We estimate the stockpiling effect with heterogeneous, brand-specific 
coefficients, i.e., for each of the seven lags we estimate 160 brand-specific coefficients. 
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Table 2.8 shows the results of this robustness check. The second column reports the posterior 
means followed by the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles of the posterior interval.  
Coefficient μ 
Number of 
Coefficients 
?̂? 
Promotional Price Index -2.28 (-2.59; -1.97) 160 1.00 
Promotional Price Index t-1.5 -0.14 (-0.58; 0.30) 160 1.00 
Promotional Price Index t-3.5 -0.10 (-0.53; 0.32) 160 1.00 
Promotional Price Index t-5.5 -0.09 (-0.52; 0.33) 160 1.00 
Promotional Price Index t-7.5 -0.04 (-0.45; 0.38) 160 1.00 
Promotional Price Index t-9.5 -0.07 (-0.52; 0.39) 160 1.00 
Promotional Price Index t-11.5 0.08 (-0.43; 0.59) 160 1.00 
Promotional Price Index t-13.5 0.15 (-0.36; 0.66) 160 1.00 
Cross Price Index 0.53 (-0.04; 1.12) 160 1.00 
Regular Price -2.71 (-2.78; -2.63) 1 1.00 
Category Sales 0.75 (0.74; 0.77) 1 1.00 
Intercept Brand 1.65 (-0.27; 3.47) 160 1.14 
Intercept Quarter 1.68 (-0.15; 3.62) 20 1.14 
Note: Posterior mean followed by 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles of posterior interval in parentheses. 
Table 2.8: Robustness Check – Posterior Means of Coefficients 
We initially focus on the lagged promotional price indices. A significant positive parameter for 
the promotional price index variable lagged by t-n indicates stockpiling, meaning that a price 
reduction in t-n decreases sales in t. Thus, if stockpiling takes place, customers buy more of 
the price-reduced brand in t-n, not to increase immediate consumption of the brand, but to stock 
log(Quantity)it = αBrandi+ αQuarterq+  β1i* log
(Promotional Price Index)it    
+ β
2i
* log(Promotional Price Index)it-1.5 +  β3i* log(Promotional Price Index)it-3.5 
+ β
4i
* log(Promotional Price Index)it-5.5 + β5i* log(Promotional Price Index)it-7.5  
+ β
6i
* log(Promotional Price Index)it-9.5 + β7i* log(Promotional Price Index)it-11.5   
+ β
8i
* log(Promotional Price Index)it-13.5 + β9j* log(Cross Price Index)it  
+ β
10
* log(Regular Price)t + β11* log(Category Quantity)t + εit  
(2.2) 
   
αBrand ~ normal (μBrand, σBrand) β1i ~ normal (μ1, σ1) β2i - 8i  ~ normal (μ2-8, σ2-8)  
μBrand ~ normal (0, 1) μ1 ~ normal (-1, 3) μ2-8 ~ normal (1, 3)   
σBrand ~ normal (0, 1) σ1 ~ normal (0, 1) σ2-8 ~ normal (0, 1)   
     
αQuarter ~ normal (μQuarter, σQuarter) β9i ~ normal (μ9, σ9) β10 ~ normal (μ10, σ10)  
μQuarter ~ normal (0, 1) μ9 ~ normal (0.3, 3) β11 ~ normal (μ11, σ11)  
σQuarter ~ normal (0, 1) 
 
σ9 ~ normal (0, 1)    
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it and consume it over time. The robustness check reveals that the posterior means of lags 1.5 
to 9.5 are negative, while the lags closest to the inter-purchase frequency, namely, lags 11.5 
and 13.5, are positive. However, the posterior interval displayed in parentheses in Table 2.8 
includes zero for all lags. Since for lags 1.5 to 9.5 slightly more of the posterior density is below 
zero, we can tentatively conclude that a negative effect is more likely than a positive effect. In 
contrast, for lags 11.5 and 13.5 more of the posterior density is above zero, such that a positive 
effect is slightly more likely than a negative effect. Hence, at very low levels of probability, 
there is some spillover after the price reduction, meaning that people buy more one week after 
the price reduction and slightly stockpile in the weeks closer to the inter-purchase frequency. 
Furthermore, the size of the posterior means is larger than the coefficient of 0.01 in the main 
model. We illustrate all 160 coefficients for each of the lagged variables, in total 1,120 
coefficients, in Figure 2.7.  
 
 
Figure 2.7: Robustness Check – Histograms of Posterior Means of Lagged Coefficients 
The red vertical line in Figure 2.7 is set at zero, splitting the graph into negative and positive 
coefficients. The histograms reveal some outliers with strongly positive as well as negative 
elasticities and show the slight shift to more positive values with increasing lags. 
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The remaining variables are robust to the new operationalization to capture stockpiling. The 
mean promotional price elasticity is -2.28, which is very similar to the elasticity of -2.30 in the 
main model. Figure 2.8 shows the heterogeneity of promotional price index coefficients. Again, 
the distribution closely resembles the main model (Figure 2.3). Furthermore, corroborating our 
previous findings, the new posterior mean of the cross-price elasticities differs by only 0.01 
from the previous model, with a similar distribution displayed in Figure 2.9. Finally, the regular 
price elasticity is again stronger than the promotional price index. 
 
Figure 2.8: Robustness Check – Histogram of Posterior Means of Promotional Price Indices 
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Figure 2.9: Robustness Check – Histogram of Posterior Means of Cross-Price Indices 
In sum, the robustness check adds to our understanding of stockpiling, as we find signals for 
decreasing sales as the price reduction approaches the inter-purchase frequency. However, the 
evidence is not strong, since for 1,042 out of 1,120 estimated coefficients the posterior interval 
includes zero. At the same time, the adjusted model specification corroborates the findings of 
the main model regarding the remaining parameters. 
2.4.8 Correlates of Sales, Revenue, and Profit Impact  
The results from the first two steps that we report above suggest that online promotions are, on 
average, financially disadvantageous to the online retailer. However, the results also show that 
there is substantial heterogeneity across brands, i.e., for some brands, we see strong negative 
effects, while for other brands, the effects are less negative. We hypothesize that the brand-
specific outcomes will vary predictably along brand and promotion characteristics. Based on 
the existing literature, we analyze a broad set of correlates of net sales, revenue, and profit 
impact, i.e., we consider five brand characteristics (brand size, line length, price level, private 
label, price range) and two characteristics that are related to the brands’ promotional activities 
(promotion frequency, promotion intensity). Table 2.9 provides an overview of the variables 
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that we use in this regression. Table 6.2 in the Appendix, provides a correlation tables that 
shows the bivariate correlation between all variables that we use in this regression. 
 
Brand Characteristic Operationalization Mean (SD) Min. Max.  
Brand Size 
Ø weekly brand sales
Ø weekly category sales
 0.10 (0.09) 0.01 0.59 
 
Line Length Number of items sold per brand 52.53 (43.92) 1.00 370.00  
Price Level 
Ø brand price
Ø category price
− 1 0.00 (0.37) -0.58 1.13 
 
Private Label Private label = 1 0.12 (0.32) 0.00 1.00  
Price Range 
max. brand price – min. brand price
Ø brand price
 0.33 (0.21) 0.07 1.16 
 
Promotion Frequency 
Number of weeks - no-promo weeks
Number of weeks
 0.72 (0.27) 0.00 1.00 
 
Promotion Intensity 
Share of items per brand on promo
Ø share of items in category on promo 
 1.00 (0.98) 0.00 10.00 
 
Table 2.9: Operationalization of Correlates 
We measure brand size as the quotient of brand-specific weekly sales and total weekly category 
sales. The number of products sold under one brand name represents the line length. The price 
level of a brand is the weekly brand price divided by the weekly mean category price. A 
dichotomous variable indicates whether a brand is a private-label brand. We compare the 
spread between the maximum and minimum price of a brand across all weeks with its mean 
price to generate price range as an indicator for the depth of price reductions. We include the 
share of weeks with items on promotion to indicate promotion frequency. Additionally, the 
ratio of the weekly share of items of a brand on promotion compared to the weekly promotion 
share within the category captures promotion intensity.  
The data set contains the estimated weekly net sales, net revenue, and net profit impact per 
brand. We analyze the impact of 160 brands and each week so that the data set comprises 
38,887 data points for sales, revenue, and profit each. 
To understand the relation between these variables and the brand- and week-specific sales 
(revenue/ profit) impact of a price promotion, we estimate a model in which the sales (revenue/ 
profit) impact of a promotion serves as the dependent variable, and the factors summarized in 
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Table 2.9 are the regressors. We again use random intercepts per brand i, include country 
dummies c and category dummies j, and select the correlates that we described in Chapter 
2.2.3.11  
We again use a Bayesian approach (Stan Development Team 2017) and set generic, weakly 
informative priors normally distributed at location 0 and spread 1. We estimate 16 chains with 
2,500 iterations each, so that we base the posterior results on a total of 40,000 draws, of which 
we use the first 20,000 as warm-up. Again, all chains are well converged and mixed with a 
potential scale reduction factor (?̂?) of (close to) 1. We summarize the main results in Table 
2.10. 
 Sales Net Revenue Profit 
Brand Size 0.412 (0.402; 0.422) 0.398 (0.388; 0.409) -0.385 (-0.396; -0.374) 
Line Length 0.271 (0.259; 0.282) 0.320 (0.308; 0.332) -0.311 (-0.323; -0.299) 
Price Level -0.088 (-0.104; -0.072) 0.021 (0.005; 0.038) -0.068 (-0.084; -0.051) 
Private Label -0.017 (-0.145; 0.110) -0.033 (-0.158; 0.091) -0.026 (-0.159; 0.108) 
Price Range 0.053 (0.044; 0.061) 0.123 (0.115; 0.133) -0.073 (-0.083; -0.064) 
Promotion Frequency -0.026 (-0.036; -0.016) 0.048 (0.038; 0.058) -0.003 (-0.014; 0.007) 
Promotion Intensity 0.004 (-0.003; 0.011) 0.003 (-0.004; 0.011) -0.001 (-0.008; 0.007) 
Note: All variables are standardized. Posterior mean followed by 2.5 and 97.5 quantiles of posterior interval in 
parentheses. We print the mean in bold if the 95-posterior interval excludes zero. 
Table 2.10: Posterior Means of Correlates of Promotion Impact 
We find that brand size is positively associated with the impact of a price promotion on sales 
and revenue, i.e., the larger the brand, the larger the gain in terms of category volume and 
revenue. For profit, however, we observe the opposite, i.e., the larger the brand, the more 
detrimental the impact with regard to profit. This finding is in line with previous research 
(Srinivasan et al. 2004; Ailawadi et al. 2006), and it underscores an important dilemma that 
retailers face when deciding on price promotions: depending on their goals, it may help or hurt 
them to promote large brands. It helps top-line results such as sales and revenue, but it hurts 
profits. Hence, we support existing empirical research in that large brands have the power to 
 
11 We estimate using standardized variables. 
Impact
it
= αBrandi + β1*Countryc
 + β
2
*Category
j
+ β
3
* Brand Size cij+ β4* Line Lengthcijt  
+ β
5
*  Price Range
cij
+ β
6
* Price Levelcij + β7* Private Labeli  
+ β 
8
* Promotion Frequency cij + β9* Promotion Intensitycijt+ ϵit  
 
(2.3) 
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draw sales to a brand, while the reduction in profit margin due to the price reduction removes 
the positive effect. 
A similar picture emerges for line length. Running promotions on brands that feature a long 
product line helps sales and revenue, but it also hurts profits. This variable has not been 
considered in previous research, and therefore we cannot compare the findings with previous 
research.  
Concerning the price level of a brand, Ailawadi et al. (2006) report a negative sales and a 
positive profit impact, while we find a negative impact on both sales and profit, i.e., for high-
priced brands, the impact on sales and profit is more negative than for low-priced brands, while 
revenue is positively affected. One potential explanation for this finding is that a high price 
level for a given brand does not necessarily translate into high margins for the retailer. It is 
possible that the relative margin for high-priced brands is lower than that for low-priced brands.  
For private labels, our results suggest that the impact of a price promotion on category volume 
and revenue is smaller compared to national brands, and this finding is in line with previous 
research. We note, however, that these effects should be treated with caution, as the posterior 
interval includes zero. For profit, our findings deviate from previous research because we 
cannot replicate the positive effect that Ailawadi et al. (2006) and Srinivasan et al. (2004) find. 
The mean of the posterior distribution is negative, but the interval clearly includes zero, so we 
view this result as inconclusive.  
We further support previous findings on the positive sales impact of price range. We compare 
price range to the promotional depth variable used by Ailawadi et al. (2006) and Srinivasan et 
al. (2004). We find that, the wider the price range, the higher the sales and revenue impact. In 
contrast to Srinivasan et al. (2004), our results show a positive impact for revenue as well, 
while the negative relation with profit is in line with previous studies.  
We assess two characteristics that are related to the brands’ promotional activities. Promotion 
frequency indicates that the more weeks that a brand includes items on promotion, the lower 
the sales, while revenue is positively affected. For profit the results are inconclusive. Within a 
given week, promotion intensity indicates the share of items of a brand on promotion, compared 
to the category average. However, the effects of promotional intensity remain inconclusive 
with respect to sales, revenue, and profit.  
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 Sales  Revenue  Profit 
 
Previous 
Research This Study  
Previous 
Research This Study  
Previous 
Research This Study 
Brand Size + +  (+) +  -/- - 
Line Length  +   +   - 
Price Level - -   +  + - 
Private Label - (-)  (-) (-)  +/+ (-) 
Price Range + +  - +  -/- - 
Promotion Frequency - -  + +  +/- (-) 
Promotion Intensity + (+)   (+)  - (-) 
Note: Previous research lists results from Ailawadi et al. (2006) and/or Srinivasan et al. (2004). Entries in 
parentheses indicate insignificant results.  
Table 2.11: Comparison of Estimation Results with Previous Research 
2.5 Conclusions, Implications, and Limitations 
In this study we assess the profitability of price reductions in online retailing, considering 
brand-specific contribution margins and manufacturer allowances. We analyze a unique 
transactional data set that spans five years from a large online retailer across four countries, 
four categories, and 160 brands in total. We find significant promotional price index elasticities 
in a range close to offline elasticities. Hence, as in offline studies, price reductions lead to sales 
increases of the focal brand. From a managerial perspective, despite the ubiquity of information 
online, price reductions are still capable of steering demand. Managers can therefore use price 
reductions, for example, to attract demand to grow a specific brand or to empty inventories if 
perishable goods approach the expiry date. At the same time, strong cross-price elasticities with 
high dispersion and the posterior mean twice as strong as the most recent meta-analysis shows 
(Auer and Papies forthcoming), suggest strong competition between brands within category. 
Managers of retailers can use this information on cross relations, for example, in the case of 
delivery difficulties. Faced with delivery difficulties, retailers can try to shift demand to other 
brands in the category in order to prevent harm from customers being disappointed with long 
delivery times. In such a case, managers can use the opportunity to steer demand to other brands 
in the category through price increases of the brand that is currently not available and/or price 
reductions of substitutive brands in the same category.  
In contrast to offline studies, we do not find strong stockpiling effects, although the products 
in the data set can be stockpiled. We conduct a robustness check, and the results of this test are 
suggestive of stockpiling effects; however, these effects are largely insignificant. For retailers, 
this is a very positive effect, since they do not sacrifice future sales at regular profit margins 
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for increasing current sales at reduced margins. A reason for this effect might be higher 
purchase frequency at lower basket size, since there is no effort of travelling and carrying 
involved in online shopping. Increasing purchase frequency with lower basket size, however, 
would be less beneficial for the retailer, since handling and shipping costs lower the profit 
margin. From a managerial perspective, the insights on stockpiling can change promotional 
planning by retailers. Usually, manufacturers and retailers set up a promotion plan for a specific 
period of time, which details the promotions. If there are fewer stockpiling effects, retailers 
have more freedom in compiling the promotion plans of different manufacturers within a 
category.  
Furthermore, we find a relatively stronger impact of regular price changes, as opposed to 
promotional price changes. In environments with a high frequency of promotions, the regular 
price might therefore serve as a stronger signal. For retailers, this could be a shift from today’s 
strong focus on highlighting temporary price changes of the actual price to managing the 
regular price as a powerful measure, since customers seem to be aware of the long-term price 
level at the retailer. Managing this price level can be an additional tool for managers steering 
demand.  
Based on the unit calculations, we further find that price reductions positively affect retailer 
sales. The combination of strong own-price elasticities, strong cross-price elasticities, and low 
stockpiling lead to a net increase in the category. Hence, the price reduction can attract new 
demand that neither stems from stockpiling nor completely arises from the other brands in the 
category. Hence, we find that the promotional sales increase online has two main sources – 
brand switching within category and store switching.12 
Temporary price reductions, however, on average reduce the retailer’s profits. The main reason 
for this unprofitability of promotions is that the increase in demand for brands is not strong 
enough to offset the lower margins. We find cross effects, which are a source of unprofitability, 
as they account for approximately 20 percent of the quantity increase, and further lower profits 
as a result of lost sales at regular margins. For retail managers, this information is crucial when 
managing for profit. The combination of heterogeneity across margins and strong cross-price 
elasticities reveals opportunities to understand and steer the profit impact of a price reduction.  
 
12 In theory, increased consumption is an additional source, which is, however, not likely for these product types. 
2. Looking beyond Sales – Promotion Impact on Profit in Online Retailing 
44 
 
We hypothesize, based on the existing literature, that brand and promotion characteristics drive 
sales, revenue, and profit impact. With an analysis of correlates, we find that decisions about 
promotions are strategic decisions for retailers. Online retailers cannot increase sales, revenue, 
and profit with the same managerial action. If firms are interested in driving sales and revenue, 
they should focus their promotions on high-share brands with a large price range. In line with 
previous findings, a stronger promotion frequency diminishes the sales impact but increases 
revenue. If profit is the central corporate objective, the opposite is true: promotions on low-
share brands with low price ranges are advisable. Interestingly, we do not find a significant 
impact of promotional features, namely, promotional frequency and promotional intensity, on 
profit, whereas brand characteristics are relevant in guiding managers’ actions with respect to 
promotion profitability.  
We note the following limitations of this study: it would be desirable to include information on 
additional marketing-mix variables (e.g., email newsletters). Furthermore, to keep the number 
of estimated coefficients and model complexity at a reasonable level, we have to restrict the 
analysis to the top ten brands per category. Similar to previous research, this implies that our 
findings may hold primarily for larger brands.  
Our research reports the diminishing importance of stockpiling online. This raises fruitful 
questions for future research, for example, whether online shopping, requiring less effort 
(travelling, carrying), makes customers shop more often, or buy less, and whether customers 
rely on high promotion frequencies online. 
Our data set includes goods sold by one retailer in four categories. Following Bijmolt et al. 
(2005, p. 151), who state that “price elasticities are largely independent of whether consumer 
heterogeneity is modeled” while they differ across product categories, we account for product 
heterogeneity. However, we do not dive into category differences. Hence, future research could 
extend our findings by category moderation.  
Moreover, data is collected from one pure online retailer, which raises questions about the 
generalizability of our findings to other retailers. Therefore, to strengthen confidence in the 
validity of our findings, future research could enhance the generalizability by combining data 
from several retailers. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the search for a 50-inch television on Amazon.com and Waltmart.com, four of the first five 
products listed show a crossed-out list price next to the actual selling price (see Figure 6.2 and 
Figure 6.3 in the Appendix).13 As indicated by the example, retailers often display the actual 
selling price in combination with a higher advertised reference price, for example, a 
manufacturer-suggested retail price or a competitor’s price (Compeau and Grewal 1998; 
Mazumdar et al. 2005). The rationale behind this for the retailer is to make the offer appear 
more attractive by influencing the reference point against which customers evaluate it. Prior 
research underlines that advertised reference prices are a powerful measure to increase 
purchase intentions (Mazumdar et al. 2005). Furthermore, empirical studies highlight that even 
inflated advertised reference prices have a positive impact on purchase evaluations (Urbany et 
al. 1988; Biswas and Blair 1991). Returning to the Amazon–Walmart example, one of the top 
five products is identical across retailers and is offered at $447.99 by both. However, the two 
retailers compare the actual selling price of the identical product against different list prices. 
On Amazon.com the list price is $599.99, whereas on Walmart.com a list price of $749.99 is 
referenced (see Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5 in the Appendix). Hence, on Wallmart.com the 
customer might get the impression of saving $300, while the savings appear to be $150 on 
Amazon.com. The manufacturer also advertises a list price of $599.99 on its own website, 
while selling the product for $449.99 (Figure 6.6 in the Appendix). This example is not 
unusual: A price comparison website reveals that on Amazon.com, over the course of the past 
seven months, the product has never been offered for the list price (see Figure 6.7 in the 
Appendix). On the manufacturer’s website and Walmart.com, the reduction in comparison to 
the list price is also in place for longer than a month (see Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 in the 
Appendix). 
This example highlights the main aspects of this study: first, the disruption of the retail market 
by e-commerce, with both the option to compare prices easily and ubiquitous reference prices 
constantly displayed by retailers; and, second, the role of the credibility of advertised reference 
 
13 We choose televisions as example, since televisions are part of the product category of computers and personal 
electronics, which attracts the largest amount of consumer spending online ($76 billion in 2015 with 15 percent 
growth). We further choose Amazon.com and Walmart.com because together they account for 28 percent of traffic 
in the U.S. (Miller and Washington 2017). 
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prices, i.e., the distance of the advertised reference price from the regular selling price, in 
purchase situations. 
First, the disruption of the retail market by e-commerce14 has introduced easy price 
comparisons for customers. In theory, the Internet lowers the cost of information search by 
facilitating access to information (Bakos 1997). With the cost of searching for information 
online being lower, customers might rely less on price information provided by the retailer in 
the form of advertised reference prices and instead search for information by comparing prices 
across stores. For example, price search engines provide the price of a specific product at 
different retailers or at different points in time (for example, Figure 6.7 in the Appendix). 
Where customers can compare actual selling prices across retailers with just one click, the 
informational value of the advertised reference price might be challenged. Furthermore, 
advertised reference prices are ubiquitous online; both major retailers and the manufacturer in 
the example provide advertised reference prices, and they provide them over a long period of 
time. Existing research provides contradictory findings for a long-term display of advertised 
reference prices. On the one hand, research in the field of reference prices supports the positive 
impact of advertised reference prices on purchases (Urbany et al. 1988; Compeau and Grewal 
1998). On the other hand, research on price promotions reports that the impact of promotions 
on sales decreases once promotions become too frequent (Jedidi et al. 1999; Ailawadi et al. 
2006). We consider the display of an advertised reference price in combination with an actual 
selling price to be a promotional framing. Hence, when the advertised reference price is 
displayed constantly its impact on sales might be reduced.  
Second, the credibility of advertised reference prices might influence purchase decisions. 
Research on advertised reference prices offline shows that even inflated advertised reference 
prices have a positive impact on customers’ evaluations of the offer (Urbany et al. 1988; Biswas 
and Blair 1991). However, as outlined above, online customers can easily check whether 
advertised reference prices are credible and thus they can detect inflated advertised reference 
prices. The credibility of advertised reference prices might impact purchasing following two 
avenues: first, the credibility of advertised reference prices might directly impact sales; and, 
second, the credibility of the advertised reference price might have an effect on the impact of 
 
14 Although online purchases currently represent a relatively small share of retail sales (7.3 percent in 2015 in the 
U.S.) e-commerce realizes strong growth (15 percent growth in 2015 in the U.S.) (Miller and Washington 2017). 
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the actual selling price on sales, i.e., the moderation of the price elasticity by the credibility of 
the advertised reference price. 
The example further highlights the special role of list prices, i.e., manufacturer-suggested retail 
prices, with respect to credibility. In the example, the advertised reference price is a 
manufacturer-suggested retail price, which is not charged by any party, including the 
manufacturer itself. In general, to prevent inflated advertised reference prices, they are subject 
to substantial legal regulations, in Germany the “Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb” 
(UWG). If the retailer decides to use its own historic price as the advertised reference price, 
the legislation requires the retailer to regularly sell the advertised product for the higher 
advertised reference price and only to discount it temporarily (§5 UWG). In order to display a 
competitor’s price, the retailer needs to ensure that the comparison is fair (§6 UWG). For 
manufacturer-suggested retail prices, however, the actual selling price at the retailer never has 
to match the manufacturer-suggested retail price, which might make this type of advertised 
reference price less credible. Adding to credibility concerns, in recent years legal and public 
interest in deceptive pricing has increased. High-profile cases concerning the display of 
deceptive reference prices in the U.S., including companies such as Overstock.com and 
Walgreen’s, have attracted strong public interest in the topic. As a consequence, deceptive 
pricing litigation has experienced a resurgence (Streitfeld 2016a, 2016b; Bartz 2017; Wisoff 
2017). In June 2016 the customer advocacy organization truthinadvertising.org was tracking 
61 federal U.S. class-action lawsuits on this topic (Salls 2016). Furthermore, substantial 
settlements of such cases generated additional attention. For example, the popular fashion label 
Michael Kors was confronted with a class action lawsuit for printing fictitious manufacturer-
suggested retail prices on items produced only for their outlet stores. The Michael Kors 
Holdings Ltd agreed to a $4.88 million payment to settle the lawsuit (Stempel 2015). Hence, 
the credibility of manufacturer-suggested retail prices might also have suffered from major 
publicity about deceptive pricing lawsuits and settlements.  
It is notable that, despite the strong prevalence of advertised reference prices online, despite 
strong growth in e-commerce, and despite developments questioning the credibility of 
advertised reference prices, empirical research has so far dedicated limited attention to the role 
of advertised reference prices online. The aim of this chapter is therefore to shed light on the 
role of advertised reference prices, in the form of manufacturer-suggested retail prices, in e-
commerce. Hence, the first objective of this study is to explore whether displaying advertised 
reference prices, compared to not displaying them, impacts online purchases.  
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(2.1) Do manufacturer-suggested retail prices have an impact on sales-related variables 
online? 
Given the facilitated information access online and the increasing awareness for potentially 
deceptive advertised reference prices, we further analyze whether the credibility of the 
advertised reference price has an impact on sales online. We operationalize credibility as the 
ratio of manufacturer-suggested retail price and regular price, i.e., the larger the distance 
between the manufacturer-suggested retail price and the price that is regularly paid by the 
customer, the lower the credibility. Therefore, we ask the following exploratory research 
question: 
(2.2) How does the credibility of a manufacturer-suggested retail price impact sales 
online?  
Finally, we explore whether this credibility moderates the effect of the actual selling price on 
sales, since with the decreasing credibility of the advertised reference price the actual selling 
price might gain relevance. Hence, we set out to answer the following exploratory questions: 
(2.3) Does the credibility of a manufacturer-suggested retail price moderate the impact 
of the actual selling price on sales online? 
Following this analysis, we conduct a sales and profit impact calculation. From a retailer’s 
perspective, we calculate the profit impact of a reduction in the actual selling price against the 
background of different distances between the manufacturer-suggested retail price and the 
regular price.  
In sum, this study sets out to shed light on advertised reference prices in online settings. We 
aim to add to limited and mixed existing findings on the impact of advertised reference prices 
on sales and to address the related research gaps. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
to analyze the interplay of the credibility of advertised reference prices and actual selling prices 
and to assess the profitability of changes in the distance to the manufacturer-suggested retail 
price. 
We approach these exploratory research questions using a unique combination of three 
empirical studies. In study one, we administer an online experiment to assess the impact on 
purchase intentions of displaying versus not displaying an advertised reference price within an 
online shopping experience. The online experiment imitates the process of an online purchase 
and offers high internal validity on the impact of the advertised reference price on purchase 
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intentions. To corroborate the findings from the laboratory study, to the best of our knowledge 
we are the first to administer a field experiment in cooperation with a large online shop on 
advertised reference prices. The experiment in study two mirrors the online survey and adds 
the idea of infinite promotion frequency, as the online shop constantly displays the 
manufacturer-suggested retail price for the products under investigation. We analyze whether 
the elimination and consecutive re-introduction of the advertised reference price have an 
impact on the online purchase process. With the combination of online and field experiments, 
our aim is to paint a precise picture of the impact of displaying an advertised reference price 
on purchase-related dependent variables. With the third empirical study, we address whether 
the credibility of reference prices impacts sales. In a large transaction data set, we assess the 
impact on sales of the ratio of manufacturer-suggested retail price and regular price and analyze 
whether this ratio moderates the impact of the actual selling price on sales. In sum, we address 
our research questions through an online experiment, a field experiment, and analysis of a large 
and recent set of transaction data. 
We structure the remainder of the chapter as follows. We initially provide the basic legal 
regulations and a literature review on comparative pricing in Chapter 3.2. Subsequent to an 
overview of the relevant legal regulations in Germany on advertised reference prices in Chapter 
3.2.1, we underline the relevant theoretical fundamentals of advertised reference prices in 
Chapter 3.2.2 and summarize the existing empirical research in Chapter 3.2.3. Since most 
studies in the field of advertised reference prices deal with traditional offline shopping, we 
point out the theoretical differences between online and offline shopping and the potential 
impact on advertised reference prices in Chapter 3.2.4. Afterwards Chapter 3.2.5 outlines the 
limited empirical research on advertised reference prices in e-commerce. Based on the 
literature review, we identify gaps and outline our contributions to the field of advertised 
reference prices in Chapter 3.3. We provide these contributions through three empirical studies 
and report the results in Chapters 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6. Finally, we discuss our findings in Chapter 
3.7 and offer managerial implications and avenues for future research in Chapter 3.8. 
3.2 Institutional Background and Literature Review  
3.2.1 Legal Regulations on Advertised Reference Prices 
Advertised references prices are subject to substantial legal regulations. To understand and 
analyze the use of advertised reference prices in retailing, we first outline the relevant legal 
regulations. As we conduct our three empirical studies in Germany, we focus on German law. 
In Germany the “Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb” (UWG) regulates comparative 
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pricing. We differentiate comparative prices according to three types: retailers’ own historic 
prices, competitors’ prices, and indirect prices, that is manufacturer-suggested retail prices. 
§5 UWG is the legal basis for comparisons with retailers’ own historic prices to prevent 
deceptive advertising. To use their own past prices as advertised reference prices, retailers need 
to verify that they usually sell the product for the advertised reference price and only 
temporarily for the reduced price. The past price may not be inflated merely to pretend there is 
price reduction. The advertised products need to be in stock for at least two days and prices 
may not be used to deceive customers in any other dimension (Eschweiler 2006).  
§6 UWG regulates competitors’ prices as advertised reference prices. Comparative advertising 
directly or indirectly refers to competitors, their products, or services. Comparative advertising 
is permitted if it is not unfair, as described in §6 (2) UWG. Among others, the advertising 
company acts unfairly if the comparison does not refer to products or services with the same 
purpose, if it does not refer to substantial, relevant, objective, verifiable, and typical attributes 
of the product or the price of the product, if the company does not differentiate itself clearly 
from its competitors, if the advertising company influences or exploits the competitor’s 
reputation unfairly, or if it advertises a copy of the competitor’s offer. Furthermore, the 
competitor needs to be clearly identifiable. Retailers have to declare a price reduction with a 
competitor’s price as advertised reference price as temporary and the price comparison has to 
be based on full costs (Eschweiler 2006).  
Manufacturer-suggested retail prices are the last and focal group of advertised reference prices 
in this study. The manufacturer-suggested retail price is a price suggestion provided by the 
manufacturer of the product. For this type of price, German jurisdiction assumes that the 
customer understands that this price is a suggestion and that, in contrast to its own price 
comparisons, the retailer does not need to sell the product for the advertised price. However, 
the retailer must still adhere to the fundamentals of fair competition, as regulated in the UWG. 
The manufacturer-suggested retail price must be a valid current suggested price provided by 
the manufacturer and must refer to the specific product offered. The manufacturer-suggested 
retail price has to be a common market price; therefore, it may not be inflated, and must be 
based on a solid calculation (BGH, November 27, 2003 – Az. I ZR 94/01). The manufacturer-
suggested retail price must be valid at the time of the advertisement. If the manufacturer no 
longer provides a manufacturer-suggested retail price in its current price list, the retailer may 
no longer use this price as the manufacturer-suggested retail price given a short transition phase 
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(BGH, January 29, 2004 – Az. I ZR 132/01). In such cases, the retailer must point out that it is 
a former manufacturer suggested retail price. Jurisdiction also enforces fair competition with 
manufacturer suggested retail prices online, for example, Amazon has been sentenced for 
displaying an inflated manufacturer-suggested retail price (LG Cologne, October 2, 2014 – 81 
O 74/14). 
With respect to all three types of advertised reference prices, the retailer is responsible for 
informing the customer about the type of reference price, whether it is a historic own price, the 
price of a competitor, or the manufacturer-suggested retail price. However, the manufacturer-
suggested retail price is the only advertised reference price that the retailer may display 
constantly without verifying that the product is sold anywhere at this price. 
For the remainder of this paper we focus on advertised reference prices in the form of 
manufacturer-suggested retail prices. 
3.2.2 Theoretical Fundamentals of Advertised Reference Prices 
A large body of literature has investigated the impact of reference prices on price evaluation, 
search intentions, and purchase decisions. With respect to the problem under investigation we 
outline the relevant theoretical fundamentals of reference prices.  
Adaptation-level theory provides the theoretical basis (Helson 1964). Buyers evaluate the 
actual price of an offer in relation to an adaptation level, that is, the internal reference price 
(Monroe 1973). Contextual stimuli, as well as memory of past purchases, form this internal 
reference price (Krishnamurthi et al. 1992; Mayhew and Winer 1992; Mazumdar et al. 2005). 
Hence, customers evaluate the price of an offer against their internal reference price to 
determine whether or not the offer is attractive (Monroe 1973). Numerous empirical studies 
support this theory, to the point that it is a common empirical generalization that internal 
reference prices influence purchase decisions (for an overview of empirical evidence see 
Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) and Mazumdar et al. (2005)). 
Assimilation-contrast theory reflected on price research adds dynamic aspect to reference 
prices, that is, the impact of new price stimuli on customers’ current internal reference price 
(Sherif and Hovland 1961). Customers perceive a range of prices to be acceptable, in other 
words, the internal reference price is a price surrounded by an acceptable price region.15 
 
15 See, for example, Kalyanaram and Little (1994) for empirical evidence of a range of price insensitivity around 
a reference price. 
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Depending on the distance between the new price stimulus and the internal reference price, 
customers update their internal reference price. New price stimuli are, for example, a new price 
for the same item or price information from the environment. These new price stimuli are 
referred to as external reference prices.16 If the external reference price falls within the 
acceptable price region very close to the internal reference price, the customer integrates the 
new external reference price which does not change the internal reference price. An external 
reference price that falls within the acceptable region, but further away from the internal 
reference price, moves the internal reference price toward the external reference price, in other 
words, it updates the internal reference price. External reference prices outside the acceptable 
region are not credible and do not move the internal reference price. Customers contrast these 
external reference prices, such that they perceive them as being even further away from the 
internal reference price (Compeau and Grewal 1998).  
In summary, external reference prices and the actual selling price influence the internal 
reference price in its respective direction. An external reference price above the internal 
reference price, above the actual selling price, and within the acceptable region, increases the 
internal reference price. The comparison between external reference price, actual selling price, 
and internal reference price forms the perceived value of the individual offer. The higher the 
actual selling price compared to the internal reference price, the lower the perceived value, 
while a higher internal reference price increases the perceived value (Grewal et al. 1998). 
Perceived value, in turn, has a positive impact on purchase and a negative impact on search 
intentions: the more valuable the offer, the lower the intention to search for more information 
on competitive offers and the higher the probability of buying (Grewal et al. 1998). This 
relationship incentivizes the retailer to set external reference prices in the direct environment 
of the actual selling price to positively influence customers’ internal reference price region and 
consequently to decrease their intentions to search and increase their willingness to buy. Such 
external reference prices provided by the retailer at the point of purchase in a product-specific 
manner are known as advertised reference prices (Mazumdar et al. 2005). Within reference 
price research, our focus is on advertised reference prices. 
 
16 Mayhew and Winer (1992) add empirical evidence that internal and external reference prices are distinct 
constructs. 
3. Crossed Out but Still Relevant? Exploring Online Advertised Reference Prices 
54 
 
3.2.3 Empirical Research on Advertised Reference Prices  
An extensive stream of existing empirical literature deals with advertised reference prices, i.e., 
prices provided by the seller at the point of purchase as a point of comparison for the actual 
selling price (Mazumdar et al. 2005). In addition, the literature on price promotions discusses 
advertised reference prices as part of a promotional framing. We consult the promotion 
literature with respect to the impact of constantly displaying advertised reference prices. In the 
following, we lay out the key empirical findings in the area of advertised reference prices. 
Based on the theories that we outlined above, advertised reference prices serve as an instrument 
for retailers to increase the internal reference price, in order that the customer perceives the 
offer as a gain. Existing research from the field of reference prices agrees upon the positive 
impact of advertised reference prices on internal reference prices. The perceived value of the 
offer increases, such that the customer’s willingness to continue searching decreases (Della 
Bitta et al. 1981; Urbany et al. 1988) and willingness to buy increases (Urbany et al. 1988; 
Compeau and Grewal 1998). Multiple laboratory studies show this positive impact of an 
advertised reference price on the internal reference price and consequently the price and 
purchase evaluation (e.g., Biswas and Blair 1991; Compeau and Grewal 1998; Grewal et al. 
1998). Compeau and Grewal (1998) offer an integrative meta-analysis of 38 empirical studies 
on comparative price advertising. The authors find that advertised reference prices have a 
positive impact on internal reference price and value perception, and a negative impact on 
search intentions.  
Resulting from this strong positive impact of advertised reference prices, research on deceptive 
advertised reference prices gained interest. Exaggerated advertised reference prices give the 
customer the impression of saving money, while the actual savings depend on whether or not 
the advertised reference price is valid (Compeau and Grewal 1998). Research suggests that 
even exaggerated advertised reference prices facilitate purchase (Urbany et al. 1988; Biswas 
and Blair 1991). The meta-analysis by Compeau and Grewal (1998, p. 263) concludes that even 
exaggerated advertised reference prices strongly influence consumers, meaning that they have 
a high “potential for deception”. Research on the sticker-shock effect concentrates on the 
distance between reference price and actual selling price and focuses on brand choice as 
dependent variable. The sticker-shock effect was introduced by Winer (1986) and captures the 
difference between reference price and actual selling price and expects a positive impact on 
utility of a positive difference and a negative impact on utility of a negative difference between 
reference price (both internal and external) and actual selling price (Mazumdar et al. 2005). 
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Mazumdar et al. (2005) provide an overview on research on the sticker shock effect and 
conclude that the symmetric sticker shock effect on brand choice is empirically generalizable.  
In sum, reference price research agrees on the positive impact of advertised reference prices, 
with even exaggerated advertised reference prices having a positive impact on consumers’ 
purchase evaluations.  
However, customers update their internal reference price using temporal and situational 
stimuli, including advertised reference prices, current selling price, prior prices, and other 
stimuli in the shopping environment. Hence, the informational value of the advertised reference 
price might change over time. Several empirical studies using longitudinal data investigate the 
long-term impact on customers’ shopping behavior. Kalwani and Yim (1992) report that 
promotional frequency and depth negatively affect customers’ price estimates. Customers form 
promotion expectations, such that they buy frequently promoted brands only when promoted, 
i.e., if the expected promotions are not in place, this will have adverse effects (Kalwani and 
Yim 1992). Alba et al.’s (1994) experiment on promotional depth and frequency shows that 
subjects assign a lower basket price to stores with frequent, shallow discounts compared to 
stores with high but infrequent discounts. Alba et al. (1999) support the notion that different 
promotional strategies regarding the depth and frequency of discounts results in diverging price 
evaluations. In sum, following Compeau and Grewal (1998) for items repeatedly being on sale, 
customers get used to the lower actual selling price compared to the higher advertised reference 
price which drives the internal reference price toward the lower selling price, thereby 
decreasing the impact of the advertised reference price on the purchase decision. Thus, in this 
context there is empirical evidence supporting the notion that frequent price reductions lead to 
reduced internal reference prices, which in turn results in less beneficial evaluations of the 
actual selling price. Furthermore, if customers get used to the lower actual selling price, while 
the importance of the advertised reference price decreases, this might hint at a moderation of 
the actual selling price by the advertised reference price. 
In sum, on the one hand, research suggests a positive impact of advertised reference prices on 
purchase. On the other hand, highly frequent promotions lose their impact on purchase. Thus, 
based on empirical findings, advertised reference prices are expected to raise internal reference 
prices and thereby positively influence purchase decisions, even if the advertised reference 
prices are inflated. Repeatedly or continuously displaying advertised reference prices, 
however, might decrease the credibility of advertised reference prices and, thereby, diminish 
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their impact on internal reference prices and consequently on purchase. Moreover, vice versa, 
the role of the actual selling price might be strengthened, if the advertised reference price loses 
relevance due to lower credibility. To the best of our knowledge, this relation has not yet been 
analyzed empirically. 
3.2.4 Theoretical Differences Between Online and Offline Shopping 
In the following, we outline theoretical work on the differences between online and offline 
shopping with respect to prices.  
Early theoretical studies on the development of electronic marketplaces anticipated drastically 
reduced search costs for customers, to the point that markets are (nearly) perfect, which again 
would lead to lower prices (Bakos 1997). In theory, lower search costs increase price 
competition because consumers have higher incentive to search for lower prices (Johnson et 
al. 2004). In perfect markets the role of advertised reference prices would diminish as 
customers would have full information. In practice, no perfect market has yet emerged online. 
However, the Internet facilitates search since comparison shopping websites provide price 
information for a specific product across stores at a click. In traditional offline settings, 
consumers can only acquire comparable price knowledge by travelling from one store to 
another, which is costly. Hence, the information conveyed by advertised reference prices might 
be substituted, e.g., by price search engines. 
Thaler (1985) offers another theoretical perspective for why price expectations and purchase 
behavior might differ online when compared to traditional offline settings. Following Thaler 
(1985), consumers evaluate prices depending on the context. In his experiment, customers were 
willing to pay more for the same product when they purchased it in a fancy hotel rather than in 
a small grocery store. Transferring this idea, the different environment online allows different 
price evaluations. Adding to this notion, consumers might link online retailing to lower costs 
(e.g., lower overhead costs, underestimated shipping and handling costs) and larger supply 
(because of the number of potential retailers online). This may further lead consumers to 
believe that prices online should be lower (Hardesty and Suter 2005). This easier information 
access and lower price expectations may affect the performance of advertised reference prices 
via two avenues. First, the ease of access to prices other than the advertised reference price 
might reduce its impact. Second, for the same advertised reference price displayed online and 
offline, for example, a manufacturer-suggested retail price, the distance between the advertised 
reference price and the internal reference price differs between online and offline if internal 
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reference prices, namely, price expectations, are lower online than offline. Following 
assimilation-contrast theory, customers contrast external reference prices outside the 
acceptable price range such that they perceive them as being even further away from the 
internal reference price and eventually do not move the internal reference price. Hence, the 
further away the advertised reference price from the internal reference price, the higher the 
probability of contrast which diminishes the impact of the advertised reference price (Hardesty 
and Suter 2005). In sum, these theoretical considerations suggest that customer might perceive 
advertised reference prices online differently than offline, which would be reflected in the 
performance of advertised reference prices. 
3.2.5 Empirical Research on Online Reference Prices 
Based on the theoretical considerations that we describe above, internal reference prices, 
meaning price expectations (not necessarily actual prices), and the importance of advertised 
reference prices might be lower online. We first report existing empirical research on online 
price expectations. Afterwards, we summarize empirical findings on online advertised 
reference prices.  
Several studies provide empirical support for lower price expectations online.17 However, here 
we focus on price expectations rather than actual selling prices. Hardesty and Suter (2005) 
administered a controlled experiment. They report that customers have lower price 
expectations (internal reference price) online than offline. Johnson et al. (2004) focus on the 
relationship between information access and search effort. The authors analyze whether 
reduced search costs online increase information search. Despite lower search costs, customers 
exert limited search effort. Nevertheless, the review of online pricing by Ratchford (2009) 
concludes that although no perfect competition emerged, improved access to information 
characterizes the online environment. Hence, the empirical evidence suggests lower price 
expectations online and an improved access to information, which is not necessarily leveraged 
by consumers.  
 
17 We focus on price expectations, which are different from actual selling prices. With respect to actual selling 
prices, following Granados et al. (2012) empirical evidence on whether the actual selling prices are lower online 
than offline is mixed. Research by Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) analyzing books and CDs, by Brown and 
Goolsbee (2002) for life insurance products, by Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) focusing again on books, and by 
Zettelmeyer et al. (2006) for automobile retailing provide evidence for lower prices online. Other predominantly 
older studies find higher prices online: Bailey (1998) for books, software, and CDs and Lal and Sarvary (1999) 
offer an analytical model which describes conditions under which higher prices emerge. 
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So far, lower price expectations and improved access to information theoretically suggest a 
diminished role of advertised reference prices online. However, dedicated empirical studies are 
scarce. To the best of our knowledge, only two existing studies explicitly address the role of 
advertised reference prices in online settings. Jensen et al. (2003) focus on the impact on price 
perceptions and search intentions of the inclusion of an advertised reference price online versus 
offline.18 They conducted three empirical studies: a classroom survey (sample of 137 students), 
an Internet survey (sample of 344 subjects), and a mail panel survey (household research 
sample of 243 subjects). Across the studies, price expectations were lower online than offline. 
Additionally, all three studies surprisingly revealed lower price search intentions online than 
offline. The three studies led to partly diverging results regarding the impact of advertised 
reference prices by channel. In the classroom survey, the effect of the advertised reference price 
in the Internet ad on price perceptions was positive but less positive than in offline settings. In 
the Internet survey with a larger sample size, this interaction effect was replicated, while the 
main effect of the advertised reference price was insignificant. In the mail panel survey, the 
impact of the advertised reference price was not significantly moderated by channel, but the 
main effect was significant. 
Lii and Lee (2005) compare the performance of plausible and implausible advertised reference 
prices online and offline with respect to internal reference price, price-search intention, and 
perceived value.19 They conducted a laboratory experiment with 142 students. Subjects had a 
lower latitude of acceptable price limits (lower prices) and a smaller width of this acceptable 
price range in the online channel than in offline retail channels. In contrast to Jensen et al. 
(2003), the authors show that customers have a higher internal reference price when exposed 
to an advertised reference price in the online channel than when exposed to an advertised 
reference price offline. They also show that consumers have lower price-search intention and 
report higher perceived value of the offer when exposed to an advertised reference price in the 
online channel than when exposed to an advertised reference price offline. Hence, Lii and Lee 
(2005) report that in the online channel, advertised reference prices lead to higher internal 
reference prices, lower search intentions and higher perceived value than offline. Further, 
implausible advertised reference prices increase internal reference prices, decrease price-search 
 
18 The authors do not include purchase intention in their studies. 
19 The authors do not include purchase intention in their study. 
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intentions, and increase perceived value compared to a plausible advertised reference price in 
both channels.  
While these studies agree upon lower price expectations online, they offer diverging insights 
into advertised reference prices. Jensen et al. (2003) conclude that the role of advertised 
reference prices is stronger offline than online, while Lii and Lee (2005) provide evidence for 
the opposite. 
Hence, the existing research offers evidence for lower price expectations online, while 
evidence on the role of advertised reference prices is scarce and mixed. Existing findings are 
limited to the extent that both empirical studies rely on laboratory experiments or surveys with 
limited sample size. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
The review of the literature reveals five avenues along which we aim to enhance the academic 
discourse on advertised reference prices. 
First, the literature review exhibits contradictory findings in different research streams, which 
are relevant in terms of the impact of advertised reference prices on sales. While research on 
reference prices supports the positive impact of displaying an advertised reference price on 
purchase evaluation, research on promotions suggests that with increasing frequency of price 
reductions their impact on sales diminishes (Compeau and Grewal 1998; Ailawadi et al. 2006). 
This study aims to address this contradiction by analyzing the continuous display of the 
manufacturer-suggested retail price next to the actual selling price on sales, i.e., the situation 
of a constant promotional framing.  
Second, naturally, the existing literature has analyzed the performance of advertised reference 
prices against the specific background of that time, namely, in offline settings. At the same 
time, theory suggests that online the premises for advertised reference prices have changed as 
a result of facilitated information access. To the best of our knowledge, to date only two studies 
have tried to capture the performance of advertised reference prices online based on laboratory 
experiments and surveys, and they offer mixed findings (Jensen et al. 2003; Lii and Lee 2005). 
Thus, this study aims to add to the limited research and it focuses on advertised reference prices 
in online settings by analyzing data from a field experiment and transaction data from real 
purchases online.  
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Third, existing research reports a positive impact on the purchase intentions of inflated and 
implausible advertised reference prices, meaning that in offline settings even inflated 
advertised reference prices impact customers’ purchase decisions positively (Urbany et al. 
1988; Biswas and Blair 1991; Compeau and Grewal 1998). The online environment, however, 
enables customers to access information and compare prices more easily to detect whether an 
advertised reference price is credible. This improved access to information, in combination 
with public media increasing skepticism about advertised reference prices, could potentially 
influence the impact of the credibility of advertised reference prices on sales online. 
Consequently, we explore whether the credibility of advertised reference prices, 
operationalized as the quotient of manufacturer-suggested retail price and regular price, has an 
impact on sales and which functional form the relation might follow. In this context, the 
functional form is substantial. A positive linear relation would imply that with increasing 
distance between manufacturer-suggested retail prices and regular prices, the positive impact 
on sales increases, meaning that even manufacturer-suggested retail prices with potentially low 
credibility increase sales. In contrast, a quadratic relation could imply that with increasing 
distance between manufacturer-suggested retail prices and regular prices the impact on sales is 
positive only up to a certain point, and afterwards decreasing credibility further has a negative 
impact on sales (inverted u-shape). Existing research on the credibility of online advertised 
reference prices is based on one laboratory study, which finds that implausible advertised 
reference prices increase perceived value (Lii and Lee 2005). Thus, in order to gain more 
insights into the impact of credibility on sales online, we focus on the functional form of this 
relation based on a large transactional data set. 
Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, existing research has not yet assessed the moderation of 
price elasticities by the credibility of advertised reference prices, although this might mirror 
the impact of credibility, as outlined above. If with decreasing credibility the relevance of the 
advertised reference price diminishes, the actual selling price might gain importance, since the 
advertised reference price is no longer perceived as a credible signal. Thus, in order to shed 
light on the interplay between the actual selling price and the credibility of the advertised 
reference price, we explore whether the credibility of the advertised reference price moderates 
the actual selling price. 
Finally, in order to assess the relevance of credible advertised reference prices for corporate 
objectives, we assess the profit impact of price changes in different scenarios. To the best of 
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our knowledge, these questions concerning profit have not yet been in focus of existing 
research. 
In sum, this study aims to shed light on the impact of advertised reference prices in purchase 
situations online by following the four avenues outlined above. Figure 3.1 depicts the focal 
relations. We initially address the first and second avenue by analyzing the main effect of 
displaying an advertised reference price on sales in an online setting based on two experimental 
studies. We further follow the third avenue and explore the role of the credibility of such 
advertised reference prices with regards to sales based on a fixed-effects model and 
transactional data. Finally, with the same model, we assess the fourth avenue, i.e., whether 
customers rely more strongly on the actual selling price if the credibility of the manufacturer-
suggested retail price is low, i.e., whether the advertised reference price moderates the price 
elasticity (dashed lines in Figure 3.1), and we assess the profit impact of credibility for the 
retailer. 
 
*Note: Study three focuses on the credibility of advertised reference prices operationalized as the quotient of 
manufacturer-suggested retail price and regular price.  
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Framework 
Control Variables
Advertised
Reference Price
(Credibility)*
Actual Selling
Price
Sales-Related
Variables
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3.4 Study 1: Online Experiment  
3.4.1 Data Collection and Description 
We administer a 2 x 2 between-subjects factorial design in an online experiment. The structure 
of the experiment closely resembles an online purchase process. Subjects initially read a short, 
neutral newsletter article about online shopping to set the scene. They are randomly assigned 
either to a fictitious online shop or to a well-known retailer, in order to rule out familiarity with 
the store as a confounding variable. The respondents see a typical representation of a product 
with product features and price and then evaluate their purchase intention. This is repeated for 
a second product type. Randomly, either both or none of the products shows an advertised 
reference price. The advertised reference price does not include any further information 
regarding its type, namely, whether it is a past price, competitor’s price, or manufacturer-
suggested retail price. Finally, we measure purchase intention on a seven-point Likert scale 
following Sweeney et al. (1999). We sent the online invitation to take part in this survey via e-
mail to university members in June 2017.20 Within one week 346 respondents took part in the 
online experiment of which 276 passed the manipulation checks.21 As each respondent 
evaluates two products, we generate 552 observations. Overall, 81 percent of respondents are 
female at mean age of 27 years. Typical of a university sample, a high share of respondents has 
a higher education with 44 percent of respondents having a university degree and being on 
relatively low income; 75 percent of the respondents report a net income below € 2,000. 
3.4.2 Model 
We analyze the effects of displaying an advertised reference price on the purchase intention of 
respondent i using a linear regression as displayed in equation 1. ARP is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether an advertised reference price was in place (= 1). Shop indicates whether the 
subject is shopping at a fictitious (= 1) or a real online retailer. Product differentiates between 
a high-priced (printer cartridge = 1) and a relatively low-priced (washing detergent) product 
type, both of which each respondent evaluates. We estimate the model using a Bayesian 
approach and rely on a Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler implemented in Stan (Stan 
Development Team 2017).  
 
20 The full survey generated 628 responses. For this research, we exclude data from 282 subjects: a manipulation 
of the credibility of online prices based on a newspaper article is excluded, such that only those respondents in a 
credible setting are used for this study. 
21 Manipulation checks tested whether the respondent could remember if an advertised reference price was 
displayed or not. 
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3.4.3 Empirical Results 
We set generic, weakly informative priors normally distributed at location zero and scale ten. 
We analyze the model using Bayesian estimation with No-U-Turn sampling (Stan 
Development Team, 2017). We estimate four chains and base the posterior results on a total of 
32,000 draws, of which we use the first 16,000 for warm-up. All chains are well converged and 
mixed with a potential scale reduction factor (?̂?) of 1.00 (Gelman et al. 2013).  
Coefficient Posterior Mean 
Intercept 2.73 (2.38; 2.88) 
ARP 0.40 (0.14; 0.65) 
Shop -0.14 (-0.39; 0.12) 
Product 1.03 (0.78; 1.28) 
n=552   
Note: Posterior mean followed by average 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of posterior interval in parentheses. For 
posterior means printed in bold, zero is not included on the 95-posterior interval 
Table 3.1: Results Online Experiment 
The results indicate a positive impact of displaying an advertised reference price on purchase 
intention (see Table 3.1). Purchase intention varies by product type with a higher purchase 
intention for the more expensive product. The framing of the shop, whether or not respondents 
are familiar with it did not significantly impact their purchase intention. 
In this laboratory setting, when evaluating their purchase intention, we did not actively provide 
any additional information on, for example, competitive prices. The displayed advertised 
reference price functions as the only stimulus to influence the customer-specific internal 
reference price, while the respondent still has the chance to search for more information online. 
Study one supports previous research in that advertised reference prices have a positive impact 
on purchase intentions, at least in these laboratory settings. 
3.5 Study 2: Field Experiment 
3.5.1 Data Collection and Description 
We administer a field experiment at an online retailer without any physical stores in a major 
European market. The total observation period covers 30 weeks from October 2017 to April 
2018. We select six brands from six categories with two products each. Within each brand one 
of the products serves as the control product, while the other product is manipulated 
(experimental product). The default setting for these products is the display of a manufacturer-
Purchase Intentioni = α+  β1*ARPi + β2*Shopi + β3*Product + ∈i  (3.1) 
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suggested retail price next to the actual sales prices. Thus, the online shop usually presents all 
12 products in conjunction with an advertised reference price. The treatment in the 
experimental group is therefore the elimination and later re-introduction of the manufacturer-
suggested retail price. Consequently, we split the observation period into three phases: a pre-
phase, the manipulation phase, and a post-phase. The pre-phase represents no change to usual 
behavior, in other words, for a period of 11 weeks we monitor sales with advertised reference 
prices being displayed for both experimental and control products. In the subsequent 
manipulation period, we remove the advertised reference prices from the experimental products 
for 12 weeks. Finally, we re-introduce the advertised reference price for the experimental 
products for the subsequent seven weeks. In the observation period, these products totaled 
165,000 visits and 10,000 orders (see Table 3.2 for descriptive statistics). We assess the data 
with respect to three dependent variables: weekly product visits, cart additions and sales in six 
categories for which Table 3.2 shows rather high variation. The products are groceries and 
accessories with high stockpiling propensity. We include five branded and one private label 
(PL) brand.  
Brand i Type Product j 
Average 
Weekly Price 
Average 
Weekly  
Visits 
Average 
Weekly Cart 
Additions 
Average 
Weekly 
Orders 
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
1 Groceries Control 5.29 0.96 255 50 96 18 76 15 
Experimental 5.29 0.96 305 70 115 19 82 14 
2 Groceries Control 10.99 0.00 266 44 103 27 21 5 
Experimental 10.99 0.00 236 41 78 27 17 4 
3 Accessories Control 20.28 0.90 111 32 9 3 2 1 
Experimental 25.06 0.37 338 92 56 19 13 4 
4 Groceries Control 30.39 1.04 187 29 35 9 13 5 
Experimental 27.29 1.21 286 65 56 16 23 9 
5 Groceries Control 14.99 0.00 47 11 11 5 8 4 
Experimental 9.59 0.00 39 12 14 6 13 5 
PL Accessories Control 53.61 3.53 2706 795 323 113 87 38 
Experimental 75.77 8.26 853 325 62 31 16 9 
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics – Field Experiment 
 
3.5.2 Model 
We use a difference-in-difference approach to analyze the effects of a temporary advertised 
reference price elimination on visits, cart additions, and sales. We estimate the data on all 
available six brands within one model as displayed in equation 3.2. To control for brand-
specific variation, products in both the experimental and the control groups belong to the same 
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brand in the same category. Treatment is a dummy variable indicating whether product j 
belongs to the experimental (= 1) or the control group within one brand. Time indicates whether 
week t is in the manipulation period (= 1). The interaction of treatment and time equals 1 for 
an experimental product in the manipulation phase, zero otherwise. We include the logarithm 
of the actual selling price of product j in week t to control for price differences across products 
and price as price per weight unit to control for different package sizes. 
log(Yjt) =αi+ β1*treatmentj+ β2*time t+ β3i*treatment*timejt+ β4*log(price)jt + ϵjt  (3.2) 
 
 
We utilize the model structure and account for brand heterogeneity in the following ways: First, 
we include random brand-specific intercepts αi. Second, to account for heterogeneous customer 
responses across brands to the elimination of the advertised reference price, we estimate the 
interaction of treatment and time in a brand-specific manner. The coefficient β3i is a vector with 
i brand-specific coefficients.  
3.5.3 Empirical Results 
We set generic, weakly informative priors normally distributed at mean zero and scale ten.22 
Hierarchical estimation requires hyperpriors, which are priors on priors (Stan Development 
Team 2018). The hyperpriors for αi and β3i for scale follow a half-cauchy distribution, with the 
prior mean fixed at zero.23 We analyze the model using Bayesian estimation with No-U-Turn 
sampling (Stan Development Team, 2017). We estimate four chains and base the posterior 
results on a total of 32,000 draws, of which we use the first 16,000 for warm-up. All chains are 
well converged and mixed with a potential scale reduction factor (?̂?) of 1.00 (Gelman et al. 
2013). 
Table 3.3 displays the results of the Bayesian difference-in-difference estimation. Negative 
coefficients for the interaction of time and treatment indicate that not displaying an advertised 
reference price decreases visits, cart additions, and quantity sold. Within brands and across 
dependent variables, the direction of impact is consistent. Thus, if the elimination of advertised 
reference price for brand i decreases (increases) visits, this will translate to a decrease (increase) 
in cart additions as well as in quantity sold (with one exception, i.e., brand 5). However, the 
analysis does not reveal a consistent significant impact of the elimination of advertised 
 
22 β1 ~ normal(0, 10), β2 ~ normal(0, 10), β4 ~ normal(0, 10) 
23 αi ~ normal(0, Scale), β3i ~ normal(0, Scale), Scale ~ cauchy(0, 5); with “Scale” bounded at 0  
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reference prices across brands. For two out of six brands, the coefficients are significant in the 
posterior interval with opposing signs. For the remaining brands, posterior intervals include 
zero. We find structural differences between the type of category, i.e., grocery and accessories. 
For the grocery categories, posterior means are mostly negative (insignificant), while they are 
rather positive for accessories (again brand 5 with small number of sales is an exception). We 
do not find structural differences between the branded categories and the private label products. 
 
  log(Visits) log(Cart Additions) log (Quantity sold) 
Coefficient Posterior mean Posterior mean Posterior mean 
Treat.*Time Brand 1 -0.12  (-0.32; 0.09) -0.14  (-0.46; 0.18) -0.08  (-0.43; 0.27) 
Treat.*Time Brand 2 -0.18  (-0.39; 0.02) -0.44  (-0.79; -0.11) -0.38  (-0.76; -0.03) 
Treat.*Time Brand 3 0.39  (0.17; 0.61) 0.61  (0.25; 0.97) 0.52  (0.14; 0.92) 
Treat.*Time Brand 4 -0.01  (-0.22; 0.2) -0.14  (-0.47; 0.18) -0.22  (-0.59; 0.13) 
Treat.*Time Brand 5 -0.06  (-0.27; 0.15) 0.06  (-0.27; 0.39) 0.16  (-0.18; 0.52) 
Treat.*Time PL 0.46  (0.21; 0.71) 0.18  (-0.18; 0.55) 0.24  (-0.15; 0.64) 
Time -0.03  (-0.12; 0.06) 0.04  (-0.11; 0.18) -0.06  (-0.21; 0.09) 
Treatment 0.26  (0.17; 0.35) 0.46  (0.32; 0.6) 0.47  (0.32; 0.62) 
log Price per Unit -2.09  (-2.35; -1.83) -2.66  (-3.06; -2.26) -3.37  (-3.81; -2.94) 
Intercept Brand 1 8.02  (7.71; 8.33) 7.61  (7.12; 8.1) 8.92  (8.39; 9.45) 
Intercept Brand 2 4.91  (4.79; 5.03) 3.64  (3.44; 3.84) 4.65  (4.43; 4.87) 
Intercept Brand 3 10.31  (9.68; 10.95) 9.42  (8.43; 10.41) 10.59  (9.5; 11.66) 
Intercept Brand 4 6.64  (6.46; 6.82) 5.23  (4.94; 5.51) 7.52  (7.21; 7.83) 
Intercept Brand 5 5.93  (5.65; 6.21) 5.06  (4.61; 5.5) 7.22  (6.73; 7.7) 
Intercept PL 13.15  (12.44; 13.87) 12.36  (11.23; 13.48) 14.30  (13.07; 15.52) 
Note: Posterior mean followed by average 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of posterior interval in parentheses. For 
posterior means printed in bold zero is not included on the 95-posterior interval 
Table 3.3: Results Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
All brand intercepts are significant controlling for heterogeneity across brands. The inclusion 
of the log price per weight unit reveals that a price reduction increases visits, cart additions and 
quantity sold. The posterior mean of -3.27 for the price elasticity with log quantity sold as 
dependent variable is strong but still in line with expected price elasticities in retailing (Bijmolt 
et al. 2005).  
3.5.4 Robustness of Results 
Equation 3.2 does not differentiate between the pre- and post-phase, as in both periods we show 
the advertised reference prices. However, in an environment with constantly displayed 
advertised reference price, re-introduction in the third phase might differ from the first phase. 
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Hence, in a second model we differentiate between the three experimental phases to obtain 
insights into the re-introduction of the advertised reference price. We again estimate all six 
categories within one model. The treatment variable captures whether product j belongs to the 
experimental group (= 1). We then split time into two separate variables: time elimination is an 
indicator variable with value 1 if week t is in the manipulation period, that is, the period in 
which we eliminate the advertised reference price. The second time variable, time re-
introduction, is an indicator variable assigning 1 to the last phase, namely, the re-introduction 
of the advertised reference price. We interact the treatment variable separately with these two 
time variables, namely, time elimination respectively time re-introduction. To account for 
heterogeneous customer responses across brands to advertised reference price elimination and 
re-introduction, we estimate the interaction in a brand-specific manner, such that the 
coefficients β3i and β5i are vectors of length i. Again, we include the actual selling price of 
product j in week t as well as random brand-specific intercepts αi.  
log(Yjt) =αi+ β1*treatmentj+ β2*time eliminationt+ β3i* treatment * time eliminationjt  
+ β
4
*time reintroductiont+ β5i* treatment * time reintroductionjt+ β5*log(price)jt + ϵjt  
(3.3) 
We estimate the model using a Bayesian approach and rely on a Hamiltonian Monte Carlo 
sampler implemented in Stan (Stan Development Team 2017). We set generic, weakly 
informative priors normally distributed at location zero and scale ten. The results are reported 
in Table 3.4. Chains are well converged and mixed with a potential scale reduction factor (?̂?) 
of 1.00 (Gelman et al. 2013). Including a time structure of elimination and subsequent re-
introduction of advertised reference price does not reveal a consistent impact on visits, cart 
additions, or quantity sold. 
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 log(Visits) log(Cart Additions) log (Quantity sold) 
Coefficient Posterior mean Posterior mean Posterior mean 
Treat.*Time elim. brand 1 -0.12 (-0.31; 0.06) -0.14 (-0.46;0.19) -0.13 (-0.49;0.21) 
Treat.*Time elim. brand 2 -0.23 (-0.41; -0.05) -0.50 (-0.83;-0.17) -0.52 (-0.89;-0.15) 
Treat.*Time elim. brand 3 0.44 (0.25; 0.64) 0.76 (0.42;1.12) 0.55 (0.18;0.92) 
Treat.*Time elim. brand 4 0.02 (-0.16; 0.21) -0.10 (-0.43;0.22) -0.27 (-0.64;0.08) 
Treat.*Time elim. brand 5 -0.12 (-0.31;0.06) 0.11 (-0.22;0.44) 0.05 (-0.29;0.4) 
Treat.*Time elim. brand PL 0.20 (-0.02;0.43) -0.12 (-0.5;0.27) -0.19 (-0.62;0.23) 
Treat.*Time re-intro. brand 1 0.03 (-0.19; 0.26) -0.05 (-0.45;0.35) -0.21 (-0.67;0.25) 
Treat.*Time re-intro. brand 2 -0.29 (-0.52; -0.06) -0.37 (-0.78;0.03) -0.66 (-1.13;-0.2) 
Treat.*Time re-intro. brand 3 0.19 (-0.04; 0.42) 0.53 (0.11;0.95) 0.03 (-0.45;0.48) 
Treat.*Time re-intro. brand 4 0.18 (-0.05; 0.41) 0.14 (-0.28;0.54) -0.22 (-0.69;0.24) 
Treat.*Time re-intro. brand 5 -0.13 (-0.36; 0.1) 0.60 (0.2; 1) -0.20 (-0.66; 0.25) 
Treat.*Time re-intro. brand PL -0.72 (-0.99; -0.46) -0.98 (-1.43; -0.53) -1.45 (-1.99; -0.9) 
Time elimination -0.14 (-0.22; -0.05) -0.01 (-0.16; 0.14) 0.02 (-0.14; 0.19) 
Time re-introduction -0.27 (-0.37; -0.17) -0.13 (-0.3; 0.05) 0.29 (0.08; 0.5) 
Treatment 0.27 (0.19; 0.36) 0.43 (0.27; 0.58) 0.56 (0.39; 0.74) 
log Price per Unit -1.78 (-2.02; -1.54) -2.29 (-2.72; -1.86) -2.92 (-3.39; -2.45) 
Intercept Brand 1 7.75 (7.46; 8.05) 7.23 (6.71; 7.75) 8.26 (7.68; 8.85) 
Intercept Brand 2 5.13 (5.01; 5.24) 3.85 (3.64; 4.06) 4.72 (4.49; 4.95) 
Intercept Brand 3 9.59 (8.99; 10.2) 8.45 (7.36; 9.53) 9.30 (8.11; 10.48) 
Intercept Brand 4 6.52 (6.34; 6.7) 5.03 (4.71; 5.34) 7.12 (6.76; 7.47) 
Intercept Brand 5 5.72 (5.45; 5.98) 4.63 (4.15; 5.1) 6.61 (6.08; 7.14) 
Intercept PL 12.49 (11.83; 13.16) 11.51 (10.34; 12.69) 13.08 (11.78; 14.38) 
Note: Posterior mean followed by average 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of posterior interval in parentheses. For 
posterior means printed in bold zero is not included on the 95-posterior interval 
Table 3.4: Results Difference-in-Difference with Pre- and Post-Phase Estimation 
We further test whether the inclusion of a random intercept per week (α2t) changes the results 
(equation 3.4). We estimate the model as before using a Bayesian approach and rely on a 
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampler implemented in Stan (Stan Development Team 2017). All 
chains are well converged with a potential scale reduction factor (?̂?) of (close to) 1.00. Table 
3.5 shows that the coefficients of the interactions do not diverge from results displayed in Table 
3.3, while price elasticity gets slightly stronger. The inclusion of a weekly intercept does not 
reveal any structural changes in the impact of advertised reference prices on visits, cart 
additions, or quantity sold when compared to previous results displayed in in Table 3.3. 
 
log(Yjt) =α1i+ α2t+ β1* treatmentj+ β2* time t+ β3i* treatment * timejt+ β4* log(price)jt + ϵjt  (3.4) 
 
 
 
3. Crossed Out but Still Relevant? Exploring Online Advertised Reference Prices 
 
69 
 
 log(Visits) log(Cart Additions) log (Quantity sold) 
Coefficient Posterior mean Posterior mean Posterior mean 
Treat.*Time Brand 1 -0.13 (-0.31; 0.05) -0.14 (-0.45; 0.16) -0.07 (-0.41; 0.27) 
Treat.*Time Brand 2 -0.19 (-0.37; -0.01) -0.44 (-0.76; -0.13) -0.37 (-0.75; -0.02) 
Treat.*Time Brand 3 0.41 (0.22; 0.6) 0.63 (0.31; 0.96) 0.54 (0.16; 0.93) 
Treat.*Time Brand 4 -0.01 (-0.19; 0.17) -0.13 (-0.44; 0.18) -0.19 (-0.56; 0.15) 
Treat.*Time Brand 5 -0.06 (-0.24; 0.12) 0.05 (-0.26; 0.35) 0.14 (-0.2; 0.5) 
Treat.*Time PL 0.47 (0.26; 0.68) 0.11 (-0.23; 0.45) 0.14 (-0.24; 0.53) 
Time 2.01 (-0.24; 4.34) 1.78 (-0.2; 3.8) 2.09 (-0.3; 4.49) 
Treatment 0.27 (0.2; 0.34) 0.44 (0.31; 0.57) 0.44 (0.29; 0.59) 
log Price per Unit -2.09 (-2.3; -1.88) -2.49 (-2.87; -2.12) -3.14 (-3.58; -2.69) 
Intercept Brand 1 5.99 (4.63; 7.28) 5.70 (4.49; 6.93) 6.50 (5.09; 7.93) 
Intercept Brand 2 2.87 (1.49; 4.18) 1.96 (0.75; 3.15) 2.57 (1.09; 3.97) 
Intercept Brand 3 8.26 (6.83; 9.62) 7.29 (5.92; 8.72) 7.85 (6.21; 9.54) 
Intercept Brand 4 4.61 (3.23; 5.89) 3.40 (2.22; 4.58) 5.22 (3.83; 6.61) 
Intercept Brand 5 3.90 (2.54; 5.18) 3.16 (1.97; 4.37) 4.82 (3.41; 6.25) 
Intercept PL 11.12 (9.66; 12.51) 10.17 (8.73; 11.68) 11.48 (9.74; 13.27) 
Week 1 2.21 (0.92; 3.58) 1.82 (0.63; 3.02) 2.00 (0.6; 3.48) 
Week 2 2.15 (0.85; 3.55) 2.00 (0.81; 3.21) 2.12 (0.71; 3.58) 
Week 3 2.16 (0.86; 3.54) 1.94 (0.74; 3.14) 1.95 (0.55; 3.41) 
Week 4 2.24 (0.94; 3.62) 1.87 (0.67; 3.06) 1.99 (0.56; 3.45) 
Week 5 2.17 (0.87; 3.55) 1.90 (0.72; 3.11) 2.12 (0.71; 3.57) 
Week 6 2.11 (0.82; 3.49) 1.42 (0.22; 2.63) 2.20 (0.79; 3.65) 
Week 7 2.14 (0.84; 3.53) 1.87 (0.68; 3.06) 2.12 (0.69; 3.58) 
Week 8 2.23 (0.93; 3.62) 0.99 (-0.2; 2.19) 2.23 (0.82; 3.68) 
Week 9 2.11 (0.8; 3.49) 1.78 (0.59; 2.98) 2.15 (0.74; 3.6) 
Week 10 2.14 (0.84; 3.51) 2.00 (0.82; 3.2) 2.18 (0.75; 3.66) 
Week 11 2.14 (0.84; 3.53) 2.01 (0.81; 3.22) 2.38 (0.95; 3.85) 
Week 12 -0.29 (-2.19; 1.62) -0.22 (-1.84; 1.42) -0.31 (-2.29; 1.67) 
Week 13 -0.01 (-1.9; 1.92) 0.04 (-1.61; 1.69) -0.15 (-2.11; 1.83) 
Week 14 0.06 (-1.84; 1.97) -0.19 (-1.82; 1.45) 0.01 (-1.97; 2) 
Week 15 0.18 (-1.72; 2.09) 0.19 (-1.45; 1.82) 0.05 (-1.92; 2.02) 
Week 16 0.15 (-1.75; 2.08) 0.11 (-1.51; 1.74) 0.13 (-1.86; 2.1) 
Week 17 0.15 (-1.75; 2.07) 0.22 (-1.42; 1.86) 0.29 (-1.68; 2.26) 
Week 18 0.05 (-1.85; 1.98) 0.02 (-1.63; 1.66) -0.15 (-2.12; 1.84) 
Week 19 -0.17 (-2.08; 1.75) -0.21 (-1.84; 1.44) -0.41 (-2.38; 1.56) 
Week 20 0.00 (-1.91; 1.92) 0.08 (-1.56; 1.74) 0.21 (-1.74; 2.18) 
Week 21 -0.05 (-1.95; 1.88) -0.01 (-1.66; 1.62) 0.09 (-1.9; 2.08) 
Week 22 -0.06 (-1.96; 1.85) -0.24 (-1.88; 1.4) -0.06 (-2.04; 1.92) 
Week 23 -0.05 (-1.93; 1.88) 0.05 (-1.6; 1.69) 0.33 (-1.64; 2.31) 
Week 24 2.06 (0.75; 3.43) 1.90 (0.71; 3.11) 2.42 (1; 3.89) 
Week 25 2.01 (0.71; 3.4) 1.76 (0.57; 2.97) 2.29 (0.87; 3.76) 
Week 26 1.90 (0.6; 3.28) 1.63 (0.44; 2.82) 2.11 (0.68; 3.57) 
Week 27 1.79 (0.49; 3.17) 1.63 (0.45; 2.83) 2.00 (0.6; 3.47) 
Week 28 1.84 (0.55; 3.23) 1.65 (0.47; 2.86) 2.01 (0.6; 3.46) 
Week 29 1.54 (0.24; 2.92) 1.57 (0.36; 2.77) 2.14 (0.72; 3.6) 
Week 30 1.66 (0.37; 3.04) 1.33 (0.14; 2.54) 2.27 (0.85; 3.71) 
Table 3.5: Results Difference-in-Difference with Week-Specific Intercept Estimation 
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Finally, we apply the method of synthetic group controls. The high variation in the dependent 
variables (see Table 3.2) may raise concerns regarding the suitability of the selected control 
product. The synthetic control groups address these concerns. Comparative case studies in 
social sciences have introduced the method of synthetic control groups (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal 2003). Instead of comparing the experimental group with one specific control 
group, the researchers build a synthetic control group from many potential control units 
(Abadie et al. 2010). We use the R-package “Synth” to construct the synthetic control group 
“based on a weighted combination of comparison units that approximates the characteristics of 
the unit that is exposed to the intervention” (Abadie et al. 2010). We use all other products 
available for sale in the same category as the experimental product. Figure 3.2 shows an 
example of a synthetic control group for one of our experimental products. The solid line 
represents sales of the experimental products, while the dashed line is the synthetic control 
group of 254 other products within the same category. The dotted vertical line shows the start 
of the manipulation phase. Across product categories, graphs remain inconclusive regarding 
the impact of the elimination of the advertised reference price (Figure 3.2) as well as the re-
introduction of the advertised reference price (Figure 3.3, synthetic control group weighted 
combination of 287 products, dotted vertical line shows the re-introduction of advertised 
reference price). The graphs exhibit a high degree of variation in sales of the specific 
experimental products, which is not sufficiently reflected in the synthetic control groups. 
Consequently, the method of synthetic group controls is unsuitable for this analysis and 
therefore not further applied. 
 
Figure 3.2: Example of Synthetic Control Group Pre-phase and Manipulation Phase 
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Figure 3.3: Example of Synthetic Control Group Manipulation Phase and Post-phase 
In sum, study two does not support findings of study one. We do not find a consistent 
significant, negative impact of the elimination of advertised reference prices in this specific 
online shop on visits, cart additions, or sales. While we do not find consistency across brands, 
we do find mostly consistent results within brand. If the elimination of an advertised reference 
price decreases (increases) visits for one brand, this is reflected in a decrease (increase) in cart 
additions, as well as in quantity sold. The model is robust with respect to the time structure. 
3.6 Study 3: Transaction Data 
3.6.1 Data Collection and Description 
In the third study, we analyze secondary transaction data from the same online retailer where 
we conduct the field experiment. We collect data on all the transactions on the German website 
in a five-year period from September 2012 until September 2017. We aggregate the transaction 
data to a weekly level to reduce intra-week variability. Of the entire sales data for this five-year 
period, for 35 percent of observations the retailer documents a manufacturer-suggested retail 
price. We reduce the data set accordingly. We restrict the remaining 915,921 observations to 
realistic cases, in which the retailer would display the manufacturer-suggested retail price. We 
define these cases as transactions, for which the actual selling price is smaller than the 
manufacturer-suggested retail price. For 99.4 percent of the remaining observations the 
manufacturer-suggested retail price is larger than the actual selling price. We remove articles 
that sold for less than 52 weeks within the five-year period, which reduces the data by a further 
16 percent. We check for variation in prices over the weeks and eliminate 344 articles without 
variation in the actual selling price or the manufacturer-suggested retail price, reducing the data 
set by a further 4 percent. This still leaves us with an extensive data set of 732,903 observations 
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covering seven categories with 58 subcategories, in total comprising 9.5 million units sold over 
the five-year period at a mean price of € 21 per article. Table 3.6 shows descriptive statistics 
per category. Standard deviations, as well as minima and maxima, exhibit a high degree of 
variety in the prices of articles within and across categories.  
 
Cate-
gory 
Sub-
categories 
Unique 
articles 
Articles sold 
Price per article in € MSRP24 
Average (SD) 
Min 
Max 
Average (SD) 
Min/ 
Max 
1 13 2,524 3,123,899 23.30 (24.52) 0.50/ 349.99  33.15 (35.23)  0.69/ 411.00 
2 13 1,974 4,727,198 17.80 (23.57) 0.79/ 299.99  26.00 (36.00)  0.98/ 399.00 
3 10 398 856,082 22.87 (39.99) 1.29/ 299.99  33.53 (58.77)  1.59/ 399.00  
4 7 162 300,352 18.98 (37.52) 0.99/ 449.00   27.66 (54.37)  1.19/ 520.00  
5 9 549 492,231 20.74 (27.85) 0.85/ 259.00  27.83 (37.77)  1.11/ 379.00  
6 1 1 225 24.50 (2.93) 19.90/ 27.90  30.83 (0.22)  30.45/ 30.95  
7 5 33 16,392 21.97 (10.39) 3.99/ 49.99  27.07 (13.55)  4.50/ 64.99  
Total 58 5,641 9,516,379 20.97 (26.67) 0.50/ 449.00 29.98 (39.07) 0.69/ 520.00 
Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics – Transaction Data 
 
3.6.2 Model 
We analyze the impact of manufacturer-suggested retail prices on quantity sold based on 
weekly article data with a fixed-effects model. To control for article and week-specific 
variation, we include fixed effects α1j for article j and α1t for week t. We construct a quotient 
of manufacturer-suggested retail price per article j in week t divided by the regular price of 
article j in week t to capture the credibility of the manufacturer-suggested retail price. We call 
this quotient reference to regular ratio (R2R-ratio) (equation 5). We approximate the regular 
price, as denominator of the R2R-ratio, as the maximal price of the surrounding nine weeks, 
that is, four weeks prior to t and four weeks after t (equation 6). We choose the approximation 
of the regular price to exclude that temporary price reductions change the R2R-ratio. Figure 
 
24 MSRP = Manufacturer-suggested retail price 
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3.4 displays a histogram of the R2R-ratio. While the maximum R2R-ratio is at 6.61, most 
weekly R2R-ratios are below 3. 
R2R-ratiojt=
Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price
jt
Regular Price
jt
    
(3.5) 
Regular Price
jt
= maxt-4
t+4 (Actual Selling Price
jt
)        (3.6) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Histogram R2R-ratio 
Assimilation-contrast theory suggests an inverted u-shape for the impact of advertised 
reference prices on purchase. Therefore, we include the main effect of the R2R-ratio (R2R), as 
well as the squared term of the R2R-ratio (R2R²). We measure purchase as quantity sold in 
weight units per article and per week. For the dependent variable we take the logarithm of this 
quantity measure. Accordingly, price impact is measured in price per kg per article j in week t. 
To capture a potential moderation of the R2R-ratio the regression includes the interaction of 
the log price per kg and the R2R-ratio. 
log(Yjt) = α1j+ α2t+ β1*R2Rjt+ β2*R2Rjt
2+ β
3
* log(price)jt + β4* log(price)jt *R2Rjt+ ∈jt  (3.7) 
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We estimate the model in R using the “lfe” package (Gaure 2018). 
3.6.3 Empirical Results and Functional Form 
We examine the functional form of the R2R-ratio and the dependent variable. The traditional 
procedure to detect an inverted u-shape in a linear model is to add the squared termed of the 
independent variable and analyze the sign and significance of the coefficient. A significantly 
negative coefficient of the squared term indicates an inverted u-shape (Cohen et al. 2002). A 
subsequent test, on whether the values at which the sign of the coefficient flips are within the 
data, offers further robustness (Berman et al. 2002). Therefore, we initially build up the 
regression displayed in equation 3.7. We sequentially add independent variables as shown in 
equations 3.7a to 3.7f and analyze the significance and sign of the coefficient as well as the 
value at which the sign flips.  
Simonsohn (2018a), however, criticizes these traditional procedures. His main points of 
concern are the high false-positive rates, such that traditional procedures, for example, derive 
that a logarithmic function is u-shaped (Simonsohn 2018a). While the author does not question 
the inclusion of quadratic terms in regressions to account for non-linear relations, he challenges 
the interpretation of the quadratic term as an indicator for a u-shaped relation.25 Instead, a 
straightforward concept estimates two lines by splitting the independent variable under 
examination at a certain value into a high and low variable. A test of whether the two lines 
exhibit slopes with opposing, significant signs follows. The procedure of setting the splitting 
value of the independent variable is critical. The goal is high statistical power of the regression. 
Higher statistical power for the two lines has three potential sources, which the algorithm 
considers: “[…] the algorithm sets a break point that will increase the statistical strength of the 
weaker of the two lines, by placing more observations in that segment, without overly 
attenuating its slope” (Simonsohn 2018a, p. 546)26. We apply the approach suggested by 
Simonsohn (2018a) to our data set. We use the results from the proposed algorithm as guiding 
information for a simplified procedure that considers our fixed-effects setting, including 
thousands of intercepts. We regress the dependent variable on low and high values of the R2R-
ratio, the logarithm of price, as well as the interactions in a fixed-effects setting.  
 
25 Visual inspection of the functional form is not feasible because of the high number of products (5,671).  
26 Three potential sources for high statistical power: (1) out of the two lines, focus on the statistically weaker 
line; (2) steeper lines with (3) more observations (smaller standard error) have more power (Simonsohn 2018a, 
p. 546). 
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Analysis of the Squared Term 
We initially follow the traditional approach and regress the dependent variable on the R2R-
ratio (R2R) and sequentially add the squared R2R-ratio (R2R²) to test for a potential inverted 
u-shape as well as the logarithm of price and the interaction of price and R2R-ratio, while 
accounting for article heterogeneity and time impact with fixed effects. Equations 3.7a to 3.7f 
build up equation 3.7. Due to testing the inverted-u shape, we do not include the R2R-ratio as 
the logarithm of the R2R-ratio. Hence, β1, the coefficient of the main effect of the R2R-ratio 
may not be interpreted as elasticity. Rather, a one unit increase in the R2R-ratio translates to 
an average change in the dependent variable quantity of 100 * (exp(β1) - 1) %. 
 
log(Yjt) = α1j+ α2t+ β1*R2Rjt+ ∈jt  
 
(3.7a) 
log(Yjt) = α1j+ α2t+ β1*R2Rjt+ β2* log(price)jt + ∈jt  (3.7b) 
log(Yjt) = α1j+ α2t+ β1*R2Rjt+ β2* log(price)jt +  β3 ∗ log(price)jt ∗ R2Rjt +  ∈jt  (3.7c) 
log(Yjt) =  α1j +  α2t +  β1 ∗ R2Rjt + β2 ∗ R2Rjt
2
jt
+  ∈jt  
 
(3.7d) 
log(Yjt) =  α1j +  α2t +  β1 ∗ R2Rjt + β2 ∗ R2Rjt
2 + β
3
∗ log(price)jt + ∈jt  
 
(3.7e) 
log(Yjt) =  α1j +  α2t +  β1 ∗ R2Rjt + β2 ∗ R2Rjt
2 + β
3
∗ log(price)jt +β4 ∗ log(price)jt ∗ R2Rjt +  ∈jt  (3.7f) 
Table 3.7 shows the results of Equations 3.7a to 3.7f indicated as models a to f. The R2R-ratio 
(R2R) has a positive impact on quantity sold; in other words, the further away the 
manufacturer-suggested retail price from the regular price, the more the retailer sells. In this 
respect, this study corroborates the findings of study one since the advertised reference price 
being larger than the regular price has a positive impact on sales. In the simplest model, 7a, 
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with only the main effect of the R2R-ratio, increasing the R2R-ratio by one unit leads to a surge 
in quantity by 75 percent. In models d, e, and f we add the squared R2R-ratio. The coefficient 
of the squared R2R-ratio (R2R²) is significant and negative, describing an inverted u-shape in 
all three model constellations. Hence, in line with assimilation-contrast theory, there is an end 
to the positive impact of the R2R-ratio on sales. The price elasticity is negative and close to -2 
which is in the expected region (Bijmolt et al. 2005). The interaction of the R2R-ratio and price 
is negative, such that with a higher R2R-ratio the price elasticity is stronger. The further away 
the manufacturer-suggested retail price from the regular price, the stronger the impact of the 
actual selling price.  
The explained variance (R²) of the fixed-effects model reveals a strong impact of article and 
time. For model f the adjusted R² of the full model including fixed effects is 0.90, while the 
model without fixed effects shows an adjusted R² of 0.04. Hence, the fixed-effects model is 
suited to accounting for considerable heterogeneity across articles and time. 
 a b c d e f 
R2R   0.56 *** 0.05 *** 0.34 ***  1.17 *** 0.18 *** 0.55 *** 
R2R squared       -0.17 *** -0.04 *** -0.05 *** 
Log (price)   -1.90 *** -1.77 ***   -1.89 *** -1.74 *** 
Log (price)* R2R     -0.10 ***     -0.11 *** 
Observations 690,970      
Dependent variable Log (quantity)     
Mult. R² full model 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
Mult. R² proj. model  0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 
 *** <0.001 
Table 3.7: Fixed-Effects Model on Article Level 
Algorithm by Simonsohn (2018a) 
The introduction of a squared term supports an inverted u-shape relation between R2R-ratio 
and the dependent variable in all model settings. However, following Simonsohn (2018a), 
testing significance and sign of the squared term is not sufficient. The author suggests an 
algorithm consisting of five steps to estimate two lines. The procedure relies on cubic splines 
to estimate the relation between x and y. After identifying the most extreme internal fitted value 
?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑥 and the set of ?̂? values within a standard error of ?̂?𝑚𝑎𝑥 (this set is referred to as ?̂?𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡)
27, 
the author estimates an interrupted regression. Here, the breakpoint is critical. The breakpoint 
is the median value of x within the ?̂?𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡. The two resulting t-test statistics t1 and t2 set the 
 
27 Simonsohn (2018a) argues for ?̂?𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡 as most inverted u-shapes are rather Us than Vs, i.e., displaying a region 
with a flat maximum. 
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breakpoint at the t2/(t1+t2) percentile of x associated with ?̂?𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡 (Simonsohn 2018a, p. 546). The 
estimation is based on the interrupted regression displayed in equation 3.8, where xc is the value 
splitting the R2R-ratio (R2R). ZBz is the matrix with covariates, here price and the interaction 
of price and R2R-ratio. In a u-shape relation, β1 and β2 have opposing signs (Simonsohn 
2018a).28 
 
log(Yjt) = α1+ β1*R2Rlowjt+ β2*R2Rhighjt+ β3*high+ ZBz+ ∈jt  
(3.8) 
R2Rlow = R2R – xc if R2R ≤ xc, 0 otherwise 
R2Rlow = R2R – xc if R2R ≥ xc, 0 otherwise 
High = 1 if R2R ≥ xc, 0 otherwise. 
 
  
Unlike the fixed-effects model, we do not account for differences between articles and between 
weeks. We use the R-Code provided by Simonsohn (2018b) for estimation. Table 3.8 shows 
the results. We provide graphs of data and estimated functional form in the Appendix in Figure 
6.10, Figure 6.11, and Figure 6.12. In model a1 opposing signs document an inverted u-shape. 
In models b1 and c1, after adding price and its interaction, the sign of the coefficient of the 
high R2R-ratio values also turns positive. However, across all models the slope of the high 
R2R-ratio is smaller than the slope of the low R2R-ratio.29 The further away the manufacturer 
recommended retail price from the regular price of an article the smaller, but still positive, the 
impact on sales. In line with previous models, the price elasticity remains negative and the 
interaction of price and R2R-ratio exhibits a negative coefficient. 
  a1 b1 c1 
Intercept  1.74 *** 5.49 ***  5.81 *** 
R2R low  0.60 ***  1.25 ***  2.14 *** 
R2R high -0.31 *** 0.06 . 1.11 *** 
Log (price)   -1.24 *** -0.78 *** 
Log (price)* R2R     -0.34 *** 
High  0.01 . -0.14  *** -0.11 *** 
Split value 1.40  1.71  1.71  
Dependent variable   Log(quantity)    
   *** <0.001 
Table 3.8: Results Algorithm by Simonsohn (2018a) 
 
28 As weak inequalities are involved, for discrete values the break point is included in the high and low equation 
(Simonsohn 2018a). 
29 Results are robust for elimination of R2R >6. 
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We introduce a reduced panel-like structure to the model. To control for time impact and article 
heterogeneity we introduce a linear trend over weeks and 58 dummies on subcategory level.30 
The results displayed in Table 3.931 all point in the same direction as before, albeit with smaller 
magnitude. We again find a less positive slope for high R2R-ratio values while the slope does 
not turn negative. Price elasticity and interaction with R2R-ratio remain negative. We provide 
graphs of data and estimated functional form in the Appendix in Figure 6.13 to Figure 6.15. 
 a2 b2 c2 
Intercept  1.35 *** 6.38 *** 6.51 *** 
R2R low  1.35 *** 0.70 *** 1.15 *** 
R2R high 0.31 *** 0.05  0.54 *** 
Log (price)   -1.30 *** -1.08 *** 
Log (price)* R2R     -0.16 *** 
High  0.09 *** -0.09 *** -0.08 *** 
Weekly trend -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Split value 1.39  1.71  1.71  
Dependent variable   Log(quantity)    
   *** <0.001 
Table 3.9: Results Algorithm by Simonsohn (2018a) with Linear Weekly Trend and Subcategory Dummies 
Finally, we combine the fixed-effects approach and the split of the variable (equation 9).  
 
log(Yjt) = α1j+ α2t+ β1*R2R_lowjt+ β2*R2R_highjt+ β4* log(price)jt  
+ β
5
* log(price)jt * R2R_lowjt+ ∈jt  
 
(3.9) 
To assess the results dependent on different splitting values for dividing the R2R-ratio into low 
and high, we provide a sensitivity analysis of the resulting coefficients β1 and β2, as shown in 
Figure 3.5. We plot β1 (R2R-ratio low) and β2 (R2R-ratio high) coefficients resulting from 
different splitting values in relation to the respective R2R-ratio-split32. From a split value of 
1.8 onward, the coefficient of the lower R2R-ratio values is stronger positive than for the higher 
R2R-ratio values. The algorithm proposed by Simonsohn (2018a) suggests a splitting value in 
the same region of 1.71. At an R2R-ratio of 2.9, the coefficients of the higher R2R-ratio turn 
negative (insignificant). Hence, we again find a stronger impact of lower R2R-ratio values on 
the dependent variable than for higher R2R-ratio values. Table 3.10 shows exemplary results 
 
30 Due to calculation constraints, the introduction of several thousand intercepts is not feasible. 
31 The results for 57 dummy coefficients are not displayed here. 
32 We split the R2R-ratio variable into two variables; R2R low and R2R high. We split the variable along a splitting 
value x, such that all observations < x are assigned to the new variable “R2R low”, otherwise 0. All observations 
≥ x are assigned to the new variable “R2R high”, otherwise 0. 
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for the splitting value of two. The R2R-ratio low variable contains all R2R-ratios smaller than 
two, while the R2R-ratio high variable contains all R2R-ratio observations larger or equal to 
two. Again, low R2R-ratio values have a stronger impact on the dependent variable than higher 
R2R-ratio values.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Sensitivity Analysis R2R-ratio Split 
Table 3.10: Example Estimates for R2R-ratio Split Value of 2 
In conclusion, the sign and significance of the price elasticity as well as the interaction of price 
and R2R-ratio, remain untouched by the specified functional form of the main effect of the 
R2R-ratio. The main effect of the R2R-ratio is positive in all specifications, highlighting a 
positive impact of displaying a manufacturer-suggested retail price which is higher than the 
R2R high
R2R low
0.01
0.05
insign.
Coefficient
Significance
Split value R2R
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
R2R low < 2 0.14 0.01 10.73 < 0.000*** 
R2R high ≥ 2 0.05 0.01 6.50 < 0.000*** 
Log (price) -1.86 0.01 -141.17 < 0.000*** 
Log (price)* R2R -0.03 0.00 -8.37 < 0.000*** 
Dependent variable  Log (quantity) 
Multiple R² full model 0.90  
*** <0.001 
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regular price on sales. With respect to the functional form and the main effect of the R2R-ratio, 
the introduction of a squared term supports an inverted-u relation. Further assessment of the 
relation supports stronger impact of lower R2R-ratio values on the dependent variable than for 
higher R2R-ratio values, but no strictly inverted-u relation. Thus, with increasing distance of 
the advertised reference price from the regular price, the impact on sales increases, albeit with 
diminishing strength. Consequently, our research extends offline research. Even exaggerated 
reference prices have a positive impact on sales. 
3.6.4 Robustness of Results  
To further test the robustness of the results, we estimate the models described in equation 3.7a 
to 3.7f on different hierarchical levels. First, we estimate a simple linear model without fixed 
effects controlling for heterogeneity. Afterwards, we include a hierarchical level that is higher 
than in the initial model. We estimate fixed effects for product landing pages instead of unique 
articles. As a further robustness check, we introduce an additional control variable to control 
for the potential impact of promotional activities. We include a dummy variable signaling 
whether or not an item is on promotion.  
Model without Fixed Effects 
The simple linear model without any fixed effects, meaning that we do not account for article 
or time structure, produced the results displayed in Table 3.11. Signs remain the same, while 
price induces a surge in explained variance, supporting previous findings. 
 a b c d e f 
Intercept 1.63 *** 3.91 *** 2.41 *** 1.15 *** 2.84 *** 1.38 *** 
R2R   0.03 *** 0.82 *** 1.93 ***  0.64 ***  2.22 *** 3.29 *** 
R2R squared       -0.20 *** -0.44 *** -0.43 *** 
Log (price)   -1.24 *** -0.71 ***   -1.24 *** -0.72 *** 
Log (price)* R2R     -0.38 ***     -0.38 *** 
Dependent variable Log (quantity)     
Mult. R² full model 0.00 0.64 0.64 0.00 0.64 0.64 
*** <0.001 
Table 3.11: Linear Model Without Fixed Effects 
Model on Product Level 
To test the impact of the choice of the hierarchical level of the article-specific fixed effects, 
instead of 5,641 single articles we use the corresponding 3,385 product landing pages. A 
product landing page includes, e.g., different sizes and flavors of an article. The remaining 
variables are specified on article level. Table 3.12 displays the results. The signs and 
significance of the coefficients remain comparable on different hierarchical levels. The R² of 
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the full model remain conclusive, including a surge after the introduction of price as an 
independent variable. 
 a b c d e f 
R2R   0.32 *** 0.12 *** 0.18 ***  0.93 ***  0.58 *** 0.70 *** 
R2R squared       -0.17 *** -0.13 *** -0.13 *** 
Log (price)   -1.79 *** -1.76 ***   -1.78 *** -1.73 *** 
Log (price)* R2R     -0.02 ***     -0.04 *** 
Dependent variable Log (quantity)     
Mult. R² full model 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.84  0.88 0.88  
Mult. R² proj. model  0.003  0.25 0.25 0.004 0.25 0.25  
*** <0.001 
Table 3.12: Fixed Effects on Product Landing Page Level 
 
Model with Control Variable Promotional Activity 
As a final robustness check we introduce a fixed effect, flagging up whether an item is on 
promotion, which might have an impact on sales. Table 3.13 shows that the results are robust 
with respect to the introduction of a promotional factor in the example of the article level 
model. 
 a b c d e f 
R2R   0.56 *** 0.05 *** 0.34 ***  1.16 *** 0.18 *** 0.55 *** 
R2R squared       -0.17 *** -0.04 *** -0.05 *** 
Log (price)   -1.90 *** -1.77 ***   -1.89 *** -1.74 *** 
Log (price)* R2R     -0.10 ***     -0.11 *** 
Observations 687,775      
Dependent variable Log (quantity)     
Multiple R² full model 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91 
Multiple R² proj. model  0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 
*** <0.001 
Table 3.13: Fixed Effects on Article Level Including Promotion 
In summary, the hierarchical level of the fixed effects neither drives the sign nor significance 
of the price elasticity nor the interaction of price and R2R-ratio. Price and the interaction of 
price and R2R-ratio have a negative impact on the dependent variable in all the tested settings.  
3.6.5 Profit Assessment 
The main effect of the R2R-ratio is positive, while the interaction of the actual selling price 
and the R2R-ratio is negative across all robustness checks and functional forms. These results 
highlight the role of credibility in using advertised reference prices. For the retailer, increasing 
the R2R-ratio, ceteris paribus, increases sales, at the same time it strengthens the impact of 
price changes on sales. In the following, we show the revenue and profit impact for three 
3. Crossed Out but Still Relevant? Exploring Online Advertised Reference Prices 
82 
 
scenarios: an increase in the R2R-ratio, a temporary price decrease in the actual selling price33, 
and the combination of the two. We use a three-step procedure to quantify the impact for the 
retailer.34  
First, we derive the predictions of the quantity for each article in each week based on the 
articles’ actual price, R2R-ratio. Based on these quantities we use article- and week-specific 
prices and margins to calculate revenue and profit.35 Second, we introduce different 
simulations: we assess the absolute sales impact of a change in the R2R-ratio by 0.01, of a 
change in actual selling price by 1 percent, and of the combination of different R2R-ratio 
increases with an actual selling price decrease, ceteris paribus, per week and article. We then 
cumulate over all weeks and articles and again calculate revenues and profits. Third, we derive 
the deltas in sales, revenue and profit between predictions and simulations. 
In total, an increase in the R2R-ratio in each week for each article by 0.01 increases cumulated 
sales by 34,000 units, associated revenue by €104,000 and profit by €21,000. Figure 3.6 
displays the profit per article cumulated across weeks. Temporary price reductions underline 
that even manufacturer-suggested retail prices, that are not credible, affect sales. While a price 
reduction by 1 percent, ceteris paribus, increases sales by 308,000 units and revenue by 
€873,000, it induces a profit decrease of €480,000, when compared to the predictions. The 
same price reduction, in combination with an increase in the R2R-ratio, changes profitability 
advantageously. Figure 3.7 displays the delta in profit of a price reduction in combination with 
different increases in the R2R-ratio compared to the profit of the predictions. The delta for each 
value of the R2R-ratio is the sum across all articles and weeks. Increasing the R2R-ratio value 
by 0.3 units changes the negative profit delta of a 1 percent price decrease to a positive profit 
impact. Thus, this simulation highlights that for the retailer using less credible manufacturer-
suggested retail price is beneficial. 
 
 
33 We assess a price reduction independent of a change in the R2R-ratio since the R2R-ratio includes the regular 
price. The price reduction is supposed to be temporarily limited and therefore should not impact the R2R-ratio. 
34 As we do not find clear support for an inverted-u shape, we assess the impact of changes in the reference to 
regular ratio on profit based on model c, i.e., equation 3.7c using article and week-specific prices and profit 
margins. 
35 We must reduce the data set by 173 articles for which profit margin information is missing, leading to a 
reduction in observations from 690,970 to 662,220. 
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Figure 3.6: Absolute Change in Profit Given R2R-ratio Increase by 0.01 Cumulated per Article 
 
Figure 3.7: Absolute Change in Profit Based on R2R Increase 
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3.7 Discussion and Managerial Implications 
The aim of this study was to shed light on the performance of advertised reference prices in 
online settings. We identified five avenues to contribute to the large field of research on 
advertised reference prices. 
First, the impact of advertised reference prices in online environments is largely unknown, 
although the theory suggests substantial changes in the informational environment (Bakos 
1997). As online pricing nevertheless seems to follow offline pricing by offering advertised 
reference prices on a great share of products in online shops, we add to the limited existing 
research on the performance of advertised reference prices in online environments.  
Second, research in the field of advertised reference prices reports a positive impact of 
advertised reference prices on purchasing (Compeau and Grewal 1998). This effect might 
diminish from a long-term perspective, as research on promotions reports that frequent 
promotions have less impact on purchase decisions (Alba et al. 1994; Alba et al. 1999).  
We addressed both avenues with experimental studies assessing whether advertised reference 
prices have an impact on online sales. Study one, an online experiment, revealed a positive 
impact of advertised reference prices on purchasing and sales. Study two, a field experiment, 
however, did not find a significant impact. 
The online experiment exhibited a positive effect of displaying an advertised reference price 
on purchase intentions. Hence, this experimental study supports the existing findings on 
advertised reference prices. However, while high in internal validity, the laboratory setting of 
the study potentially limited the access to information by subjects. It is likely that the subjects 
did not search for other price information online while answering the survey. Thus, although 
we framed the experiment as an online shopping experience, this study was potentially limited 
with respect to the information search conducted by the respondents. To challenge this finding 
and to add external validity, we conducted a field experiment. In this natural environment, 
displaying an advertised reference price is the default mode, meaning that the products’ landing 
pages usually display an advertised reference price. Furthermore, customers were more likely 
to be familiar with the product they were buying and aware of, or accessing, additional price 
information compared to the online experiment. Here, we were not able to replicate the findings 
from the online survey. We did not find a consistent effect of advertised reference prices on 
visits, cart additions, or sales. In sum, we did not find empirical evidence justifying advertised 
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reference prices online; nor did we find the opposite scenario. In this field setting, eliminating 
the advertised reference price did not decrease sales strongly and significantly.  
Third, we analyzed whether, and how, the impact of the credibility of an advertised reference 
price, operationalized as the ratio of manufacturer-suggested retail price and regular price, 
impacts sales. The focal aspect was the analysis of the functional form of the relation, for which 
we used a large transaction data set. We did not find full support for an inverted u-shape. 
However, different approaches to accessing the functional form underlined a diminishing 
positive impact of the credibility of advertised reference prices for high values on sales: the 
larger the distance between the manufacturer-suggested retail price and the regular selling 
price, i.e., the less credible the manufacturer-suggested retail price, the less positive the impact 
on sales. Nevertheless, even manufacturer-suggested retail prices that were substantially higher 
than the regular price still had a positive impact on sales.  
Fourth, we assessed whether the actual selling price becomes a stronger signal the less credible 
the manufacturer-suggested retail price, namely, whether the R2R-ratio moderates price 
elasticity negatively. We found a negative relation. Thus, the further away the manufacturer-
suggested retail price from the regular price, i.e., the less credible the manufacturer-suggested 
retail price, the stronger the impact of the actual selling price on sales.  
Finally, based on the same data set, we conducted a profit simulation. We found that using less 
credible advertised reference prices in combination with price reductions can balance the 
negative profit impact of temporary price reductions. 
Displaying advertised reference prices comes at a cost for retailers since advertised reference 
prices must adhere to legal requirements. Therefore, retailers need to generate, update, or 
validate advertised reference prices, resulting in personnel costs. Furthermore, if legal 
requirements are violated, the penalties are a potential cost factor. Therefore, from a managerial 
perspective it is of interest to analyze whether displaying advertised reference prices increases 
sales. While we did not find a consistent positive impact of advertised reference prices across 
all three studies, we also did not find the opposite to be true. Hence, as a first step, displaying 
advertised reference prices in online shops, even if they have a notion of an inflated advertised 
reference price, does not seem to harm sales. The field experiment, however, highlights that in 
a realistic purchasing environment, the advertised reference price might not be as strong a cue 
when in competition with other information and when displayed by default. Based on the field 
experiment, we cannot provide robust estimates of the sales impact of the elimination of 
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advertised reference prices; thus, we do not find evidence to suggest retailers should not 
continue with the status quo, as it does not harm sales. Furthermore, studies one and three point 
in the direction of a positive impact of advertised reference prices in online environments. 
The analysis of the credibility of advertised reference prices provides interesting insights. This 
analysis revealed that for less credible advertised reference prices online, customers tend to re-
focus on the actual selling price. Thus, retailers must manage the constellation of three price 
cues, namely, the manufacturer-suggested retail price, the regular price, and the actual selling 
price. However, we want to underline the responsibility of retailers with respect to the legal 
requirements. As study three highlights the positive profit impact of using less credible 
manufacturer-suggested retail prices, it is evident that there is the potential to trick customers 
into buying with less credible or inflated reference prices. When providing a manufacturer-
suggested retail price with the intention of highlighting the offer value of the product, the 
manufacturer-suggested retail price has to be true. Otherwise, although customers can easily 
access additional price information online, the online shop is deceiving its customers and may 
face financial penalties and loss of image.  
3.8 Limitations and Future Research 
We note several limitations that might guide future research. In both the online experiment and 
the field experiment, we model the advertised reference price as a dichotomous variable. As 
we chose the manufacturer-suggested retail price as advertised reference price for the field 
experiment, we could not manipulate the distance of the advertised reference price and the 
regular price by adjusting the advertised reference price. Future research might address this 
relation in further experiments.  
The field experiment revealed a high level of variance in weekly sales of the selected products. 
Repeating this experiment in an environment exhibiting less natural variation might lead to 
more structured and more conclusive results. Furthermore, we focused on a limited sample of 
products per brand, which might also impact the generalizability of our findings. 
We gathered data from one company in one European market, which limits the generalizability 
of our findings. Future research might address this aspect and analyze the performance of 
advertised reference prices for different categories and multiple retailers.  
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4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, the ascent of the Internet has disrupted retailing. Online shopping has provided 
customers with easy access to information, lower search costs for information, and new forms 
of information. The Internet has, in particular, changed the scope of providing information from 
customer to customer by the means of online product reviews. Online product reviews are 
“peer-generated product evaluations posted on company or third party web sites” (Mudambi 
and Schuff 2010, p. 186). While traditionally customers would exchange information among 
their peers only, posting a product review online, makes it accessible to anyone (Dellarocas 
2003). With the ascent of the Internet such online product reviews “have become one of the 
most popular information sources for modern consumers” (Racherla et al. 2012, p. 94). Today, 
online product reviews are ubiquitous. In recent years, major retailers have accumulated an 
enormous number of reviews, such that showing product reviews is increasingly becoming 
standard practice for retailers; for example, on Amazon.com in 2014 more than 140 million 
product reviews were available (McAuley et al. 2015).36 According to recent surveys, for 93 
percent of respondents37 reviews have an impact on their purchase decisions (Podium 2017), 
and online peer and expert reviews are the top two influencers in purchase decisions, while 
advice from family and friends is relegated to third place (Stine and Sethi 2014).38 The reason 
for product reviews playing a key role for customers is that customers perceive risk when 
purchasing products. They buy in markets that are characterized by information asymmetry 
that is disadvantageous to customers because sellers typically know the quality of their products 
better than customers, meaning that customers will pay the price of the product while being 
uncertain about its performance (Forsythe et al. 2006). To facilitate purchase decisions, sellers 
try to reduce uncertainty by providing information on their products (Kirmani and Rao 2000), 
while customers counteract these perceived risks by searching for information, e.g., by 
consulting product reviews. Reviews reduce the risk involved in the purchase decision, as they 
provide signals on the quality of products. These signals on the quality of the products are of 
particular importance for pricing. Quality is inherent to pricing literature, since it is assumed 
to influence the impact of price on sales, e.g., for larger brands price elasticities are less strong 
potentially stemming from the higher quality of these large brands (Fok et al. 2006). Thus, as 
 
36 The data crawled by McAuley spans the period from May 1996 until July 2014. 
37 A total of 2,005 respondents took part in the survey (Podium 2017). 
38 A total of 1,174 customers took part in the survey, and the sample is representative of the United States 
broadband population by age, income, and region. 
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online product reviews signal quality they may also moderate the impact of price on sales. For 
example, in the presence of many positive reviews, there are strong signals for high quality of 
the product, so that the perceived risk of the purchase decreases and price might become a less 
relevant factor. Consequently, positive product reviews might dampen the impact of price on 
sales. This potential impact of reviews on price is substantial, as price is of outstanding 
importance for retailers. Existing marketing research has identified price as the most powerful 
instrument steering demand in offline shopping. A comparison of meta-analyses on marketing 
instruments reveals that the impact of price on sales is substantially stronger than the impact of 
other marketing instruments. For example, the impact of price on sales is ten times greater than 
the impact of advertising (Bijmolt et al. 2005; Sethuraman et al. 2011).39 
Therefore, this study has the primary goal of understanding whether and how online product 
reviews affect the impact of price on sales, i.e., price elasticities, online.  
In order to obtain granular insights, we follow existing research and analyze the impact of 
product reviews via three dimensions (Chintagunta et al. 2010). The first dimension of a review 
is valence. Valence is the average rating of a product and illustrates the level of satisfaction 
that other customers derive from the product (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2008; 
Kostyra et al. 2016). Valence is typically provided on a five-star scale (e.g., the three largest 
US online retailers accounting for 45 percent of traffic, Amazon.com, ebay.com, and 
Walmart.com (Miller and Washington 2017), ask for reviews on a five-star scale). The second 
dimension is volume, which captures the amount of reviews that other customers have provided 
for this specific product (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2008; Kostyra et al. 2016). 
And the last dimension is variance within the reviews. Variance captures the spread in average 
reviews, i.e., the disagreement or agreement among reviewers (Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Sun 
2012). According to existing research, these three dimensions, individually and collectively, 
impact the purchase decisions of customers in online retail settings. 
So far, however, research on the interactions between valence, volume, variance, and price is 
very scarce. Two existing studies have discuss these relations and highlight the relevance of 
product reviews for pricing (Kostyra et al. 2016; Maslowska et al. 2017). While Kostyra et al. 
 
39 The meta-analysis by Sethuraman et al. (2011) assesses 56 studies published between 1960 and 2008. They 
report a short-term advertising elasticity based on 751 individual elasticities of 0.12 and a long-term advertising 
elasticity based on 402 elasticities of 0.24. Bijmolt et al. (2005) report a price elasticity of -2.62 based on 1,851 
individual price elasticities from 81 studies. 
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(2016) do not include distinct interactions, Maslowska et al. (2017) assess interactions but 
exclude variance from their analysis. Given this scarcity of empirical findings, we pose the first 
research question: 
(3.1) Do valence, volume, and variance moderate the impact of price on sales? 
On top of that, product reviews might influence sales directly since they increase customers’ 
trust in an online shop by signaling that other customers have already made purchases from the 
shop (Dellarocas 2003); they also indicate quality and customer satisfaction with the product 
(Floyd et al. 2014; Kostyra et al. 2016; Maslowska et al. 2017). In line with the growing 
relevance of product reviews in practice, many research publications focus on the role of 
product reviews in online shopping. In particular, studies examine the effects of product 
reviews on sales and provide guidance for companies to leverage reviews to their advantage. 
While most researchers have found that review valence positively influences purchase 
decisions (e.g., Chintagunta et al. 2010), other empirical results downplay the relevance of 
valence and stress the impact of review volume (e.g., Amblee and Bui 2011). One reason for 
these mixed findings may be that studies show a strong focus on a limited number of product 
categories, as well as data sources (Trenz and Berger 2013; Babić Rosario et al. 2016). The 
meta-analysis by Babić Rosario et al. (2016) highlights this concentration. Of the total 1,532 
effect sizes in their study, 59 percent originate from books and movies. The same analysis 
reveals that 44 percent of studies are based on Amazon data (Babić Rosario et al. 2016). In 
addition, the interactions between review dimensions, i.e., the role of the number of reviews in 
combination with valence, as well as the interaction of valence and variance, have only recently 
emerged as a further fruitful aspect in research (Kostyra et al. 2016). While Chintagunta et al. 
(2010) do not find a significant moderation of valence by volume for movies, other contextual 
settings provide opposing results. Park et al. (2012), in analyzing camera products, Maslowska 
et al. (2017) for health and beauty products, and Kostyra et al. (2016) for e-readers, provide 
evidence for a moderation. Only three studies so far have analyzed the interaction between 
valence and variance. Sun (2012) finds a significant interaction between valence and variance 
for books: for books with low average rating, high variance increases demand. For a highly 
rated book, higher variance reduces demand. Kostyra et al. (2016) corroborates the findings of 
Sun (2012) in a choice experiment, whereas Chintagunta et al. (2010) report the interaction to 
be insignificant for movies. 
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Overall, research findings on product reviews and their effects on sales show mixed empirical 
results regarding the relevance of the three review dimensions, and they show very limited 
findings on the interactions of such. One possible reason for these mixed findings is that a 
comprehensive perspective, including the moderation among review dimensions (Kostyra et 
al. 2016; Maslowska et al. 2017), as well as the moderation of price, has mostly been ignored. 
Thus, the second objective of this paper is to address those mixed findings and assess the impact 
of review dimensions, as well as their interactions on sales: 
(3.2) Do valence, volume, and variance – individually and comprehensively – have an 
impact on sales?  
Hence, this study sets out to comprehensively integrate research on product reviews and pricing 
research. We propose that the assessment of the moderation of the impact of price on sales by 
the above-mentioned review dimensions, as well as the inclusion of the relevant interactions 
between review dimensions, will lead to a clearer picture of product reviews and contribute to 
findings that are currently mixed. Furthermore, adding knowledge to the relation of reviews 
and price may provide useful guidance for the complex task of setting and changing product 
prices for retailers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the interaction 
between all three review dimensions and price (see Table 4.1 for an overview of existing studies 
that consider sales or sales-related variables as the dependent variable, and which include all 
three dimensions of reviews, or at least two dimensions of reviews in combination with price.)  
We test the effects with transaction data collected from a large European online retailer over 
the course of three years. We focus on retailer-based product reviews, i.e., the retailer provides 
a platform that enables customers to review the product. This type of review provides a direct 
link between reviews and purchases, as customers can only review products that they have 
bought. With this data set we combine data on review dimensions, prices, and sales. We further 
include the profit margin to assess the impact on profit. To overcome the limitations in product 
categories in the extant literature, we collect data on a broad product range of roughly 45,000 
products in 88 product categories from seven countries.  
The next chapter outlines the conceptual framework of the study and develops the hypotheses 
in detail. Subsequent to presenting the methodology, we describe the study’s results and test 
their robustness. We further use the results to illustrate pricing decisions based on product 
reviews, as well as the impact on sales, revenue, and profit. Afterwards, we discuss the results 
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and derive managerial implications. Finally, the limitations and future research 
recommendations are put in focus. 
 Valence Volume Variance Price 
Interact. with 
Price 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Results 
Chintagunta et 
al. (2010) 
Yes Yes Yes - -  Box office 
sales 
Only valence 
significant 
Sun (2012) Yes Yes Yes Yes -  Books sales 
rank 
Interactions 
significant40 
Kostyra et al. 
(2016) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes41 -  E-readers’ 
choice 
Interactions 
significant 
 
Maslowska et 
al. (2017) 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes  Health and 
beauty sales 
Interactions 
significant 
 
Our Study Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Consumer 
goods sales 
Interactions 
significant 
Table 4.1: Overview of Existing Empirical Findings on Product Reviews Including Interactions 
4.2 Contribution and Conceptual Framework 
As outlined above, in this study we focus on retail, which is commonly characterized by 
information asymmetry that is disadvantageous to the customer. Such information asymmetries 
have an impact on demand (Stiglitz 2000). Signaling theory addresses the uncertainty 
originating from information asymmetry (Spence 1978). With the provision of signals parties 
seek to reduce information asymmetry (Connelly et al. 2011). In order to reduce uncertainty, 
retailers and manufacturers steer marketing mix variables as quality signals, for example, by 
building brands or granting warranties (Kirmani and Rao 2000). In the presence of positive 
quality signals, the perceived risk of the purchase decreases and price might become a less 
relevant factor, so that the impact of price on sales diminishes. 
Product reviews are a unique type of signal for the retailer. In contrast to other signals, retailers 
decide whether to provide the platform that enables customers to review the product, whereas 
they cannot directly steer the product reviews that are then posted on their website. We 
concentrate on such retailer-hosted product review platforms that provide a direct link between 
reviews and purchases. Furthermore, we focus on quantitative product-specific reviews, which 
ask the customer to evaluate a specific product based on a pre-defined rating scale. We follow 
the existing research by differentiating online reviews along three dimensions (Chintagunta et 
al. 2010): valence (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2008; Kostyra et al. 2016), volume 
 
40 Higher variance increases sales for low-valence books and decreases sales for high-valence books (Sun 2012). 
41 The importance of price decreases when product reviews are present (Kostyra et al. 2016). 
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(Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Duan et al. 2008; Kostyra et al. 2016), and variance (Godes and 
Mayzlin 2004; Sun 2012). Much research has been conducted on these dimensions with respect 
to different dependent variables, e.g., sales (Maslowska et al. 2017), sales rank (Chevalier and 
Mayzlin 2006; Amblee and Bui 2011), or helpfulness (Mudambi and Schuff 2010). In the 
following, to derive our hypotheses we review the existing literature on these three dimensions 
of product reviews and their relation to price with respect to sales-related dependent variables.  
4.2.1 Review Dimension: Valence 
Valence refers to the preference conveyed with the review, which can be positive, neutral, or 
negative (Liu 2006). The average number of stars that previous reviewers have assigned to the 
product indicates its valence. It is an indicator of the product’s quality and customers’ 
satisfaction with the product (Floyd et al. 2014; Kostyra et al. 2016; Maslowska et al. 2017; 
Watson et al. 2018). According to social impact theory, people affect one another, to the point 
that one individual’s actions influence another individual’s motives, values, and behaviors 
(Latané 1981). Latané (1981) defines such effects as social impact. As such, product reviews 
have a social impact. The exposure to product reviews, i.e., to another customer’s satisfaction 
with a product, can generate, support, or change a customer’s preference for the product. Thus, 
product reviews have a persuasive effect (Rui et al. 2013), as they move customers’ preferences 
toward the preference (positive, neutral, negative) given in the review and thereby affect 
customers’ purchase decisions (Rui et al. 2013).  
Research on the impact of valence on sales has so far been consistent in its positive direction 
of the effect but mixed regarding its significance. The majority of studies find a significantly 
positive effect of valence on sales (Chintagunta et al. 2010; Gopinath et al. 2014; Maslowska 
et al. 2017), sales rank (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), and choice in experimental settings 
(Kostyra et al. 2016). However, some studies find valence to be an insignificant driver of sales 
(Duan et al. 2008) and sales rank (Amblee and Bui 2011; Park et al. 2012).  
In recent years conceptional literature reviews (Cheung and Thadani 2012; Trenz and Berger 
2013; King et al. 2014), as well as meta-analyses (Floyd et al. 2014; You et al. 2015; Babić 
Rosario et al. 2016), have started to summarize and analyze the existing research on product 
reviews. We concentrate on the three meta-analyses analyzing sales-related dependent 
variables: Floyd et al. (2014), You et al. (2015), and Babić Rosario et al. (2016). All three meta-
analyses find a positive impact of valence on sales. Floyd et al. (2014) analyze 26 articles on 
how valence influences the elasticity of retailer sales. They find a positive mean sales elasticity 
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with a valence of 0.69. The meta-analysis by You et al. (2015) corroborates this positive impact 
of valence based on 51 articles. They report an average valence elasticity of 0.42. Babić Rosario 
et al. (2016) review research with a broader scope, including 96 studies. They also report a 
positive correlation between valence and sales. Hence, following the majority of findings, we 
test the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Positive valence, i.e., four- and five-star reviews, has a positive impact on sales 
compared to a neutral valence of three stars. 
H1b: Negative valence, i.e., one- and two-star reviews, has a negative impact on sales 
compared to a neutral valence of three stars. 
4.2.2 Review Dimension: Volume 
Volume is the total number of reviews that one product has received (Floyd et al. 2014). Many 
studies name customer awareness as reason why volume without any information on valence 
has an impact on sales. With an increasing number of reviews, the probability of gaining 
information on the product increases, i.e., awareness of the product (Liu 2006; Chen et al. 2011; 
Cui et al. 2012; Park et al. 2012). Awareness, in turn, is a necessary condition for purchasing, 
thus resulting in higher sales (Godes and Mayzlin 2004). However, for reviews that are posted 
on retailer websites the creation of awareness is a questionable reason, as customers only see 
the review after searching for the product (Duan et al. 2008). For reviews on retailer websites, 
the bandwagon effect offers a more suitable explanation. The bandwagon effect describes 
diffusion behavior, in which the probability of adoption increases with the number of people 
who have already adopted (Babić Rosario et al. 2016). As many review systems require a 
verified purchase in order to write a review, e.g., Amazon.com, a high number of reviews 
implies a high number of people who have bought the product. Social impact theory also 
underlines that the impact of other people on an individual’s behavior is, among other things, 
based on the number of other people exerting an impact (Latané 1981). As the volume of 
reviews represents the number of people, the more reviews there are, the higher the incentive 
there is to imitate previous behavior.  
Most empirical studies report a positive impact of volume on sales (Maslowska et al. 2017) 
and sales rank (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Amblee and Bui 2011). Others find the impact to 
be insignificant: Gopinath et al. (2014) report that volume does not impact the sales of cellular 
phones while valence does. Chintagunta et al. (2010) support this finding for the box-office 
performance of movies. 
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Meta-analytical findings, however, support a positive impact of volume on sales. Floyd et al. 
(2014) find a positive mean sales elasticity of volume of 0.35. You et al. (2015) report an 
average volume elasticity of 0.24. However, the meta-analyses present different results on 
which dimension is more influential. Babić Rosario et al. (2016) choose a more differentiated 
approach. They introduce the composite valence–volume metric to differentiate between 
absolute and relative volume. They add to existing meta-analyses that volume and the 
composite valence–volume are most important with respect to sales. Furthermore, analyzing 
the results of these meta-analyses, the relation between volume and sales is more robust than 
the one between valence and sales (Schoenmueller et al. 2018). Following meta-analytical 
results, we hypothesize: 
H2: An increasing volume of reviews has a positive impact on sales. 
4.2.3 Review Dimension: Variance  
Variance is the variation in reviews and captures the heterogeneity among reviews (Sun 2012). 
Different interpretations of the impact of variance include, on the one hand, that, as customers 
are risk-averse, heterogeneity in evaluations should decrease demand; and, on the other hand, 
that heterogeneous reviews induce curiosity, which increases demand. Additionally, a high 
dispersion of reviews might make customers deduce that the product is a niche product which 
induces extreme evaluations (Sun 2012). Research mainly focuses on volume and valence, 
while only a few studies pay attention to variance, with mixed findings (Babić Rosario et al. 
2016). Clemons et al. (2006) and Sun (2012) report a significant correlation of the variance of 
reviews and sales, and Kostyra et al. (2016) corroborate these insights with a choice 
experiment. In contrast, Chintagunta et al. (2010) find no significant impact of variance. 
Babić Rosario et al. (2016) provide the only meta-analysis that includes variance. They derive 
that polarized evaluations increase risk and uncertainty, causing customers to avoid the 
product. Hence, variance reduces customers’ reliance on reviews (Babić Rosario et al. 2016). 
Following these findings, we hypothesize: 
H3: Increasing variance decreases sales. 
4.2.4 Interactions Between Review Dimensions 
Despite strong growth in the field, we do not yet have a clear picture of product reviews. One 
potential reason for the mixed findings might be the omission of interactions among review 
dimensions (Kostyra et al. 2016; Maslowska et al. 2017).  
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Besides the direct impact of volume on sales, volume might moderate the effect of valence on 
sales. Higher volume increases the trustworthiness of the reviews’ valence, as the overall rating 
converges to the true value of valence with an increasing number of reviews. While 
Chintagunta et al. (2010) find no significant impact of this interaction in the field of movies, 
Park et al. (2012) stress the relevance of the interaction of valence and volume and report that 
valence is positively interacted with volume in the category of camera products. Both 
Maslowska et al. (2017), for a high number of fast-moving consumer-goods categories, and 
Kostyra et al. (2016), in a choice experiment, support the notion that a high number of reviews, 
i.e., high volume, strengthens the positive sales impact of positive valence, as well as the 
negative sales impact of negative valence. Therefore, we hypothesize the following interaction 
between valence and volume:  
H4a: Volume moderates the impact of four- and five-star reviews positively, leading to a 
more positive impact on sales.  
H4b: Volume moderates the impact of one- and two-star reviews negatively, strengthening 
their negative sales impact. 
Sun (2012) provides reasons for the inclusion of the interaction of valence and variance. High 
variance is associated with a niche product, i.e., with extreme evaluation, as some love and 
others hate the product. The author finds a significant interaction between valence and 
variance: for a product with low valence, higher variance increases demand. For high-valence 
products, higher variance reduces demand. These findings are not supported by Chintagunta et 
al. (2010). Another interpretation of the impact of the variance of reviews relates to risk 
aversion or the trustworthiness of the review. Low variance in reviews reduces risk and 
increases trustworthiness, while high variance increases the risk involved in the purchase. 
Kostyra et al. (2016) find support for the idea that higher variance decreases the positive impact 
of high valence and decreases the negative impact of low valence. Hence, we hypothesize 
moderation of the impact of valence on sales by variance: 
H5a: For high valence, higher variance decreases sales, i.e., increasing variance decreases 
the positive impact of high valence on sales. 
H5b: For low valence, higher variance increases demand, i.e., increasing variance weakens 
the negative impact of low valence on sales. 
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4.2.5 Price 
An extensive stream of research on pricing reflects that changing the price of a product is one 
of the most important topics in marketing (Gijsbrechts 1993). Two influential meta-analyses 
by Tellis (1988) and Bijmolt et al. (2005) summarize the research on price elasticities. Both 
meta-analyses focus on offline pricing; consequently, they do not contain product reviews. 
However, the construct linking product review and price is quality, as product reviews are an 
indicator of the quality of the product, respectively, of customers’ satisfaction with the product 
(Floyd et al. 2014; Kostyra et al. 2016; Maslowska et al. 2017). Both Tellis (1988, p. 334) and 
Bijmolt et al. (2005, p. 150) assess whether the inclusion of a quality indicator influences price 
elasticity under the hypothesis that not including quality would bias price elasticities positively. 
The results are mixed: while Tellis (1988) finds support for the omitted variable bias, Bijmolt 
et al. (2005) do not. Several studies explicitly focus on the determinants of price elasticities or 
price-promotion elasticities. Fok et al. (2006) provide a selection of such studies on price 
elasticities. The focus is on category, brand, and product features to explain the differences in 
price elasticities. Fok et al. (2006) find, among others, that brand size as a share of sales 
moderates price elasticities. Quality as an underlying construct plays an important role in the 
reasoning for this determinant of price elasticities. For brand size, the hypothesis based on 
previous empirical studies is enhanced by the idea “that large brands tend to have higher 
quality; in turn, this could lead to lower price elasticities” (Fok et al. 2006, p. 448). Hence, 
although meta-analyses provide opposing results, quality is inherent to pricing literature, 
meaning that increasing quality might shift price elasticity closer to zero. 
In research on product reviews, while there are studies that control for price (You et al. 2015; 
Babić Rosario et al. 2016)42 , that analyze the impact of reviews on price (Shin et al. 2008), as 
well as the impact of price on reviews (Li and Hitt 2010), research on the moderation of the 
impact of price on sales by dimensions of product reviews is scarce. Kostyra et al. (2016)43 and 
Maslowska et al. (2017) are two exceptions. Only Maslowska et al. (2017) include interactions 
among the dimensions of product reviews and price, while Kostyra et al. (2016) do not assess 
interactions directly but use a dichotomous control-group approach. Kostyra et al. (2016) 
conduct a conjoint analysis including all three dimensions of product reviews, as well as 
 
42 Two of the existing meta-analyses on product reviews, review the inclusion of price as a control variable and 
provide a mixed picture. While Babić Rosario et al. (2016) report that not controlling for price systematically 
biases the impact of word-of-mouth information, You et al. (2015) find no significant impact. 
43 Kostyra et al. (2016) do not assess interactions directly but use a dichotomous control-group approach. 
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product attributes, including price. They compare the relevance of price when product reviews 
are present as opposed to when they are not. The relevance of price and all other product 
attributes decreases when product reviews are available. Maslowska et al. (2017) provide the 
only empirical study analyzing interactions of the product review dimensions valence and 
volume with price. However, the authors reduce price to a factor variable and exclude variance 
from the analysis. They find a stronger impact of valence and volume, as well as the moderation 
of valence by volume for high-priced products.  
Valence and volume, and their interaction, signal the quality of the products. Providing 
information on the quality of the product changes the risk involved in the purchase (Erdem et 
al. 2002; Kostyra et al. 2016).Therefore, following the quality assumptions in the pricing 
literature, product reviews may moderate price elasticities. For high-valence products, the risk 
involved in the investment decreases as a result of the positive reviews, such that price is a less 
relevant factor, i.e., decreasing the impact of price on sales. Following insights on interactions 
among review dimensions, the weakening of the price elasticity by high valence should be 
enhanced by high volume, resulting in a less negative impact of price. The more positive 
reviews a product has, the less important is the price of the product. For low-valence products, 
negative reviews increase the perceived risk, which makes price a more relevant factor, thereby 
increasing absolute price elasticity (more negative). High volume then intensifies this relation, 
i.e., price elasticity is stronger negative. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H6a: The higher the volume for positive valence reviews, the closer to zero the price 
elasticity. 
H6b: The higher the volume for negative valence reviews, the further away from zero the 
price elasticity. 
Finally, increasing variance in reviews augments uncertainty about the review, while low 
variance in reviews increases trustworthiness. For positive valence, high variance makes the 
review less informative and should strengthen the role of price. Positive valence shifts price 
elasticity closer to zero, as positive reviews reduce the perceived risk for the customer. The 
stronger the variance in positive reviews, the less trustworthy the product review. Increasing 
variance thus counteracts the positive signal in the positive valence, meaning that customers 
are less sure about the review. Consequently, with increasing variance in positive valence, price 
should regain importance, pushing the price elasticity further away from zero. We assume that 
this effect changes with the direction of valence. Negative valence shifts price elasticity further 
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away from zero, as negative reviews increase the perceived risk of the purchase. The stronger 
the variance, the less trustworthy the negative reviews, i.e., the weaker the informational value. 
Hence, variance counteracts the shift by negative valence, meaning the more variance there is 
in the negative reviews, the less sure customers are about the negative statement. With 
decreasing trust in information on low quality, price should play a less important role compared 
to low valence and low variance. Therefore, we hypothesize the following moderation of the 
impact of valence on sales by variance: 
H7a: The more variance there is in positive valence, the stronger, i.e., the further away from 
zero, the price elasticity. 
H7b: The more variance there is in negative valence, the less strong, i.e., the closer to zero, 
the price elasticity. 
In summary, the primary objective of this paper is to analyze the interactions between review 
dimensions and price, which we capture with hypotheses H6a to H7b. Additionally, we assess 
the impact of review dimensions and interactions among review dimensions on sales with 
hypotheses H1a to H5b, since existing literature provides mixed findings and lacks a 
comprehensive model. In order to close this gap in terms of a comprehensive analysis, we 
follow the conceptual framework displayed in Figure 4.1.   
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Framework 
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4.3 Empirical Study 
4.3.1 Product Review Process 
We focus on reviews provided on the websites of a large, European online retailer with more 
than five million active customers and more than one billion euros in revenue in 2017. The 
retailer sells a large variety of goods including, groceries, accessories, and electronic goods. 
The product review platform is part of the retailer-hosted website and asks for product reviews 
for specific products sold on the retailer’s website. In this online shop, a standard process to 
review products is established. Customers see the average review valence and the number of 
reviews (volume) next to the product picture. The online shops display valence as the average 
review rounded to full stars from one to five, with the total number of reviews (volume) next 
to it. Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show two representations of product reviews in the online shop. 
All product pages include the review information in one of these formats. Consequently, 
customers always see the average review and the number of reviews, meaning that every 
buying decision is influenced by the review information.44 They do not need to search for this 
aggregated information. Individual product reviews are available by clicking on the stars or the 
number of reviews. A bar chart providing the number of reviews (volume) for each valence 
option (one to five stars) illustrates the variance, as displayed in Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.2: Product Information on Overview Website 
 
 
44 Promotions on landing pages only show the rating and not the number of reviews. Clicking on the respective 
product on promotion directs the customer to a product detail view, which shows both review valence and volume. 
4. Reach for the Stars – the Interplay of Product Reviews and Price in Online Retailing 
 
101 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Product Information on Product Detail Website 
 
Figure 4.4: Variance of Product Reviews 
The online shop invites customers to provide reviews via a process typical for current retail 
websites. To increase barriers to submitting manipulated reviews, the online shop includes 
quality measures in the process of review submission. We describe these in the following. The 
process of submitting a product review starts with a guiding remark that reviews should be 
relevant and helpful. Next, the customer must provide a review rated from one to five, add a 
title for the review, and complement the review with further details edited in a free text field. 
The customer is then asked to provide some personal information, i.e., name and email address. 
Without this information submission of the review is not permitted, while the customer can 
decide whether the review is shown with or without his or her name displayed. Finally, the 
customer needs to agree to the terms of participation. These include the fact that the product 
review becomes the property of the online shop, that the personal data may be saved and used 
to contact the reviewer regarding the review, and that the online shop can adapt the written 
evaluations if these do not correspond to its etiquette. 
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4.3.2 Data Collection and Description 
We collect transaction data from a large European pure online retailer over the period of four 
years from October 2012 until September 2016. The data set comprises roughly 93,000 
products, of which 78 million pieces have been sold, and includes products both with and 
without reviews. We reduce the data to those products that have attracted product reviews 
according to the process described in Chapter 4.3.1, i.e., in the data set used for subsequent 
analyses only products with at least one review are included. This reduces the number of unique 
products by 50 percent, so that the data set comprises 52 million sold pieces. Of this data set, 
we use the first 12 months as the initialization phase. This reduction leaves us with data on 
products in 88 product categories45 across seven European countries. The final data set includes 
roughly 45,000 products,46 with 204,904 individual reviews. The number of products sold over 
the course of the three years adds up to 44 million pieces at an average price of €23.76 per 
piece or 180 million weight units at an average price of €32.64 per weight unit. The average 
star-rating displayed with a product over the three years was 4.46, with an average number of 
reviews per product of 9.34. Table 4.2 displays the descriptive statistics of the data set.47 
Variable Mean SD Min. 25% Q. Median 75% Q. Max. 
Weekly Price per Product € 23.76 27.80 0.25 5.99 13.32  32.25  1,439.00  
Average Valence  4.46 0.76  1.00  4.00 5.00  5.00  5.00  
Average Volume  9.34 18.02  1.00  2.00  4.00  10.00  860.00  
Average Variance  0.51 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.29  0.95  2.83  
Weekly Number of Products Sold  15.80 40.1 0.00 2.00 6.00  15.00  2,879.00 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics – Product Reviews 
The quantiles of valence exhibit a strongly positively skewed distribution, with 50 percent of 
the data points having an average of five stars. Figure 4.5 shows the frequency of each valence 
option based on the individual product reviews over the course of the three years. In line with 
 
45 Categories comprise a wide range of product types, for example, fast-moving consumer goods, durables, and 
electronic products. 
46 Products are country-specific. The same product sold in two countries (with different packaging as a result of 
different languages) is counted as two products. 
47 We provide details of the calculation of valence, volume, and variance in the subsequent chapter. 
4. Reach for the Stars – the Interplay of Product Reviews and Price in Online Retailing 
 
103 
 
the existing literature, the frequency distribution is positively skewed (J-shaped) (Hu et al. 
2017).  
 
Figure 4.5: J-shape of Online Product Reviews (n = 204,904 Unique Reviews) 
 
4.3.3 Model 
We analyze the effects of product reviews on sales with a fixed-effects model on weekly 
product level. The dependent variable is sales, which we operationalize as the logarithm of the 
sum of weight units sold of product j in week t and aggregate over all variants of the same 
product, for example, flavors, sizes, and colors. We use the terms sales and quantity 
interchangeably to refer to the amount of weight units sold. For product reviews, we consider 
the three dimensions valence, volume, and variance, as outlined above. Valencejt is the average 
rating of product j in week t based on all reviews for j up to week t, meaning that for a given 
week all previous reviews, as well as the new reviews for that week, are reflected in the valence 
score. We use the first twelve months of data to generate a starting value for the valence 
variable, i.e., an average star rating for the product. We then aggregate the individual product 
reviews into weekly averages, cumulate, and round to the nearest star-rating. 
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Valence jt= 
∑ Weekly Valence
j
t
t=1
Volume jt
 (4.1) 
         
Volumejt is the number of all reviews submitted for product j up to week t. We add up the 
number of individual reviews per week to a week-specific volume score and cumulate this 
number with proceeding weeks. We include the logarithm of the mean-centered variable as 
volume.48 
Volume jt= ∑ Number Weekly Reviewsjt
t
t=1
 (4.2) 
  
Variance is the standard deviation of the cumulated valence of reviews. We include the mean-
centered cumulated standard deviation for each product based on each week’s average 
valence.49  
Variancejt=sd(Valence jt) (4.3) 
 
A product may include different variants, e.g., different sizes, flavors, and colors. We derive 
the price of a product as price per kilogram. With this definition of price per weight unit across 
all product categories we account for different variants of the same product. The price is the 
mean-centered logarithm of the average weekly price per weight unit for product j in week t.  
We interact each of the three dimensions of product reviews separately with price. Furthermore, 
we include the three-way interaction between valence, volume, and price on sales, as well as 
valence, variance, and price on sales. With respect to interactions between review dimensions, 
we include the two-way interactions between valence and volume, and valence and variance.  
We control for promotional activity, with the variable Promojt equaling 1 if product j is 
promoted in week t, and 0 otherwise. We further include the dependent variable lagged by one 
week to capture dynamic effects and to remove autocorrelation. Finally, the sum of quantity 
sold in the entire shop controls for shocks in the country. To account for product- and week-
specific variation, we include fixed effects α1j for product j and α1t for week t. It is very likely 
that products differ in quality; however, the quality is not completely observable. Products of 
 
48 Whenever mean-centering is applied we use the grand mean for centering purposes. For logged variables we 
first take the logarithm and then subtract the grand mean of the logged variable from the logged variable. 
49 We do not take the logarithm of variance because of data constraints. Variance equals 0 in 45 percent of 
observations, which would result in considerable data loss. 
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high quality may generate more sales, be higher priced, and exhibit higher valence. This may 
lead to the price, review, and error term being correlated. With the product-specific time-
invariant fixed effects we address potential endogeneity due to unobserved quality difference 
between products.  
log(Yjt) = α1j+ α2t + β1* log(Price)jt
+ β
2
* log(Volume)
jt
+ β
3
* Valencejt + β4* Variancejt   
+ β
5
* log(Price)jt * log(Volume)jt + β6* log(Price)jt * Valencejt + β7* log(Price)jt * Variancejt  
+ β
8
* Valencejt * log(Volume)jt + β9* Valencejt* Variancejt+ β10
* log(Price)jt * Valencejt* log(Volume)jt  
+ β
11
* log(Price)jt * Valencejt* Variancejt + β12* log(Yjt-1) + β13*log(Shop Quantity)t + β14*Promot + ∈jt  
 
(4.4) 
We estimate the model in R using the “lfe” package (Gaure 2018). The unit root test reveals 
that the dependent variable is stationary.50 
4.3.4 Empirical Results 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the study. Table 4.3 displays the estimates of the 
fixed-effects model described in Equation 4.4. Price, volume, and variance are mean-centered. 
Valence is a factor variable with reference level three. Thus, for interpretation purposes, we 
assume mean-centered variables at the mean and valence at the reference level of three stars. 
We do not display individual product and time fixed effects because of the high number.  
First, the focus is on the impact of the three review dimensions, valence, volume, and variance, 
on sales, regardless of price, i.e., hypotheses H1a–H3. Afterwards we analyze the interactions 
between valence and volume (hypotheses H4a and H4b), as well as valence and variance 
(hypotheses H5a and H5b). Finally, we concentrate on the moderation of price by review 
dimensions (hypotheses H6a, H6b, H7a and H7b). For visualization purposes, we calculate 
scenarios, which are different combinations of the independent variables. We combine the five 
levels of valence (one to five stars) with three levels of volume, variance, and price. For these 
continuous, mean-centered variables we choose the mean, as well as one standard deviation 
above and below the mean as levels for visualization. These level definitions result in 135 
scenarios (5 levels of valence* 3 levels of volume* 3 levels of variance * 3 levels of price = 
135 scenarios).51 
 
50 We test whether the dependent variable is stationary with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test. The null 
hypothesis that a unit root is present in the time series can be rejected.  
51 Table 6.3 in the Appendix presents the levels of the independent variables, with the resulting quantities and 
price elasticities and intercepts. All insignificant terms are set to zero. 
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Table 4.3: Results of Fixed-Effects Model 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  
β1 log(Price) -1.678 0.005 -351.891 0.0000 *** 
β2 log(Volume) 0.021 0.003 6.532 0.0000 *** 
β3.1 Valence 1 -0.265 0.037 -7.186 0.0000 *** 
β3.2 Valence 2 -0.087 0.010 -9.028 0.0000 *** 
β3.3 Valence 4 0.109 0.005 23.135 0.0000 *** 
β3.4 Valence 5 0.144 0.005 29.458 0.0000 *** 
β4 Variance -0.028 0.005 -5.792 0.0000 *** 
β5 log(Price) * log(Volume) -0.020 0.002 -9.599 0.0000 *** 
β6.1 log(Price) * Valence 1 0.084 0.026 3.265 0.0011 ** 
β6.2 log(Price) * Valence 2 -0.003 0.007 -0.488 0.6259  
β6.3 log(Price) * Valence 4 0.011 0.003 3.018 0.0025 ** 
β6.4 log(Price) * Valence 5 0.014 0.004 3.781 0.0002 *** 
β7 log(Price) * Variance 0.003 0.003 0.803 0.4220  
β8.1 Valence 1 * log(Volume) -0.098 0.026 -3.706 0.0002 *** 
β8.2 Valence 2 * log(Volume) -0.038 0.008 -4.544 0.0000 *** 
β8.3 Valence 4 * log(Volume) 0.058 0.003 18.764 0.0000 *** 
β8.4 Valence 5 * log(Volume) 0.103 0.003 32.087 0.0000 *** 
β9.1 Valence 1 * Variance -0.051 0.088 -0.576 0.5648  
β9.2 Valence 2 * Variance 0.031 0.011 2.855 0.0043 ** 
β9.3 Valence 4 * Variance -0.033 0.005 -6.389 0.0000 *** 
β9.4 Valence 5 * Variance -0.035 0.006 -5.846 0.0000 *** 
β10.1 log(Price) * Valence 1 * log(Volume) -0.056 0.015 -3.792 0.0001 *** 
β10.2 log(Price) * Valence 2 * log(Volume) -0.008 0.006 -1.450 0.1471  
β10.3 log(Price) * Valence 4 * log(Volume) 0.014 0.002 6.682 0.0000 *** 
β10.4 log(Price) * Valence 5 * log(Volume) 0.013 0.002 5.741 0.0000 *** 
β11.1 log(Price) * Valence 1 * Variance 0.347 0.063 5.492 0.0000 *** 
β11.2 log(Price) * Valence 2 * Variance 0.000 0.008 -0.038 0.9696  
β11.3 log(Price) * Valence 4 * Variance -0.009 0.004 -2.390 0.0169 * 
β11.4 log(Price) * Valence 5 * Variance -0.009 0.005 -2.066 0.0389 * 
β12 log(Quantityt-1) 0.188 0.001 329.708 0.0000 *** 
β13 log(Shop Quantity) 0.606 0.003 186.048 0.0000 *** 
β14 Promotion 0.221 0.019 11.534 0.0000 *** 
Dependent variable   log(Quantity in kg) 
Observations   2,788,753 
Multiple R² full model   0.9179 
Multiple R² proj. model   0.1483 
  *** <0.001; ** <0.01; * <0.05 
4. Reach for the Stars – the Interplay of Product Reviews and Price in Online Retailing 
 
107 
 
The effects of each review dimension separately with the other variables at the mean 
respectively reference level support hypotheses H1a –H3. The valence of four (β3.3) and five 
stars (β3.4) increases sales, while one (β3.1) and two stars (β3.2) have a negative impact compared 
to the three-star reference level.52 The left panel in Figure 4.6 displays the impact of valence 
on log quantity for mean price, mean volume, and mean variance. Hence, we find support for 
hypotheses H1a and H1b. The results further support hypothesis H2. Volume per se has a positive 
impact on sales (β2), as high volume increases trust in the product and signals that other 
customers have already bought the product (Figure 4.6, middle panel). Hypothesis H3 is also 
supported as with increasing variance sales decrease (β4) (Figure 4.6, right panel).53  
 
Note: In each panel, all remaining variables are at the mean or reference level. 
Figure 4.6: Effects of Valence, Volume, and Variance on Sales 
Our analysis of the interaction of valence and volume supports prior studies (e.g., Park et al. 
2012 and Maslowska et al. 2017). Volume moderates the positive impact of four- and five-star 
reviews (positive valence) positively (β8.3 and β8.4), leading to higher sales. A high number of 
 
52 A positive coefficient does not mean that the effect is positive; rather that it is larger than for three-star reviews 
(the selected reference point). 
53 In all figures insignificant terms are set to zero. 
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positive reviews strengthens the positive impact of positive reviews on sales, while a lower 
number of reviews weakens the positive impact on sales. For one- and two-star reviews volume 
strengthens the negative impact on sales. The more negative reviews, the stronger the negative 
impact of the negative reviews (β8.1 and β8.2). If fewer reviews form the negative review, the 
negative impact of negative valence on sales is less strong. Thus, in line with existing research 
(Park et al. 2012; Kostyra et al. 2016; Maslowska et al. 2017), we find support for hypotheses 
H4a and H4b. Figure 4.7 highlights this two-way interaction with price and variance at the mean.  
 
Figure 4.7: Interaction of Volume and Valence at Mean Price and Mean Variance 
 
Finally, we derive the moderation of valence by variance in reviews. Increasing variance 
decreases the positive sales impact of positive valence (β9.3 and β9.4). More variance makes 
reviews less trustworthy and therefore reduces the sales impact of high valence. For two-star 
reviews, increasing variance weakens the negative sales impact of negative valence and makes 
the sales impact of low-valence product reviews less negative, i.e., variance moderates two-
star reviews positively (β9.2). For one-star reviews, the moderation is insignificant (β9.1). Figure 
4.8 displays the sales impact of valence dependent on variance. As a result of the insignificance 
of the moderation of one-star reviews, Figure 4.8 shows the main effect of variance on sales 
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for valence of one. For valence of two the moderation (β9.2 = 0.031) balances the main effect 
of variance (β4 = -0.028). Figure 4.8 includes this small remaining difference for two-star 
reviews. For four- and five-star reviews the moderation of valence by variance reduces the 
sales impact. Hence, we find partial support for hypothesis H5. Increasing variance causes 
decreasing sales for positive valence. For two-star reviews, variance moderates valence 
positively, thus, increasing sales for low valence, while for one-star reviews the moderation is 
insignificant.  
 
Figure 4.8: Interaction of Variance and Valence at Mean Price and Mean Volume 
Figure 4.9 combines hypotheses H4a, H4b, and H5 by showing the moderation of valence by 
variance with increasing volume. With increasing valence, increasing volume and decreasing 
variance, the sales of positive valence products increase, i.e., many positive reviews with little 
variation result in the highest sales. The role of volume and variance switches for two-star 
reviews: for few reviews with high variance, sales are the strongest. Thus, customers do not 
assume the negative reviews to be trustworthy as a result of high variance. Vice versa, the more 
reviews with low variance, the lower the resulting sales, as customers believe in the low quality 
of the product. However, the difference is barely visible in Figure 4.9, as it only changes the 
third decimal in logs, i.e., the effect is very small. Table 4.4 displays the relevant extract of the 
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scenario table (Appendix Table 6.3) for mean price and valence of two. The fourth and fifth 
columns clarify the differences between the scenarios in the logarithm of quantity and quantity. 
 
Figure 4.9: Interaction of Valence and Variance at Mean Price by Volume 
 
Scenario  Volume Variance log(Quantity) Quantity in Weight Units 
47 low high 2.0743 7.96 
38 low mean 2.0724 7.94 
29 low low 2.0704 7.93 
50 mean high 2.0553 7.81 
41 mean mean 2.0533 7.79 
32 mean low 2.0514 7.78 
53 high high 2.0363 7.66 
44 high mean 2.0343 7.65 
35 high low 2.0324 7.63 
Table 4.4: Detailed Impact of Variance on Sales for Valence of Two Stars 
 
In the following, we focus on the moderation of price. For visualization purposes, we derive 
the price elasticity for each of the scenarios presented in Table 6.3 in the Appendix. We 
rearrange Equation 4.4 into those parts that are independent of price changes (left side of the 
equation) and those that are dependent on price changes (right side of the equation):  
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log(Ŷjt) - (α1j+ α2t + β2* log(Volume)jt  
+ β
3
* Valencejt + β4* Variancejt  
+ β
8
* Valencejt * log(Volume)jt  
+ β
9
* Valencejt* Variancejt  
+ β
12
* log(Y
jt-1
) + β
13
*log(Shop Quantity)
t
  
+ β
14
*Promot)     
 
= 
β
1
 * log(Price)  
+ β
5
* log(Price)* log(Volume)  
+ β
6
 * log(Price)* Valence   
+ β
7
 * log(Price)* Variance  
+ β
10
* log(Price)* Valence * log(Volume)  
+ β
11
* log(Price) * Valence* Variance   
 
(4.5) 
 
As volume is a continuous variable, we insert the mean volume, one standard deviation above 
the mean and one standard deviation below the mean. Hence, for mean-centered variables the 
mean is zero. We further set insignificant coefficients to zero (the italics below indicate 
insignificance). We use the right-hand side of Equation 4.5 to generate the coefficient 
displaying price elasticity. For example, for a review with valence of four, mean volume and 
mean variance, the price elasticity is -1.668 (Scenario 95 in Table 6.3 in the Appendix): 
= log(Price) * (β
1
+ β
5
 *log(Volume)    
+ β
6.4
* Valence 4 + β
7
* Variance     
(4.6) 
+ β
10.4
* Valence 4 * log(Volume)    
+ β
11.4
* Valence 4 * Variance)   
  
= log(Price) * (-1.678 + (-0.020 * 0)    
+ (0.010 * 1) + (0.011 * 0.5)     
+ (0.014 * 1 * 0) + (-0.009 * 1 * 0) )   
= -1.668* log(Price)  
 
 
The price elasticities across all scenarios range from -1.84 to -1.35, characterizing elastic 
goods. It is closer to zero but in a credible range of a recent meta-analysis study conducted by 
Bijmolt et al. (2005).  
In line with hypothesis H6a, the three-way interaction effect of price, valence, and volume is 
significant for positive valence (four- and five-star reviews, i.e., β10.3 and β10.4). Hence, these 
three variables are interdependent in their effect on sales. With increasing volume, positive 
valence has a stronger impact on price elasticity, i.e., high volume strengthens positive valence 
in shifting price elasticity closer to zero. For negative valence, the picture is more complex. 
The three-way interaction is only significant and negative for one-star reviews, while the two-
way interaction of price and valence of level one is positive. The more reviews there are, the 
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further away from zero the price elasticity for one-star reviews. For two-star reviews both the 
two-way and the three-way interaction are insignificant. Hence, hypothesis H6b is only 
partially supported. Figure 4.10 displays the changes in price elasticities (setting insignificant 
terms to zero).  
 
 
Figure 4.10: Three-way Interaction of Price, Valence, and Volume at Mean Variance 
 
In the following, we assess the role of variance. We hypothesize that increasing variance in 
reviews augments uncertainty about the review, while low variance in reviews increases 
trustworthiness. The stronger the variance in positive reviews, the less trustworthy the product 
review for the customer. Hence, increasing variance counteracts the positive signal of positive 
valence, so that customers are less sure about the review. While positive valence shifts price 
elasticity closer to zero, high valence should balance this movement. Thus, the more variance 
there is in positive valence, the stronger, i.e., the further away from zero, the price elasticity. 
Thus, we expect the three-way interaction to be negative for positive valence (β11.3 and β11.4). 
Figure 4.11 displays this relation at mean volume. Hence, we find support for hypothesis H7a 
at low levels of significance and with low size. In contrast, we hypothesize that negative 
4. Reach for the Stars – the Interplay of Product Reviews and Price in Online Retailing 
 
113 
 
valence shifts price elasticity further away from zero, as negative reviews increase the 
purchasing risk. Variance then counteracts this movement: the more variance there is in the 
negative reviews, the less trustworthy they are. Interestingly, we find price elasticity to be 
closer to zero for one-star reviews, which contradicts the first part of this hypothesis. However, 
the moderation of variance functions as hypothesized. Strong variance shifts price elasticity 
closer to zero, while low variance shifts price elasticity further away from zero. Thus, we 
cannot completely support hypothesis H7b. It is further noteworthy that the impact of variance 
for low valence is larger than for high-valence reviews.  
 
Figure 4.11: Three-way Interaction of Price, Valence, and Variance at Mean Volume 
 
Finally, we adopt a comprehensive perspective combining both three-way interactions on price 
elasticity. Figure 4.12 depicts price elasticities dependent on low, mean, and high values of 
valence, volume, and variance. We find the strongest negative price elasticities for reviews 
with one-star, high volume, and low variance. Hence, if many customers agree about having 
low satisfaction with the product, the signal of price is most important. In this case, a price 
reduction generates the highest sales impact. The high impact of variance and valence of one 
star is based on the size of β11.1 compared to the other coefficients. Interestingly, one star-
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reviews are also accompanied by price elasticity closest to zero. If customers disagree on the 
low quality of a product, the signal of price is least important. For five-star reviews, variance 
has a very small impact, while higher volume shifts the price elasticity of positive volume 
closer to zero. Thus, the higher the number of reviews for positive valence, the less important 
the price signal, with variance playing a minor role. We summarize our results with respect to 
the hypotheses in Table 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.12: Three-way Interactions on Price Elasticity  
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Hypotheses Result 
Impact of valence, volume, and variance on sales  
H1a: Positive valence, i.e., four- and five-star reviews, has a positive impact on sales compared 
to a neutral valence of three stars. 
Support 
H1b: Negative valence, i.e., one- and two-star reviews, has a negative impact on sales compared 
to a neutral valence of three stars. 
Support 
H2: Increasing volume has a positive impact on sales. Support 
H3: Increasing variance decreases sales.  Support 
Interactions among valence, volume, and variance  
H4a: Volume moderates the impact of four- and five-star reviews positively, leading to a more 
positive impact on sales.  
Support 
H4b: Volume moderates the impact of one- and two-star reviews negatively, strengthening their 
negative sales impact. 
Support 
H5a: For high valence, higher variance decreases sales, i.e., increasing variance decreases the 
positive impact of high valence on sales. 
Support 
H5b: For low valence, higher variance increases demand, i.e., increasing variance weakens the 
negative impact of low valence on sales. 
Partial 
Support 
Interactions of valence, volume, and variance with price  
H6a: The higher the volume for positive valence reviews, the closer to zero the price elasticity. Support 
H6b: The higher the volume for negative valence reviews, the further away from zero the price 
elasticity. 
Partial 
Support 
H7a: The more variance there is in positive valence, the stronger, i.e., the further away from zero, 
the price elasticity. 
Support 
H7b: The more variance there is in negative valence, the less strong, i.e., the closer to zero, the 
price elasticity. 
Partial 
Support 
Table 4.5: Overview of Hypotheses 
 
4.3.5 Robustness Check 
To assess the robustness of the results outlined in the previous chapter, we test whether our 
model is robust against the inclusion of lagged review dimensions. Previous research has based 
models on lagged predictors generating a better model fit (Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Kübler et 
al. 2018). In our model specification, sales per product and week is the dependent variable, 
while valence, volume, and variance are cumulative measures. Consequently, reviews are not 
necessarily posted in the same week as the sales number is reported. These cumulative 
measures, as opposed to measures of the same week, are less likely to encounter endogeneity 
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issues.54 In time-series data, the cumulated review dimensions would have to systematically 
match unobserved demand shocks (Berger et al. 2010). However, if review dimensions were 
influenced by past sales, model estimates would change for lagged review dimensions. Hence, 
we test the robustness of our model against review dimensions being affected by sales of past 
weeks. Thus, we estimate Equation 4.4 with valence, volume, and variance lagged by one week 
instead. Table 4.6 displays the results, and significant differences are in bold. Coefficients 
remain roughly the same. The only notable differences are in the significance of the three-way 
moderation of price by valence of two and volume, as well as price by valence of five and 
variance. Following our hypothesis, for valence of two, the three-way interaction of price, 
valence, and volume (β10.2) turns significant at low levels of significance. Furthermore, for 
valence of five, the three-way interaction of price, valence, and variance (β11.4) is now 
insignificant. In the main model, the relation is significant at low levels. Figure 4.13 shows the 
moderation of valence by volume at different levels of variance based on the lagged model. In 
line with previous findings, high volume increases sales of high-valence products and decreases 
sales of low-valence products, while low volume increases sales of low-valence products and 
decreases sales of high-valence products. Figure 4.14 shows the impact on price elasticity.55  
In sum, the model is robust against changes in the time structure of the variables.  
  
 
54 Product review dimensions may be both the cause of sales and the outcome of sales. Please refer to Chapter 4.6 
regarding potential endogeneity concerns. 
55 The data points for valence of two seem to be identical; however, they differ in the fourth decimal. 
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Table 4.6: Robustness Check – Results of Fixed-Effects Model with Lagged Valence, Volume, and Variance 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)  
β1 log(Price) -1.676 0.0048 -349.513 0.0000 *** 
β2 log(Volume t-1) 0.011 0.0033 3.367 0.0008 *** 
β3.1 Valence 1t-1 -0.260 0.0372 -6.990 0.0000 *** 
β3.2 Valence 2 t-1 -0.083 0.0097 -8.531 0.0000 *** 
β3.3 Valence 4 t-1 0.107 0.0047 22.627 0.0000 *** 
β3.4 Valence 5 t-1 0.144 0.0049 29.381 0.0000 *** 
β4 Variance t-1 -0.027 0.0049 -5.559 0.0000 *** 
β5 log(Price) * log(Volume t-1) -0.020 0.0021 -9.545 0.0000 *** 
β6.1 log(Price) * Valence 1 t-1 0.077 0.0260 2.963 0.0030 ** 
β6.2 log(Price) * Valence 2 t-1 -0.007 0.0070 -0.965 0.3347  
β6.3 log(Price) * Valence 4 t-1 0.009 0.0035 2.673 0.0075 ** 
β6.4 log(Price) * Valence 5 t-1 0.013 0.0037 3.417 0.0006 *** 
β7 log(Price) * Variance t-1 0.002 0.0035 0.464 0.6425  
β8.1 Valence 1 t-1 * log(Volume t-1) -0.081 0.0265 -3.046 0.0023 ** 
β8.2 Valence 2 t-1 * log(Volume t-1) -0.033 0.0085 -3.865 0.0001 *** 
β8.3 Valence 4 t-1 * log(Volume t-1) 0.056 0.0031 17.984 0.0000 *** 
β8.4 Valence 5 t-1 * log(Volume t-1) 0.103 0.0032 31.912 0.0000 *** 
β9.1 Valence 1 t-1 * Variance t-1 -0.083 0.0892 -0.933 0.3510  
β9.2 Valence 2 t-1 * Variance t-1 0.027 0.0110 2.414 0.0158 * 
β9.3 Valence 4 t-1 * Variance t-1 -0.029 0.0052 -5.501 0.0000 *** 
β9.4 Valence 5 t-1 * Variance t-1 -0.035 0.0060 -5.915 0.0000 *** 
β10.1 log(Price) * Valence 1 t-1 * log(Volume t-1) -0.066 0.0149 -4.416 0.0000 *** 
β10.2 log(Price) * Valence 2 t-1 * log(Volume t-1) -0.012 0.0058 -2.000 0.0455 * 
β10.3 log(Price) * Valence 4 t-1 * log(Volume t-1) 0.014 0.0021 6.765 0.0000 *** 
β10.4 log(Price) * Valence 5 t-1 * log(Volume t-1) 0.012 0.0022 5.482 0.0000 *** 
β11.1 log(Price) * Valence 1 t-1 * Variance t-1 0.369 0.0640 5.764 0.0000 *** 
β11.2 log(Price) * Valence 2 t-1 * Variance t-1 0.000 0.0076 -0.044 0.9652  
β11.3 log(Price) * Valence 4 t-1 * Variance t-1 -0.008 0.0038 -2.190 0.0286 * 
β11.4 log(Price) * Valence 5 t-1 * Variance t-1 -0.007 0.0046 -1.593 0.1111  
β12 log(Quantityt-1) 0.188 0.0006 328.022 0.0000 *** 
β13 log(Shop Quantity) 0.609 0.0033 185.299 0.0000 *** 
β14 Promotion 0.225 0.0192 11.715 0.0000 *** 
Dependent variable   log(Quantity in kg) 
Observations   2,744,918 
Multiple R² full model   0.918 
Multiple R² proj. model   0.148 
  *** <0.001; ** <0.01; * <0.05 
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Figure 4.13: Robustness Check – Interaction of Volume and Valence at Mean Price by Variance 
 
Figure 4.14: Robustness Check – Three-way Interaction on Price Elasticity 
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4.4 Pricing Decisions and Product Reviews 
Our previous analyses show that valence, volume, variance, and price have an interdependent 
impact on sales. While retailers cannot precisely steer but only facilitate and induce product 
reviews, they can strategically manage price. In their pricing strategy, product reviews provide 
important signals. In the following, we analyze the impact of price changes as reactions to a 
decrease in valence with respect to sales, revenue, and profit. We assess the scenario of losing 
one star in reviews. The analysis in the previous chapter revealed that decreasing valence 
decreases sales. In such a case, different price changes can compensate for the impact on sales, 
revenue, or profit induced by lower valence. Hence, we assess the inclusion of product reviews 
in retailers’ pricing strategy and analyze the monetary impact.  
The predicted quantities serve as a base case, i.e., we derive the predicted quantity for each 
product in each week using the products’ actual price, valence, volume, and control variables 
in that specific week, as well as the coefficients displayed in Table 4.3 (predicted values). With 
these quantities we derive the associated revenue (as quantity multiplied by product- and week-
specific price) and profit based on product- and week-specific prices and margins. We display 
this base case of sales, revenue, and profit as horizontal dotted red lines in Figure 4.15 to Figure 
4.18. We assess the impact on sales, revenue, and profit across all 45,000 products and seven 
countries. 
We analyze the absolute sales impact of a valence reduction by one star,56 ceteris paribus, per 
week and present the average over all weeks. The sales, revenue, and profit resulting from a 
decrease in valence are indicated by horizontal dashed black lines in Figure 4.15, Figure 4.16, 
and Figure 4.17. Cumulated over the course of the three years, losing one star on every product 
in every week decreases the quantity sold by 14 million weight units, €90 million in revenues 
and €16 million in profit. In order to counteract the impact in sales, revenue, or profit, retailers 
have the option to change the price. Each corporate objective, i.e., sales, revenue, and profit, 
requires different price changes. In Figure 4.15 we present the corporate objective sales (as 
weekly average) dependent on price changes. This illustration allows us to compare the sales 
in the base case without any changes in valence or price (horizontal red dotted line), with sales 
in the case of a valence reduction (horizontal dashed black line), and in combination with 
different levels of price reduction (solid black line). The intersection between the red line and 
the black solid line is the price change that compensates for the sales decrease due to the 
 
56 We reduce valence for each product in each week by one star, while we do not change one-star ratings. 
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valence loss (a price reduction of about 5 percent on average). With the decrease in sales due 
to losing one star in the reviews, the retailer loses the associated revenue. Figure 4.16 depicts 
the price reduction to compensate for the revenue decrease due to a loss in valence. Again, the 
intersection between the red dotted line and the solid black line highlights the price change to 
compensate for the loss, i.e., on average the price needs to be reduced by 11 percent to generate 
the same revenue as prior to the loss in valence. Finally, the lost revenue translates to decreased 
profits. Figure 4.17 shows the change in price to prevent a loss in profit when valence is 
decreased by one star. In order to keep profit at the same level as prior to the valence decrease, 
prices must increase by 2 percent.  
 
 
Figure 4.15: Price Reduction to Compensate for the Sales Impact of a Decrease in Valence  
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Figure 4.16: Price Reduction to Compensate for the Revenue Impact of a Decrease in Valence  
 
Figure 4.17: Price Increase to Compensate for the Profit Impact of a Decrease in Valence 
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Thus, to balance a loss in valence, retailers must initially decide on the corporate objective, 
since price changes differ in direction and size for the three objectives. If the retailer operates 
under the corporate objective of maximizing sales or revenue, price reductions compensate for 
the sales (revenue) loss. Figure 4.18 depicts a sensitivity analysis for price changes ranging 
from -12 percent to +12 percent, which illustrates that the prioritization of one objective is 
detrimental to the other. The green vertical line in Figure 4.18 highlights the example of 
decreasing the price by 11 percent to counteract a loss in revenue. While this decrease in price 
overcompensates for the sales loss, it strengthens the detrimental impact on profit, since the 
increase in sales does not compensate for the loss in profit margin due to the price reduction. 
Moreover, vice versa, increasing price by 2 percent to counteract the profit loss results in 
decreased sales and revenue (blue vertical line in Figure 4.18). 
 
Figure 4.18: Impact of Price Changes on Corporate Objectives 
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4.5 Discussion and Managerial Implications 
Customers perceive risk when they are in a purchase situation (Cox and Rich 1964; Murray 
1991). As a consequence, they search for information to reduce this risk (Stern et al. 1977). In 
offline settings, word-of-mouth has long been established as a method to reduce the risk 
involved in purchase decisions (Arndt 1967). Product reviews are the widespread resemblance 
of word-of-mouth online and are, thus, supposed to signal quality. Hence, providing more 
information about the quality of the product should reduce the risk involved in the purchase 
(Erdem et al. 2002; Kostyra et al. 2016). Therefore, following the findings on the relation of 
quality and price, product reviews, as a signal of quality, may moderate price elasticities. For 
example, for products with many, positive, and agreeing reviews, the perceived risk of the 
investment for the customer decreases, so that price is a less relevant factor, and consequently 
the impact of price on sales decreases. However, research on product reviews so far has mainly 
excluded interactions of product reviews and price. To the best of our knowledge, only two 
previous studies have paid attention to the moderation of price by review dimensions. Those 
two studies highlight the relevance of product reviews for price elasticities. Hence, the primary 
goal of this study was to understand whether product reviews affect price elasticities. 
Furthermore, findings on the effects of review dimensions and their interactions on sales are 
still mixed. We hypothesized that a possible reason for these mixed findings is that a 
comprehensive perspective, including the moderation among review dimensions and price, has 
mostly been ignored (Kostyra et al. 2016; Maslowska et al. 2017). Therefore, we applied a 
comprehensive analysis of all three relevant review dimensions, valence, volume, and variance, 
the interactions among these dimensions, as well as the moderation of the impact of price on 
sales by those review dimensions. Our study makes the following contributions. 
First and foremost, we find strong support for the moderation of price by product review 
dimensions. Dependent on the characteristics of the product review (valence, volume, and 
variance), the impact of price on sales changes.  
For high valence, i.e., products with which other customers are satisfied, the risk of investment 
decreases and price is less relevant, i.e., the price elasticity moves closer to zero. High volume 
enhances the weakening of the price elasticity, so that an even less negative impact of 
increasing prices on sales results. Hence, if more customers provide a positive review, price is 
a less strong driver. Our results also reveal that the size of this effect is rather small. In 
particular, in the case of high valence, the moderation of price by variance is significant but 
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very small. For high-valence products, increasing variance makes price a slightly stronger 
signal. Increasing variance in positive reviews creates uncertainty about the review, while low 
variance in such reviews increases trustworthiness. Increasing variance therefore counteracts 
the positive signal in positive valence, meaning that customers are less sure about the review, 
strengthening the signal of price, however, in very small size. 
We cannot mirror these findings for negative valence. For two-star reviews, interactions are 
insignificant. On the contrary, one-star reviews reveal the strongest reactions, which partly 
oppose our hypothesis. Low volume strengthens this effect, while high volume counteracts it. 
Hence, for a high number of reviews with an average of one star the price elasticity is further 
away from zero for a lower number of reviews. Thus, the more customers share their low 
satisfaction, the stronger the impact of price on sales. While the direction of the moderation by 
volume is in line with our hypotheses, the level of the price elasticity is not. Surprisingly, for 
one-star reviews with mean variance and mean volume price elasticity is closer to zero than in 
the case of high-valence reviews. However, for one-star valence, variance is the strongest 
moderator. While the two-way interaction of variance and price remains insignificant, the 
three-way interaction of variance, valence, and price reveals an interesting interplay. As 
described above, one-star reviews shift price elasticity closer to zero. Low variance strongly 
counteracts this effect. For one-star reviews, on which customers agree (low variance), the 
price elasticity is by far the strongest, which is in line with our hypotheses. On the contrary, 
for mean and high variance, i.e., with increasing disagreement among reviewers of one-star 
reviews, the impact of price on sales strongly decreases. The size of the effect is somewhat 
surprising. For one-star reviews with mean variance or high variance price elasticity is closer 
to zero than in the case of high-valence reviews. Thus, for one-star reviews, our analysis reveals 
the importance variance. While when ignoring variance, the most prompting question would 
be, why sales react less strong to price changes of products with one-star reviews, the inclusion 
of variance provides some guidance. For the moderation of price by one-star reviews the 
agreement or disagreement of reviewers is substantial. Even average disagreement among 
reviewers of one-star products leads to a strongly decreasing impact of price on sales, while 
high disagreement results in the smallest impact of price on sales identified in our model. 
However, it is somewhat surprising that the impact of price on sales for products with 
disagreeing one-star reviews is lower than for products with agreeing five-star reviews. An 
explanation for the strong moderation by variance in the case of one-star reviews might be that 
variance has only one direction, i.e., positive divergence from one star, since more negative 
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ratings than one star are not possible. For one-star reviews, with increasing variance more 
reviewers rate the product positive among a strong majority of negative reviews. This might 
send the signal to the customer that the product is a specific niche product which only satisfies 
a very specific need. Therefore, only those customers for whom consumption goals and the 
product performance match would buy the product. For these customers, price is less important 
due to the satisfaction of their specific need. 
Following our second research objective, we analyze the impact of valence, volume, and 
variance, and their interactions on sales. We find that the average rating, i.e., the review’s 
valence, has a significant impact on sales. In line with social impact theory (Latané 1981) and 
the persuasive effect of product reviews (Rui et al. 2013), we find that the preferences of other 
individuals for products affect an individual’s preference, i.e., in our data set, positive valence 
increases sales, whereas negative valence decreases sales when compared to a neutral review. 
Hence, we add further evidence to the majority of studies that find a significant positive effect 
of valence on sales (Chintagunta et al. 2010; Gopinath et al. 2014; Maslowska et al. 2017). 
Furthermore, the effect of one-star reviews on sales is much stronger than that of any other 
valence level, which highlights the role of negative reviews. Our simulation in the previous 
chapter further illustrates a strong sales decrease following a loss of one star. 
We further add to the existing finding that volume, per se – without the direction of valence – 
has an impact on sales. Awareness has often been given as a reason for increasing sales with 
increasing review volume, as awareness of a product is a necessary condition for purchasing 
(Godes and Mayzlin 2004; Liu 2006; Chen et al. 2011; Cui et al. 2012; Park et al. 2012). 
However, for reviews that are posted on retailer websites, as in this study, the creation of 
awareness is a questionable reason, because customers only see the review after searching for 
the product (Duan et al. 2008). However, the bandwagon effect offers a relevant explanation 
for the direct impact of volume on sales, i.e., the probability of adoption increases with the 
number of people who have already adopted the product (Babić Rosario et al. 2016). Thus, the 
more reviews there are, the higher the incentive to imitate previous behavior and buy the 
product. We add to the majority of existing studies with a significant positive impact of volume 
on sales (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Amblee and Bui 2011; Maslowska et al. 2017). 
Irrespective of the direction of valence, the number of reviews induces customers to imitate 
others’ behavior. 
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Most studies on product reviews exclude variance and focus instead on valence and volume 
only (Babić Rosario et al. 2016). Nevertheless, variance has been found to have a significant 
impact on sales in several studies (Sun 2012; Kostyra et al. 2016) and has been interpreted from 
different perspectives. For risk-averse customers, higher variance in reviews introduces risk 
and should therefore decrease demand. On the contrary, more heterogeneous reviews could 
induce curiosity, thereby increasing demand. As most of the studies rely on experiential goods 
(i.e., books and movies), we add to research on rather non-experiential goods with a broad data 
set. We find that variance significantly affects sales, meaning that more diverse reviews weaken 
the impact on sales. Hence, we add to the findings that polarized evaluations increase risk and 
uncertainty and induce the customer to avoid the product (Babić Rosario et al. 2016). 
For a comprehensive picture, we analyze the moderation of valence by volume and variance. 
The findings provide important information, since the omission of the interactions might bias 
results in existing studies. For the moderation of valence by volume, we oppose findings by 
Chintagunta et al. (2010) for the movie industry and add support to the studies by Maslowska 
et al. (2017), Kostyra et al. (2016), and Park et al. (2012). We find a significant interaction of 
valence and volume. In our data set covering seven countries and 88 categories, high volume 
strengthens the positive impact of high-star reviews on sales, while it also strengthens the 
negative impact of low-star reviews on sales.  
Variance of reviews relates to risk aversion, as it displays the trustworthiness of the review. 
Low variance in reviews increases trustworthiness and reduces risk, while high variance 
increases risk in the purchase. We find support for this relation. High variance decreases 
demand for products with positive valence and increases demand for products with negative 
reviews. Products with two-star reviews benefit from the uncertainty about this negative review 
introduced by high variance, while one-star reviews remain untouched (insignificant relation). 
For the same reason, for four- and five-star reviews, high variance is detrimental, as it 
introduces uncertainty about the positive average valence. 
In sum, the effects of product review dimensions remain relatively small in size compared to 
the price elasticity; however, product reviews comprise new, additional, or reassuring 
information for the customer. Valence, volume, and variance transport information and interact 
in multiple ways with the price of the product. Therefore, it is highly recommendable for 
retailers to include product review information in pricing decisions and to actively manage 
product reviews. With respect to managing product reviews it is important to differentiate 
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between the objectives of retailers and manufacturers. While manufacturers are interested in 
positive reviews of specific brands, retailers must take on a more comprehensive perspective. 
The decision about whether to provide a review platform affects all categories and all brands. 
Unlike manufacturers, retailers have the sales, revenue, and profit of the entire category or shop 
as a corporate objective, not just the performance of a specific brand. Hence, retailers must 
assess whether the upsides of providing a review option for their customers will outweigh the 
downsides. On the one hand, reviews provide the opportunity to increase sales based on high 
valence or high volume, or a combination of both. Consequently, by providing a review option 
for their customers, retailers gain further measures to manage demand. Although the effect is 
small, review stimulation strategies should be considered, for example, at least reminding the 
customer to leave a review after purchase, as a high volume of reviews alone – independent of 
valence – increases sales. More active strategies, for example, providing discounts or samples 
for reviews, could be assessed. Analogous to the simulation in Chapter 4.4, an increase in 
volume can provide room for price increases at constant sales. For positively perceived 
products, such an increase in volume even decreases the role of price and therefore weakens 
the negative impact of price increases on sales. At the same time, retailers can use this 
information for price changes. For example, since the impact of price on sales is weaker for 
products with many, agreeing, and positive reviews, retailers could increase the prices for such 
products or reduce the frequency of price promotions or price reductions. In this context, our 
findings on one-star reviews must be mentioned. As one-star reviews characterized by high 
variance generate the weakest impact of price changes on sales, price increases on these 
products will result in the smallest sales loss for the retailer. On the contrary, one-star reviews 
characterized by low variance induce the strongest impact of price changes on sales, i.e., price 
reductions on these products will result in a strong sales increase.  
On the other hand, the most impactful downside for the retailer of providing a product review 
platform, is the probability of receiving low-valence reviews, which decrease sales, revenues, 
and profits. However, reviews with low valence also have the strongest price elasticities, 
meaning that price reductions on these products will strongly increase sales. Hence, even 
negative information might be valuable for retailers, since this information provides an 
opportunity to adjust the pricing strategies according to customers’ interests and thereby to 
boost demand or adjust the product portfolio, e.g., de-list low-valence products. Furthermore, 
in price negotiations with manufacturers, negative information provided by product reviews 
can complement price and sales data to decrease the price at which retailers by the product 
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from manufacturers. Such price decreases in supply would allow for price reductions to offset 
valence reductions while limiting profit deterioration (Figure 4.18, bottom panel). Finally, 
retailers can use product review information for an enhanced perspective on the product 
portfolio. A categorization along valence, volume, and variance can serve as additional 
information for pricing strategies. 
4.6 Limitations and Future Research 
Although our analysis provides important findings, we acknowledge several limitations to it. 
We cannot capture missed sales opportunities, i.e., non-purchases that might be due to negative 
reviews, as we focus on those products that have sold and for which product reviews have been 
submitted. Therefore, deriving insights on the impact of a change from zero to one review could 
be a fruitful avenue for future studies. 
Furthermore, future research could address potential endogeneity via different routes. 
Theoretically, there are two potential sources of endogeneity in our setting: unobserved product 
quality and endogenous predictors. With the product- and week-specific fixed effects included 
in our main model, we address potential endogeneity due to unobserved quality difference 
between products, i.e., products differ in quality, which may lead to the price, review, and error 
term being correlated. High-quality products may be sold more frequently at a higher price and 
with higher valence. Furthermore, product review dimensions may be both the cause of sales 
and the outcome of sales. The sales of each product in each week are the dependent variable, 
while valence, volume, and variance are cumulative measures. Consequently, reviews are not 
necessarily posted in the same week as the sales number is reported. These cumulative 
measures, as opposed to measures of the same week, are less likely to encounter endogeneity 
issues. In the time-series structure of our data set, the cumulated review dimensions would have 
to systematically match unobserved demand shocks (Berger et al. 2010). Furthermore, we use 
the data-rich approach described by Germann et al. (2015) and include the promotion variable 
to control for other marketing actions. However, valence, volume, and variance may not be 
fully exogenous. In theory, reviews might already have an impact on pricing, meaning that the 
retailer or manufacturer increase prices for products with high valence and volume and 
decrease prices for products with low valence. In this case, the variables might be endogenous, 
and estimating through instrumental variable estimation would be a common approach (Papies 
et al. 2017). Past research has included instrumental variables to address endogeneity concerns 
(Chintagunta et al. 2010; Kübler et al. 2018), with the meta-analysis by Babić Rosario et al. 
(2016) showing that the impact of product reviews does not change substantially when using 
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instrumental variables. However, future research could apply an instrumental variable 
approach for the three review dimensions. 
Additionally, the common J-shape of product review frequencies (Figure 4.5) is based on two 
self-selection biases: an acquisition bias, i.e., those who buy and are able to review have a more 
positive attitude toward the product; and an underreporting bias, i.e., the probability to submit 
a review is higher for those customers with extreme evaluations (Hu et al. 2017). Future 
research could address these selection biases by modeling the selection process separately. 
Finally, we include data from seven countries and control for the difference via product-
specific fixed effects, which also differentiate products across countries, i.e., because of 
different packaging, among other things, the same product has different fixed effects across 
countries. However, we do not dive deeper into the differences between the countries. 
Following Kübler et al. (2018), the inclusion of country as moderator of both price elasticities 
and product reviews might be a fruitful avenue for future research. The decision to have the 
large data set further restrains us from estimating product- or category-specific price 
elasticities. In this context, future research could provide a more granular perspective by 
estimating, for example, category-specific price elasticities. 
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5.1 Main Research Findings and Managerial Implications 
The ascent of the Internet means that research is needed to re-evaluate retailers’ traditional 
pricing measures to steer demand and to assess new, true online phenomena. Given the limited 
empirical studies on pricing in online retailing, this dissertation set out to contribute to current 
research priorities by analyzing the central impact of price on three corporate objectives: sales, 
revenue, and profit. We further assessed this central relation in the light of two different 
information sources: first, information provided by the retailer in the form of advertised 
reference prices; and, second, information provided by customers in online reviews. Building 
on online and offline literature, we asked research questions addressing the gaps in the current 
literature. To answer these questions, we collected unique transaction data from an online 
retailer, conducted a field study and an online experiment, and analyzed data with both 
Bayesian and frequentist models to answer the research models. Table 5.1 illustrates the scope 
of these studies. In the following, this chapter gives a brief overview of the findings of each 
study57 and afterwards provides a holistic discussion and unique conclusions based on the 
constellation of the three studies. 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Central Independent 
Variable 
Price Advertised reference price Review valence 
Review volume 
Review variance 
Dependent Variables Sales 
Revenue 
Profit 
Sales 
(Revenue) 
Profit 
Sales 
Revenue 
Profit 
Data Transaction data Transaction data 
Field experiment 
Online experiment 
Transaction data 
Method Bayesian multilevel 
analysis 
Bayesian regression 
Fixed-effects model 
Fixed-effects model 
Table 5.1: Scope of Individual Chapters 
Chapter 2 assesses the central relation of this dissertation, the impact of price changes, in the 
form of temporary price reductions, on sales, revenue, and particularly profit. Online price 
reductions increase the focal brands’ sales and revenue. Although theory expects stronger price 
competition online, we found price elasticities in the range of offline elasticities. Furthermore, 
stockpiling does not reduce sales and revenue for the online retailer, i.e., price reductions in 
the past do not influence current sales significantly. While a robustness check revealed 
parameters pointing in the direction of stockpiling, these were not unambiguous. At the same 
 
57 Chapters 2 to 4 provide more detailed discussions of the respective findings. 
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time, price reductions decrease the sales and revenue of the other brands in the category based 
on cross-price elasticities, revealing strong competition among brands. In sum, the impact of 
price reductions on category sales and revenue are still positive, whereas this net category 
impact turns negative for profit. The negative profit impact results from the increase in demand 
for the brands, which is too weak to balance the lower profit margins of the focal brand. 
Additionally, the reduced demand for the remaining brands strengthens the negative profit 
impact for the category. However, results include substantial brand-specific heterogeneity, 
such that decisions on promotions are strategic decisions for retailers. Online retailers cannot 
increase the sales, revenue, and profit of a category with the same promotional action across 
all brands. However, certain characteristics of the brands can be used to guide promotions, e.g., 
the size of the brands. An interesting finding of this study is that regular price changes, 
compared to promotional price changes, are a relatively strong signal and should therefore be 
managed carefully. 
In sum, Chapter 2 offers a granular perspective on the central relation of price reductions and 
profit for online retailers, while analyzing the impact of price reductions, as well as the key 
correlates of differences in the reductions’ impact on sales, revenue, and profit.  
Chapter 3 explores whether displaying advertised reference prices impacts online purchases. 
We conducted three empirical studies to answer the exploratory research questions, which offer 
partly contradictory insights. First, two experimental studies compare whether displaying an 
advertised reference price has an advantage over not displaying such a price with respect to 
sales. While the online experiment supports a positive impact of displaying an advertised 
reference price on sales, the field experiment did not add empirical evidence to this finding. In 
the field experiment, eliminating the advertised reference price did not decrease sales strongly 
and significantly. Subsequent to the impact of displaying versus not displaying an advertised 
reference price we assess whether the credibility of advertised reference prices impacts sales. 
Different approaches to analyzing the functional form of the relation of manufacturer-
suggested retail price, regular price, and sales underline that for a larger distance between the 
manufacturer-suggested retail price and the regular price, meaning a less credible advertised 
reference price, the impact on sales is still positive, but less positive than for more credible 
advertised reference prices. Thus, even manufacturer-suggested retail prices that are 
substantially higher than the regular price increase sales. Finally, we analyze the interaction 
with price. The further away the manufacturer-suggested retail price from the regular price, 
meaning the less credible the reference price, the stronger the impact of the actual selling price 
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on sales. Hence, the actual selling price becomes a stronger signal for the customer. With 
respect to profit, increasing the distance between the manufacturer-suggested retail price and 
the regular price weakens the negative profit impact of a price reduction.  
In summary, Chapter 3 explores the performance of advertised reference prices and highlights 
the role of the actual price when advertised reference prices are not credible.  
Chapter 4 assesses the relation of price and online product reviews as a true online 
phenomenon. We focus on the established review dimensions of valence, volume, and variance 
and their price and sales relations. First, we find strong support for the moderation of price by 
product review dimensions. Dependent on the characteristics of the product review (valence, 
volume, and variance), the price impact on sales changes. For products with positive reviews, 
i.e., products with which customers are satisfied, price is less relevant, i.e., the price elasticity 
moves closer to zero. With an increasing number of reviews this relation strengthens: if more 
customers provide a positive review, price is a less strong driver. However, increasing variance 
among reviews counteracts the positive signal in positive valence, meaning that customers are 
less sure about the review and price becomes a stronger signal. Hence, in order to make price 
less relevant, many positive reviews with low variance are beneficial. Negative reviews, 
however, do not mirror these findings: for a high number of reviews with an average of one 
star the price elasticity is further away from zero when compared to lower volume. Thus, the 
more customers share their low satisfaction, the stronger the price impact. Moreover, for one-
star valence, variance is the strongest moderator. For one-star reviews, on which customers 
agree (low variance), price elasticity is the strongest. If customers disagree about one-star 
reviews, this seems to reduce risk strongly, leading to the lowest price elasticity. Therefore, 
products with one-star reviews might be niche products that some customers love and others 
hate. In addition to the moderating role this dissertation corroborates the existing literature with 
respect to the effect of valence, volume, and variance on sales: positive reviews (valence) 
increase sales, whereas negative reviews decrease them. Furthermore, with increasing volume, 
i.e., a growing number of reviews, sales increase. Variance also significantly impacts sales, so 
that more diverse reviews weaken sales. For a comprehensive assessment, the moderation of 
valence by volume and variance is included. Both interactions are relevant. We find a 
significant interaction of valence and volume: high volume strengthens the positive impact of 
high-star reviews on sales, while it also strengthens the negative impact of low-star reviews on 
sales, making it more negative. High variance decreases demand for products with positive 
valence and increases demand for products with negative reviews. The effects of product 
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review dimensions are small compared to price elasticity; however, they significantly moderate 
price. A profit assessment highlights that different price changes can balance the impact that 
changes in valence exert on the corporate objectives of sales, revenue, and profit. In sum, 
Chapter 4 provides insights that highly recommend retailers including product review 
information in pricing decisions and actively managing product reviews.  
The constellation of these three studies allows us to reach three overarching conclusions: first, 
regarding the profit impact of price decisions in an online environment; second, referring to 
the ubiquity of information in online retailing; and third, with respect to the moderation of price 
in online retailing. 
First, this combination of three studies adds to the very limited knowledge on profit impact for 
retailers and it is the first to provide insights into the profit impact of price changes for online 
retailers. Foremost, managers must acknowledge that price reductions have opposing impacts 
on different corporate objectives. In particular, price reductions are detrimental to profit, while 
they drive sales and revenue. The profit the online retailers generate when they reduce prices 
across all three studies is lower than the profit generated at regular prices. Four aspects drive 
profit for the retailer: sales, price, costs, and manufacturer allowances. Since the estimated 
price elasticities are negative across all three studies, the quantity sold increases with 
decreasing prices. At constant costs, the resulting relation of price and profit describes an 
inverted u-shape: at low price levels, where sales are high, a price reduction leads to a profit 
decrease. With a price reduction, sales do not increase strongly enough to balance the loss in 
profit margin. At higher price levels with lower sales, a price reduction would increase profit. 
Given this inverted u-shaped relation between profit and price, the price level at the retailer, in 
general, might not be set to generate highest profit but be too low. As in all three studies a price 
reduction reduces profit, the retailer seems to be on the ascending part of the inverted u-shaped 
profit-price relation. Thus, if the retailer increases price, price reductions from higher price 
levels are more likely beneficial for the profit impact. Manufacturer allowances are another 
factor influencing profit. Manufacturer allowances are additional funds provided by 
manufacturers for promoting their specific brands. Hence, in order to counteract the lost profit 
based on price reductions, increasing margin by additional manufacturer allowances during the 
promotional period would counteract the lost profit. As practice shows that retailers frequently 
allow price reductions, retailers might have strong incentives to focus on sales and revenue 
rather than profit. We further find that the impact is brand-specific, meaning that brand criteria 
can guide promotion decisions. Furthermore, both advertised reference prices and product 
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reviews offer promising avenues to decrease the loss in profit resulting from price reductions. 
Advertised reference prices have the potential to increase sales, although customers can easily 
search for alternative reference prices online. This, however, must be in line with legal 
regulations to avoid deception. Product reviews further provide a counteracting force, as they 
increase sales via different dimensions (valence, volume, variance). Hence, for an online 
retailer, steering promotions according to brand criteria, and providing advertised reverence 
prices and a product review platform for which they pursue an active review stimulation 
strategy can influence sales, revenue, and profit positively. 
Second, the unique constellation of the three studies reveals a comprehensive picture of the 
role of information in online retailing. Although customers can easily search for the best price, 
price reductions move demand between brands in one category, i.e., they induce brand 
switching. This is of specific importance to retailers, which aim at the category’s or shop’s 
sales, revenue, and profit. Thus, despite the high probability that a competitive brand is on 
promotion in some other online shop, and that the information is available and accessible for 
the customer, the retailer can steer demand among brands in his or her category. Similarly, 
although other, maybe more relevant, reference price information is readily available online, 
advertised reference prices are still valuable to the retailer. Finally, retailers can use the impact 
of information by providing a platform for product reviews. Product reviews have a significant 
impact on sales via different dimensions. Hence, the customer’s access to information online 
can even be guided by the retailer. 
Third, price has a substantial impact on sales online, which is reflected in significant negative 
price elasticities across all three chapters. Furthermore, the impact of price is manageable. Both 
advertised reference prices and information conveyed via product reviews moderate the impact 
of price on sales. On the one hand, the actual selling price becomes a stronger signal the further 
away the manufacturer-suggested retail price is from the regular price, and vice versa. On the 
other hand, more information in the form of many, positive, agreeing product reviews can 
reduce the impact of price. Additionally, we find that retailers should not underestimate the 
role of the regular price.  
The constellation of the three studies contributes to research on online pricing in retail 
environments and highlights the managerial importance of including the online environment in 
pricing decisions for practitioners. 
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5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
As with any research, this dissertation has several limitations,58 which offer opportunities for 
future research. We categorize these along the following four avenues.  
First, our data was collected from one pure online retailer, which raises questions about the 
generalizability of our findings to other retailers or industries. Therefore, the first avenue for 
future research relates to the transfer to different settings. Future research could enhance the 
academic discourse by combining data from several retailers and combining household and 
retailer data.  
The second avenue focuses on the impact of different cultures and categories to obtain a more 
granular understanding of the difference in online pricing across the retailer’s assortment and 
branches. Our data set comprises a wide variety of goods sold by one retailer. While we account 
for product heterogeneity, we do not explore category differences. Hence, future research could 
extend our findings by category moderation, e.g., whether durables should be managed 
differently than non-durables. Similarly, we analyze data from multiple countries, while we do 
not dive deeper into the cultural differences between those countries. Future research could 
include the country as moderator of price elasticities, advertised reference prices, and product 
reviews. This might be a fruitful avenue for future research since the uncertainty perceived in 
purchasing situations might differ across cultures.  
Third, although changing the price is a delicate topic for retailers, we were able to conduct a 
field experiment on advertised reference prices, which provided different insights into purchase 
processes than the analysis of laboratory and transaction data. Field experiments are time-
consuming and require effort in their administration, as well as corporate partners; however, 
they have the potential to substantially enhance insights into price reductions and product 
reviews. Therefore, the third avenue for future research highlights the application of different 
approaches and thereby follows Gneezy (2017) in calling for more field experiment.  
Our analyses offer results that could systematically differ between offline and online 
purchasing situations. Hence, we add evidence to the call by Bijmolt et al. (2005) for a meta-
analysis that analyzes whether price elasticities online are systematically different. Thus, the 
fourth avenue underlines the need for a meta-analysis on online price elasticities.  
 
58 This chapter concentrates on limitations and suggestions with a broader perspective on the entire dissertation, 
whereas more specific limitations are presented in the specific paragraphs of Chapters 2 to 4. 
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Thus, although this dissertation addresses relevant gaps in the existing literature, a multitude 
of questions on pricing in online retailing still need to be answered by future research. For 
researchers and practitioners, understanding the impact of pricing on different corporate 
objectives in online retailing continues to be of critical importance. 
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6.1 Appendix – Chapter 2 
 
Note: Each panel represents one country-category combination, and each line represents one brand. 
Figure 6.1: Heterogeneity Across Margins for Each Country-Category Combination 
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 Quantity Promo PI Promo PIt-IPF Cross PI Reg. Price Cat. Quantity 
Quantity 1.0000 -0.0070 0.0171 0.0416 -0.2596 0.7049 
Promo PI -0.0070 1.0000 0.0016 0.0013 -0.0328 0.0195 
Promo PIt-IPF 0.0171 0.0016 1.0000 -0.0162 0.0121 0.0217 
Cross PI 0.0416 0.0013 -0.0162 1.0000 0.0160 0.0464 
Regular Price -0.2596 -0.0328 0.0121 0.0160 1.0000 -0.1024 
Category Quantity 0.7049 0.0195 0.0217 0.0464 -0.1024 1.0000 
Table 6.1: Correlation Table: Demand Model59 
 
 
Quantity 
Impact 
Revenue 
Impact 
Profit 
Impact 
Brand 
Size 
Line 
Length 
Price 
Level 
Private 
label 
Price 
Range 
Promo 
Frequency 
Promo 
Intensity 
Quantity 
Impact 
1.0000 0.9058 -0.2325 0.5515 0.2930 -0.3158 0.0438 -0.0018 0.1380 0.0774 
Revenue 
Impact 
0.9058 1.0000 -0.1208 0.4754 0.2586 -0.2057 0.0498 0.0059 0.1202 0.0824 
Profit 
Impact 
-0.2325 -0.1208 1.0000 -0.4341 -0.4614 -0.0999 0.2016 0.2806 -0.1408 0.0306 
Brand Size 0.5515 0.4754 -0.4341 1.0000 0.4913 -0.2584 -0.0190 -0.1498 0.2405 0.0368 
Line Length 0.2930 0.2586 -0.4614 0.4913 1.0000 0.0574 -0.0287 -0.2561 0.4122 0.0669 
Price Level -0.3158 -0.2057 -0.0999 -0.2584 0.0574 1.0000 -0.2933 -0.0392 -0.2218 -0.1343 
Private 
label 
0.0438 0.0498 0.2016 -0.0190 -0.0287 -0.2933 1.0000 0.1118 0.1785 0.1502 
Price Range -0.0018 0.0059 0.2806 -0.1498 -0.2561 -0.0392 0.1118 1.0000 -0.1974 -0.0504 
Promo 
Frequency 
0.1380 0.1202 -0.1408 0.2405 0.4122 -0.2218 0.1785 -0.1974 1.0000 0.3769 
Promo 
Intensity 
0.0774 0.0824 0.0306 0.0368 0.0669 -0.1343 0.1502 -0.0504 0.3769 1.0000 
Table 6.2: Correlation Table: Correlates60 
 
  
 
59 PI = price index; all variables in logs. 
60 The correlation table displays the correlation of the standardized variables. 
6. Appendices 
 
141 
 
6.2 Appendix – Chapter 3 
 
Figure 6.2: Walmart Advertised Reference Prices61 
 
 
 
61 Retrieved from: https://www.walmart.com/browse/electronics/50-inch-tvs/3944_1060825_2489948_5472490? 
povid=106 0825+%7C+2018-04-30+%7C+Popular%20Categories%2050%20Inch%20TVs, January 9, 2019. 
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Figure 6.3: Amazon.com Advertised Reference Prices62 
 
62 Retrieved from: https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=node%3D172659&field-keywords=50+inch 
&rh=n%3 A172659%2Ck%3A50+inch, January 9, 2019. 
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Figure 6.4: Walmart List Price for Samsung UN50NU7100FXZA in January, 201963 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Amazon.com List Price for Samsung UN50NU7100FXZA in January, 201964 
 
63 Retrieved from: https://www.walmart.com/ip/SAMSUNG-50-Class-4K-2160P-Ultra-HD-Smart-LED-TV-
UN50NU7100-2018-Model/938766895, January 9, 2019. 
64 Retrieved from: https://www.amazon.com/Samsung-50NU7100-Flat-Smart-2018/dp/B079NH7LJQ/ref=sr_ 
1_5?s=tv&ie=UTF8&qid=1547043738&sr=1-5&keywords=50+inch, January 9, 2019. 
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Figure 6.6: Samsung.com List Price for Samsung UN50NU7100FXZA in January, 201965 
 
  
 
65 Retrieved from: https://www.samsung.com/us/televisions-home-theater/tvs/uhd-tvs/50--nu7100-smart-4k-uhd-
tv-un50 nu7100fxza/, January 9, 2019. 
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Figure 6.7: Historic Prices of Samsung UN50NU7100FXZA on Amazon.com66 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Samsung.com List Price for Samsung UN50NU7100FXZA in February, 201967 
 
66 Retrieved from: https://camelcamelcamel.com/Samsung-UN50NU7100-Flat-Smart-2018/product/B079NH7 
LJQ ?active=summary, February 18, 2019. 
67 Retrieved from: https://www.samsung.com/us/televisions-home-theater/tvs/uhd-tvs/50--nu7100-smart-4k-uhd-
tv-un50nu7100fxza/, February 18, 2019. 
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Figure 6.9: Walmart List Price for Samsung UN50NU7100FXZA in February, 201968 
 
 
68 Retrieved from: https://www.walmart.com/ip/SAMSUNG-50-Class-4K-2160P-Ultra-HD-Smart-LED-TV-
UN50NU7100-2018-Model/938766895, February 20, 2019. 
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Figure 6.10: Model a1 
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Figure 6.11: Model b1 
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Figure 6.12: Model c1 
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Figure 6.13: Model a2 
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Figure 6.14: Model b2 
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Figure 6.15: Model c2 
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6.3 Appendix – Chapter 4 
Scenario log(Price) log(Volume) Variance Valence log(Quantity) 
Price 
Elasticity 
Intercept 
1 -1.24 low -1.12 low -0.59 low 1 4.1667 -1.7592 1.9772 
2 0.00 mean -1.12 low -0.59 low 1 1.9772 -1.7592 1.9772 
3 1.24 high -1.12 low -0.59 low 1 -0.2123 -1.7592 1.9772 
4 -1.24 low 0.00 mean -0.59 low 1 4.1297 -1.7982 1.8917 
5 0.00 mean 0.00 mean -0.59 low 1 1.8917 -1.7982 1.8917 
6 1.24 high 0.00 mean -0.59 low 1 -0.3462 -1.7982 1.8917 
7 -1.24 low 1.12 high -0.59 low 1 4.0927 -1.8371 1.8063 
8 0.00 mean 1.12 high -0.59 low 1 1.8063 -1.8371 1.8063 
9 1.24 high 1.12 high -0.59 low 1 -0.4802 -1.8371 1.8063 
10 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.00 mean 1 3.8967 -1.5555 1.9608 
11 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.00 mean 1 1.9608 -1.5555 1.9608 
12 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.00 mean 1 0.0248 -1.5555 1.9608 
13 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 1 3.8597 -1.5945 1.8753 
14 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 1 1.8753 -1.5945 1.8753 
15 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 1 -0.1092 -1.5945 1.8753 
16 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.00 mean 1 3.8227 -1.6334 1.7898 
17 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.00 mean 1 1.7898 -1.6334 1.7898 
18 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.00 mean 1 -0.2431 -1.6334 1.7898 
19 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.59 high 1 3.6267 -1.3518 1.9443 
20 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.59 high 1 1.9443 -1.3518 1.9443 
21 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.59 high 1 0.2618 -1.3518 1.9443 
22 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.59 high 1 3.5897 -1.3908 1.8588 
23 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.59 high 1 1.8588 -1.3908 1.8588 
24 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.59 high 1 0.1279 -1.3908 1.8588 
25 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.59 high 1 3.5527 -1.4297 1.7734 
26 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.59 high 1 1.7734 -1.4297 1.7734 
27 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.59 high 1 -0.0060 -1.4297 1.7734 
28 -1.24 low -1.12 low -0.59 low 2 4.1889 -1.7022 2.0704 
47 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.59 high 2 2.0743 -1.7022 2.0743 
30 1.24 high -1.12 low -0.59 low 2 -0.0481 -1.7022 2.0704 
31 -1.24 low 0.00 mean -0.59 low 2 4.1403 -1.6784 2.0514 
38 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.00 mean 2 2.0724 -1.7022 2.0724 
33 1.24 high 0.00 mean -0.59 low 2 -0.0375 -1.6784 2.0514 
34 -1.24 low 1.12 high -0.59 low 2 4.0916 -1.6546 2.0324 
29 0.00 mean -1.12 low -0.59 low 2 2.0704 -1.7022 2.0704 
36 1.24 high 1.12 high -0.59 low 2 -0.0269 -1.6546 2.0324 
37 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.00 mean 2 4.1908 -1.7022 2.0724 
50 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.59 high 2 2.0553 -1.6784 2.0553 
39 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.00 mean 2 -0.0461 -1.7022 2.0724 
40 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 2 4.1422 -1.6784 2.0533 
41 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 2 2.0533 -1.6784 2.0533 
42 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 2 -0.0355 -1.6784 2.0533 
43 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.00 mean 2 4.0936 -1.6546 2.0343 
32 0.00 mean 0.00 mean -0.59 low 2 2.0514 -1.6784 2.0514 
45 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.00 mean 2 -0.0249 -1.6546 2.0343 
46 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.59 high 2 4.1928 -1.7022 2.0743 
53 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.59 high 2 2.0363 -1.6546 2.0363 
48 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.59 high 2 -0.0442 -1.7022 2.0743 
49 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.59 high 2 4.1442 -1.6784 2.0553 
44 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.00 mean 2 2.0343 -1.6546 2.0343 
51 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.59 high 2 -0.0336 -1.6784 2.0553 
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Scenario log(Price) log(Volume) Variance Valence log(Quantity) 
Price 
Elasticity 
Intercept 
52 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.59 high 2 4.0955 -1.6546 2.0363 
35 0.00 mean 1.12 high -0.59 low 2 2.0324 -1.6546 2.0324 
54 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.59 high 2 -0.0230 -1.6546 2.0363 
55 -1.24 low -1.12 low -0.59 low 3 4.2516 -1.7022 2.1332 
56 0.00 mean -1.12 low -0.59 low 3 2.1332 -1.7022 2.1332 
57 1.24 high -1.12 low -0.59 low 3 0.0147 -1.7022 2.1332 
58 -1.24 low 0.00 mean -0.59 low 3 4.2458 -1.6784 2.1569 
59 0.00 mean 0.00 mean -0.59 low 3 2.1569 -1.6784 2.1569 
60 1.24 high 0.00 mean -0.59 low 3 0.0681 -1.6784 2.1569 
61 -1.24 low 1.12 high -0.59 low 3 4.2400 -1.6546 2.1807 
62 0.00 mean 1.12 high -0.59 low 3 2.1807 -1.6546 2.1807 
63 1.24 high 1.12 high -0.59 low 3 0.1215 -1.6546 2.1807 
64 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.00 mean 3 4.2352 -1.7022 2.1167 
65 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.00 mean 3 2.1167 -1.7022 2.1167 
66 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.00 mean 3 -0.0018 -1.7022 2.1167 
67 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 3 4.2294 -1.6784 2.1405 
68 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 3 2.1405 -1.6784 2.1405 
69 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 3 0.0516 -1.6784 2.1405 
70 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.00 mean 3 4.2235 -1.6546 2.1643 
71 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.00 mean 3 2.1643 -1.6546 2.1643 
72 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.00 mean 3 0.1050 -1.6546 2.1643 
73 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.59 high 3 4.2187 -1.7022 2.1002 
74 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.59 high 3 2.1002 -1.7022 2.1002 
75 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.59 high 3 -0.0182 -1.7022 2.1002 
76 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.59 high 3 4.2129 -1.6784 2.1240 
77 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.59 high 3 2.1240 -1.6784 2.1240 
78 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.59 high 3 0.0352 -1.6784 2.1240 
79 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.59 high 3 4.2071 -1.6546 2.1478 
80 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.59 high 3 2.1478 -1.6546 2.1478 
81 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.59 high 3 0.0885 -1.6546 2.1478 
82 -1.24 low -1.12 low -0.59 low 4 4.3149 -1.7018 2.1969 
83 0.00 mean -1.12 low -0.59 low 4 2.1969 -1.7018 2.1969 
84 1.24 high -1.12 low -0.59 low 4 0.0788 -1.7018 2.1969 
85 -1.24 low 0.00 mean -0.59 low 4 4.3545 -1.6625 2.2854 
86 0.00 mean 0.00 mean -0.59 low 4 2.2854 -1.6625 2.2854 
87 1.24 high 0.00 mean -0.59 low 4 0.2163 -1.6625 2.2854 
88 -1.24 low 1.12 high -0.59 low 4 4.3940 -1.6231 2.3740 
89 0.00 mean 1.12 high -0.59 low 4 2.3740 -1.6231 2.3740 
90 1.24 high 1.12 high -0.59 low 4 0.3539 -1.6231 2.3740 
91 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.00 mean 4 4.2856 -1.7072 2.1609 
92 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.00 mean 4 2.1609 -1.7072 2.1609 
93 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.00 mean 4 0.0361 -1.7072 2.1609 
94 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 4 4.3251 -1.6678 2.2494 
95 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 4 2.2494 -1.6678 2.2494 
96 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 4 0.1737 -1.6678 2.2494 
97 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.00 mean 4 4.3647 -1.6284 2.3380 
98 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.00 mean 4 2.3380 -1.6284 2.3380 
99 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.00 mean 4 0.3112 -1.6284 2.3380 
100 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.59 high 4 4.2562 -1.7125 2.1249 
101 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.59 high 4 2.1249 -1.7125 2.1249 
102 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.59 high 4 -0.0065 -1.7125 2.1249 
103 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.59 high 4 4.2958 -1.6731 2.2134 
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Scenario log(Price) log(Volume) Variance Valence log(Quantity) 
Price 
Elasticity 
Intercept 
104 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.59 high 4 2.2134 -1.6731 2.2134 
105 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.59 high 4 0.1310 -1.6731 2.2134 
106 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.59 high 4 4.3353 -1.6338 2.3019 
107 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.59 high 4 2.3019 -1.6338 2.3019 
108 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.59 high 4 0.2686 -1.6338 2.3019 
109 -1.24 low -1.12 low -0.59 low 5 4.2947 -1.6970 2.1827 
110 0.00 mean -1.12 low -0.59 low 5 2.1827 -1.6970 2.1827 
111 1.24 high -1.12 low -0.59 low 5 0.0707 -1.6970 2.1827 
112 -1.24 low 0.00 mean -0.59 low 5 4.3862 -1.6590 2.3214 
113 0.00 mean 0.00 mean -0.59 low 5 2.3214 -1.6590 2.3214 
114 1.24 high 0.00 mean -0.59 low 5 0.2566 -1.6590 2.3214 
115 -1.24 low 1.12 high -0.59 low 5 4.4777 -1.6211 2.4601 
116 0.00 mean 1.12 high -0.59 low 5 2.4601 -1.6211 2.4601 
117 1.24 high 1.12 high -0.59 low 5 0.4426 -1.6211 2.4601 
118 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.00 mean 5 4.2647 -1.7025 2.1459 
119 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.00 mean 5 2.1459 -1.7025 2.1459 
120 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.00 mean 5 0.0270 -1.7025 2.1459 
121 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 5 4.3563 -1.6646 2.2846 
122 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 5 2.2846 -1.6646 2.2846 
123 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 5 0.2129 -1.6646 2.2846 
124 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.00 mean 5 4.4478 -1.6266 2.4233 
125 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.00 mean 5 2.4233 -1.6266 2.4233 
126 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.00 mean 5 0.3989 -1.6266 2.4233 
127 -1.24 low -1.12 low 0.59 high 5 4.2348 -1.7080 2.1090 
128 0.00 mean -1.12 low 0.59 high 5 2.1090 -1.7080 2.1090 
129 1.24 high -1.12 low 0.59 high 5 -0.0167 -1.7080 2.1090 
130 -1.24 low 0.00 mean 0.59 high 5 4.3263 -1.6701 2.2478 
131 0.00 mean 0.00 mean 0.59 high 5 2.2478 -1.6701 2.2478 
132 1.24 high 0.00 mean 0.59 high 5 0.1692 -1.6701 2.2478 
133 -1.24 low 1.12 high 0.59 high 5 4.4178 -1.6321 2.3865 
134 0.00 mean 1.12 high 0.59 high 5 2.3865 -1.6321 2.3865 
135 1.24 high 1.12 high 0.59 high 5 0.3551 -1.6321 2.3865 
Table 6.3: Scenarios for Visualization of Results 
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